Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:03-CV-0956-R
March 24, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Now before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (filed July 1, 2003). Because all Defendants, save Chevron USA, Inc. ("Chevron"), have been dismissed from this case, this Court addresses the motion at bar with regard to only Chevron.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's Original Complaint (filed May 7, 2003) seeks relief for racial discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination under Title II of the Civil Rights of 1964 ("Title VII"). Plaintiff further asserts an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and wrongful termination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"). Defendant asks that the court dismiss Plaintiff's § 1981, TCHRA, and constitutional claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant moves to dismiss on two grounds: certain of Plaintiff s claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations; and, Plaintiff s equal protection claim fails because Defendant's actions were not "state actions."
Defendants' Motion as filed includes a third basis for dismissing Plaintiff s claims: noncorporate Defendants fail to state claims because none are Plaintiff's "employer." Because noncorporate Defendants have since been dismissed, and Chevron is the only remaining Defendant in this case, this Court will address Defendant's Motion only as it relates to Chevron.
Chevron hired Whitehead on August 10, 1986. After sustaining an on-the-job injury and being placed on indefinite suspension beginning January 20, 2000, Whitehead was terminated on April 9, 2000. In February of 2000, Whitehead filed a charge of discrimination based upon race, retaliation, and wrongful termination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Texas Commission on Human Rights ("TCHR"). The EEOC issued Whitehead a right-to-sue letter on February 7, 2003 — three years after Whitehead filed the complaint. On May 7, 2003, Whitehead filed the instant suit.
Defendant rightfully points out that Plaintiff alleges to have filed charges with the EEOC and THCR prior to his termination and offers that Plaintiff's charge was filed in January 2001. For the purposes of this motion, this Court accepts Plaintiff's version of the facts: Whitehead filed his EEOC and THCR complaints in February 2000 and was terminated April 9, 2000.
II. ANALYSIS
In considering this motion, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to Whitehead. See Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). "[A] claim may not be dismissed unless it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994).
A. Plaintiff's Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and TCHRA
Chevron urges that Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the TCHRA are barred by the relevant two-year statutes of limitations.
Claims brought under § 1981 are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988). Despite Plaintiff's urging to the contrary, the Texas "limitations period for personal injury torts is the most appropriate" for all § 1981 claims. Id. Plaintiff also argues that the EEOC's failure to promptly — or even timely — issue Whitehead a right-to-sue letter should preclude the enforcement of a two-year statute of limitations. Unfortunately for this Plaintiff, § 1981 provides a right of action separate and independent from rights under Title VII. See Johnson v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975). As a result, Plaintiff "could have filed his § 1981 action at any time after his cause of action accrued." Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim under § 1981 is time barred.
Under the TCHRA, the complainant must file a complaint with the TCHR within 180 days of alleged discriminatory act. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.202(a). Whitehead complied with this requirement. If the TCHR dismisses the complaint, or has not filed suit or negotiated a conciliation agreement within 180 days, it must notify the complainant in writing. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.208; Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co., 143 F. Supp.2d 743, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2001). Once the complainant receives notice of his right to sue, he has 60 days to file suit against the respondent. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.254. Plaintiff has plead no facts to indicate whether or not he received a letter notice of his right to file a civil action from the TCHR. Regardless, "a civil action must be brought within two years after the filing of the complaint with the Commission." Lottinger, 143 F. Supp.2d at 753 (citing Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.256). Plaintiff filed suit on May 7, 2003, more than two years after filing his complaint in February 2000. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with regard to Plaintiff's TCHRA and § 1981 claims.
B. Plaintiff's Equal Protection Claim
Next, Chevron argues that Whitehead's equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to support a finding that Chevron's action were "state action." The Fourteenth Amendment "protects liberty and property interests only against invasion by the state." Bass v. Parkwood Hospital, 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff's claim on Fourteenth Amendments grounds is DISMISSED.