Heck also applies to claims challenging the calculation of a sentence or release date and challenges regarding time credits. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997) (holding that claim related to the revocation of good-time credits in a prison disciplinary proceeding is not cognizable under § 1983 because success on the claim would “necessarily” imply the invalidity of continued imprisonment); Whitehurst v. Jones, 278 Fed.Appx. 362, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding that claims challenging the denial of time credits, which unlawfully extend the period of incarceration, directly implicate the duration of a prisoner's confinement and are barred by Heck); cf. Hernandez v. Tisdale, No. 4:12-CV-3387, 2015 WL 1220316, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2015) (finding that claims challenging the denial of time credits or the calculation of release dates are “subject to Heck's favorable-termination requirement”). Here, a ruling in Thornton's favor on the claims pled would necessarily implicate the duration of his confinement and lead to an earlier release from TDCJ custody, as Thornton's complaint is undergirded by his contention that TDCJ is holding him beyond his alleged “presumptive February 12, 2024 discharge date” in Case No. F1970256.
And when, like here, a prisoner brings a Bivens action challenging "the duration of his confinement," he "must exhaust his remedies available to him through habeas corpus before pursuing his Bivens claims." Whitehurst v. Jones, 278 F. App'x 362, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Cook v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Dep't, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994)). Relatedly, Holloway's Bivens action implicates Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Likewise, the BOP's refusal to award prior custody credits or commence a sentence at a prior date under § 3585(a), (b), cannot form the basis for a civil rights action until after the BOP's decision is invalidated through a proper habeas action. Cf. Medrano-Arzate v. United States, No. 4: 10-CV-0720, 2010 WL 4321541, at *3-4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2010); See also Whitehurst v. Jones, 278 F. App'x 362, 363-64 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that Bivens action for detaining prisoner beyond release date as calculated by prisoner was premature until prisoner obtained habeas relief invalidating BOP's sentence calculations). Because Baker has not previously obtained a judicial determination that the BOP's calculations are improper, the Court must dismiss his claims as prematurely filed.
And when, like here, a prisoner brings a Bivens action challenging "the duration of his confinement," he "must exhaust his remedies available to him through habeas corpus before pursuing his Bivens claims." Whitehurst v. Jones, 278 F. App'x 362, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Cook v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Dep't, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The core issue in determining whether a prisoner must pursue habeas corpus relief rather than a civil rights action is to determine whether the prisoner challenges the 'fact or duration' of his confinement or merely the rules, customs, and procedures affecting 'conditions' of confinement."); Spina v. Aaron, 821 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987)). Relatedly, Orlando's Bivens action implicates Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
See Ford v. Foti, 2001 WL 845461, *1 n.1 (E.D. La. July 25, 2001) (citing Gay v. Texas Dept. of Corr., 117 F.3d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 1997)) (finding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1997 "attaches at the time of filing and is not changed by the fact that inmate is later released"). Kelly's claim that he should recover monetary damages for an allegedly unlawful period of incarceration because of an error in the calculation of his trusty time and meritorious earned time, see Compl. [1] at 4, Pl.'s Resp. [14] at 1, cannot be pursued as a § 1983 civil action until he satisfies the conditions set out in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), see Whitehurst v. Jones, 278 F. App'x 362, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that Heck applies to claims "that the denial of time credits unlawfully extended [a prisoner's] detention"). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for monetary damages which essentially challenges a Plaintiff's conviction or imprisonment is not cognizable until his conviction or alleged unconstitutional imprisonment has been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254."
(12-2080, Rec. Doc. 36, p. 4) (quoting Whitehurst v. Jones, 278 F. App'x 362, 363 (5th Cir. 2008)). Additionally, a Bivens claim in Louisiana has a one-year statute of limitations, which period commences "when the aggrieved party has either knowledge of the violation or notice of facts in which the exercise of due diligence would have led to actual knowledge thereof."
Abate v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 993 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1993). When a Bivens action implies the invalidity of an underlying criminal conviction, "[a]ccording to the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), [a defendant] cannot bring his Bivens action for damages until his conviction or sentence has been 'reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid . . . or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.'" Whitehurst v. Jones, 278 F. App'x 362, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87).
In 2006 Whitehurst brought suit seeking credit for time served in both the Southern and the Western Districts of Texas. See Whitehurst v. Jones, 278 Fed. Appx. 362 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (appeal from dismissal of suit brought in the Southern District of Texas, Case Number 2:06-CV-150), and Whitehurst v. Valdez, 290 Fed. Appx. 764 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (appeal from dismissal of suit brought in the Western District of Texas, Case Number 1:06-CV-535). In Whitehurst v. Valdez, Whitehurst brought suit against