(3 Couch on Insurance sec. 24:72, at 160 (2d ed. 1960).) As between a mortgagor and mortgagee, "`* * * the insurance money, in case of the destruction of the property, represents the property itself * * *.'" ( White v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 588, 594, 316 N.E.2d 131, 136, citing Grange Mill Co. v. Western Assurance Co. (1886), 118 Ill. 396, 399, 9 N.E. 274, 275.) The purpose of insurance protecting the mortgagee's interest is to secure payment of the balance of the debt evidenced by the mortgage note in the event that the building should be damaged or destroyed. ( 21 Ill. App.3d 588, 595, 316 N.E.2d 131, 137.
Accordingly, we believe equitable conversion is applicable and that the defendant Boalbey is the equitable owner of the real estate while holding the purchase money, including the fire insurance proceeds, as trustee for the plaintiff. We find support for our position in White v. United States Fidelity Casualty Co. (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 588, 316 N.E.2d 131, where a similar dispute arose concerning proceeds from insurance in an installment land sale situation with similar contract language. The court there very clearly stated, "[a]s a general proposition it seems well established that where the purchaser under an installment contract for the sale of realty agrees to insure the property against loss for the benefit of the seller, the seller is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance at least to the extent of his interest in the property."
• 2, 3 As a general rule where the buyer under an instalment contract for the sale of realty agrees to insure the property against casualty loss for the benefit of the seller, the seller is entitled to the insurance proceeds to the extent of his interest in the insured property. ( International Insurance Co. v. Melrose Park National Bank (1986), 145 Ill. App.3d 286, 290, 495 N.E.2d 1197, 1199; Kindred v. Boalbey (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 37, 40, 391 N.E.2d 236; White v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 588, 594, 316 N.E.2d 131.) We find this rule to be applicable here.
These cases are inapposite because the policy at issue here already contains a standard mortgage clause and names the mortgagee as payee. E. g., White v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 21 Ill.App.3d 588, 316 N.E.2d 131 (1st Dist. 1974); Weiner v. Sentinel Fire Ins. Co., 87 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1937). The first problem with plaintiff's theory is that the record at best, contains only evidence of Lumpkin's intent and no evidence of defendant's intent.
"Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Wilborn (1973), 291 Ala. 193, 198, 279 So.2d 460, 463, citing 5A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 3403, at 301-3[sic] (1970); accord, White v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 588, 316 N.E.2d 131.Great-West Life Assurance Co. v. General Accident Fire Life Assurance Corp., 116 Ill. App.3d 921, 72 Ill.Dec. 297, 452 N.E.2d 550, 556-57 (Ill. App.Ct. 1983) (some brackets and emphases in original and some added).
The Second Circuit decision in Bivona was preceded by its decision in United States v. White, 486 F.2d 204 (2nd Cir. 1973) cert. den. White v. United States, 415 U.S. 980, 94 S.Ct. 1569, 39 L.Ed.2d 876 (1974). In White, the Court noted that in at least six cases in the preceding six months, appellants had included allegations of prosecutorial misconduct at trial among their claims of error on appeal.
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. White v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 21 Ill. App.3d 588, 316 N.E.2d 131 (1974). When deciding the motion, the trial court should construe all of the evidence before it strictly against the movant.
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. White v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 21 Ill. App.3d 588, 592 (1974). Summary judgment motions permit the trial court to provide an expedient means of resolution where no genuine issue of material fact exists.
While this is not a frequently litigated issue, at least one state follows this latter interpretation. White v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 588, 316 N.E.2d 131. To adopt Property Owners' position would be to adhere slavishly to the form of the rule that contract sellers are analogous to mortgagees while ignoring the purpose of that rule, which is to provide contract sellers with protection of their interests in insurance proceeds and the interests those proceeds represent.
The interest of a seller under an installment agreement is analogous to that of a mortgagee. ( White v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 588, 594-95, 316 N.E.2d 131, 136, quoting Grange Mill Co. v. Western Assurance Co. (1886), 118 Ill. 396, 399-400, 9 N.E. 274, 275.) The mortgagee's insurable interest is prima facie the value mortgaged, and extends only to the amount of the debt, not exceeding the value of the mortgaged property.