Opinion
Civil Action CV-20-171
03-23-2021
KATHRYN WHITEHEAD, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MAINE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, LONG CREEK YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER, Defendants
Plaintiff-Danielle Quinlan, Esq. Defendant-Kelly Morrell, AAG.
Plaintiff-Danielle Quinlan, Esq. Defendant-Kelly Morrell, AAG.
ORDER
Mary Gay Kennedy, Justice, Superior Court.
Before the court is Plaintiff, Kathryn Whitehead's/ Motion for Leave to Amend. For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion is granted.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on April 21, 2020. Pursuant to the court's Scheduling Order, Plaintiff had four months from July 8, 2020 to amend her Complaint. Plaintiff missed the deadline and filed her Motion to Amend on January 19, 2021. She asserts that the ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic caused delays in the discovery process, Despite the parties' prior agreements that there was good cause to amend the court's Scheduling Order for dates relating to discovery, motions, and witness and exhibit lists, Defendants now oppose Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and argue that Plaintiff must demonstrate "excusable neglect" before the Motion may be granted. Defendants do not suggest that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause to amend the Complaint, nor do they allege that they will suffer prejudice if the Motion is granted.
II. Legal Standard
"Once a responsive pleading is served, a party may amend the pleading 'by leave of court/ which 'shall be freely given when justice so requires.'" Paul v. Town of Liberty, 2016 ME 173, ¶ 9, 151 A.3d 924; quoting M.R. Civ. P. 15(a). "Undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, or futility of amendment are grounds for denying a motion to amend/' Id. (quotation marks omitted). "A Rule 15 motion for leave to amend is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Glynn v. City of Portland, 640 A.2d 1065, 1067 (Me. 1994).
As noted above, Defendants argue that the Plaintiff is required to show excusable neglect before she may be allowed to amend her Complaint because the Motion to Amend was filed outside the time permitted by this court's standard Scheduling Order. The Defendant cites M.R. Civ. P. 6(b) that provides: "when ... a notice is given . by order of court [that] an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified amount of time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion" permit the act to be completed after the expiration of the time allowed if "the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect[.]" However, M.R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1), which governs amendments to a court's scheduling order, allows for amendments to the scheduling order "for good cause[.]" The parties disagree over which standard applies in this case.
III. Discussion
Superior Court precedent, provides that: "a motion to amend, normally subject to a very low threshold, ... which requires modification of a scheduling order, will be held to the M.R. Civ. P. 16 standard of 'good cause.'" First Tracks Invs., LLC v. Sunrise Schoolhouse, LLC, 2011 ME. Super. LEXIS 143, *11. In Sunrise Schoolhouse, the court observed that "[precedent is clear and numerous that a motion to amend made in good faith will be liberally granted" in the first instance. Id. at *10. Indeed, technicalities regarding timing alone do not present the sort of "undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, or futility of argument" that are typically grounds for denying a motion to amend. Town of Liberty, 2016 ME 173, ¶ 9, 151 A.3d 924.
In light of the forgoing, there appears little reason to depart from the longstanding precedent that Rule 15 be applied liberally, particularly when there is no allegation of undue prejudice or delay. See Bangor Motor Co. v. Chapman, 452 A.2d 389, 392 (Me. 1982). That said, because Plaintiffs Motion to Amend was filed after the time allowed by the Scheduling Order, it is subject to a higher standard of scrutiny. The scrutiny to be imposed, however, is good cause and not excusable neglect.
In this case, the parties have already agreed that there was good cause to amend the Scheduling Order to add sixty days to the Order's deadlines regarding: completion of discovery; witness and exhibit lists; and filing of motions. (Joint Mot. to Amend. Scheduling Order, ¶ 6.) Additionally, Plaintiff informed Defendants on December 8, 2020, that she intended to amend her Complaint to add additional causes of action based upon information obtained through discovery. As a result, the parties' agreed to leave certain depositions open in anticipation of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff further alleges that the Amended Complaint will not involve any significant changes to discovery requirements and that Defendants will not be prejudiced if the Complaint is Amended; and, of particular note, Defendants do not allege they will suffer any undue delay or prejudice if Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is granted.
Given Maine's strong preference to decide cases on the merits, and the fact that Defendants will not be prejudiced if the Motion is granted, the court finds there is good cause to allow the Plaintiff to amend her Complaint in this matter.
IV. Conclusion
It has long been established that parties "should not be precluded by technicalities of pleading from presenting [a] claim or defense on its merits unless the pleadings have misled the opposing party to [their] prejudice." Bangor Motor Co., 452 A.2d at 392. Because there is no allegation that the Amended Complaint will cause undue prejudice or delay, the court finds good cause for the Plaintiff to amend her Complaint under the circumstances presented.
Accordingly, the entry is:
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint shall be deemed to have been filed upon entry of this Motion.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).