In fact, this Court has found dozens of cases from the Idaho appellate courts that rely on this rule. See, e.g., KEB Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 101 P.3d 690, 698 (Idaho 2004); McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 157 (Idaho 1999); Whitehawk v. State, 804 P.2d 341, 343 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) ("It is a well-settled rule that constitutional issues are waived, if raised for the first time on appeal."). Because the Idaho Court of Appeals declined to consider Claim 10 on an adequate and independent state procedural ground, that claim is procedurally defaulted.

Moreover, Cowan continues, he did raise due process claims in his prior petitions for review. Cowan also makes much of the fact that the Board cites to Roell v. Boise City, 134 Idaho 214, 999 P.2d 251 (2000), and Whitehawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 804 P.2d 341 (Ct.App. 1991), to support its contention that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived. He argues that these cases are factually distinguishable and should not apply to the current situation because they deal with the failure to raise an issue at trial and then attempt to present that issue before the appellate court. However, these are distinctions without a difference for purposes of determining waiver.

This Court will not consider issues on appeal that are not argued or supported by citation of authority in an appellate brief. Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415, 418 n.1, 162 P.3d 794, 797 n.1 (Ct. App. 2007); Whitehawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 170, 804 P.2d 341, 343 (Ct. App. 1991). See State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983); State v. Carper, 116 Idaho 77, 78, 773 P.2d 1164, 1165 (Ct. App. 1989); Galindo v. Hibbard, 106 Idaho 302, 304, 678 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1984).

We decline to address this argument, however, because Smith did not raise this issue either in the proceedings before the magistrate or on his intermediate appeal to the district court. See State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488, 490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992); Whitehawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 170, 804 P.2d 341, 343 (Ct.App. 1991); Gordon v. Noble, 109 Idaho 1048, 1052, 712 P.2d 749, 753 (Ct.App. 1986). In summary we conclude that the magistrate properly rejected Smith's contention that the Alco-Sensor III test was not administered in compliance with Department standards and his assertion that the procedure was unreliable because there was not a one-hour interval between the two tests.

Constitutional issues generally will not be considered by an appellate court if raised for the first time on appeal. State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968 (1995). Failure to raise such an issue below is a waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal. Whitehawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 170, 804 P.2d 341, 343 (Ct.App. 1991). One exception to this rule, however, allows for consideration of the issue if the court below committed a "fundamental error."

Constitutional issues generally will not be considered by an appellate court if raised for the first time on appeal. State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968 (1995). Failure to raise such an issue below is a waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal. Whitehawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 170, 804 P.2d 341, 343 (Ct.App. 1991); see also State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992); Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991). Fox failed to raise this matter before the trial court through any motion to dismiss or other pretrial procedure.

Neither of these issues was raised before the trial court. It is well established that Idaho appellate courts will not consider issues that are presented for the first time on appeal. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991); State v. Dunlap, 123 Idaho 396, 399, 848 P.2d 454, 457 (Ct.App. 1993); Whitehawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 804 P.2d 341 (Ct.App. 1991). In addition, a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea waives many rights which otherwise could have been asserted at trial, including the right of a defendant to challenge the admissibility of evidence upon which the State might have relied.

The State correctly points out that this basis for avoiding the statute of limitation bar, predicated on Browning, was not raised by Bell until this appeal. The district court was not asked by Bell to consider the effect of Browning on the statute of limitation defense. It is a fundamental tenet of appellate review that issues which are raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488, 490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992); State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 828 P.2d 871 (1992); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908, 112 S.Ct. 1268, 117 L.Ed.2d 495 (1992); Whitehawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 804 P.2d 341 (Ct.App. 1991). Even assuming the issue is properly before us, however, Bell has not demonstrated, at least with respect to his own alleged grounds for relief, that he lacked a right of action prior to the federal court's decision in Browning.

In the trial proceedings, Carl did not seek review of the gift of money from Roger to Belinda or whether Roger possessed a community property interest either in the loan proceeds reflected by the promissory note or in the real property when it was purchased by Belinda. Accordingly, we will not address those possibilities on this appeal. Matter of Estate of Reinwald, 122 Idaho 401, 834 P.2d 1317 (1992); Whitehawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 170, 804 P.2d 341, 343 (Ct.App. 1991). Carl contends that the trial court's decision should be set aside because: (1) a debtor's transfer of an asset for no consideration is presumed fraudulent when he reasonably should have believed he would incur debts beyond his ability to pay them when they became due, I.C. § 55-913(1)(b)2; (2) a debtor's transfer of an asset to an insider for an antecedent debt when the debtor was insolvent is presumed fraudulent, I.C. § 55-914(2); and (3) a person becomes the owner of an equitable interest in the property when part or all of the property's purchase price is paid by this individual, Erb v. Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328, 824 P.2d 903 (Ct.App. 1992).

These include allegations that his trial counsel failed to: (1) seek a change of venue for the trial; (2) visit the scene of the alleged crime; and (3) adequately prepare witnesses. Because these issues were not presented in Milton's pleadings, they were not addressed by the district court, and this Court will not entertain them on appeal. See State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488, 490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992); Whitehawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 170, 804 P.2d 341, 343 (Ct.App. 1991). III.CONCLUSION