Opinion
No. 04 CV 0602 (SJ).
February 16, 2005
EARL B. WHITE, Brooklyn, NY, Plaintiff Pro Se.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, Steven Michael Warshawsky, Brooklyn, NY, Attorney for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Earl B. White ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Defendant United States Postal Service ("Defendant"), alleging violations of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., grounded in Defendant's use and disclosure of records contained in Plaintiff's workers' compensation file. Presently before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata due to the fact that Plaintiff signed a settlement agreement with Defendant releasing Defendant from liability. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.
Defendant also offers other grounds for dismissal; however, as the Court finds that dismissal is warranted on the basis ofres judicata it is not necessary to reach the remaining issues.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On a motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations set out in plaintiff's complaint, draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and construe the complaint liberally." Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 2001). The court should not dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
In general a court may not look beyond the pleadings in deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). However, "[t]he mandate that a pro se plaintiff's complaint be construed liberally makes it appropriate for the Court to consider the factual allegations in the plaintiff's opposition materials to supplement the allegations in the complaint." Baez v. Parks, No. 02 Civ. 5821 PKC DF, 2004 WL 1052779, *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2004). This Court may also consider "documents attached to the pleadings or in documents incorporated by reference." Gregory, 243 F.3d at 691. The following summary of the facts is therefore based upon Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and the exhibits attached to these pleadings, accepting all facts alleged therein as true.
BACKGROUND
This action stems from Defendant's use and disclosure of certain of Plaintiff's workers' compensation records in the course of a disciplinary action against Plaintiff. The disciplinary action was in regards to Plaintiff's alleged falsification of said records. In brief, Plaintiff was charged with submitting a fraudulent Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation ("Form CA-2") in which he explained his absence from work and requested compensation for illness, asserting that he had tested positive for tuberculosis and had been told by a doctor that he was unable to work. (Compl. Exs. 1-2.) Plaintiff subsequently admitted to inaccuracies and mistakes in his original statements, and further investigation demonstrated that Plaintiff had not tested positive for tuberculosis, nor had he been told that he should not return to work. (Id.)
Plaintiff attempted to excuse these inaccuracies by claiming that the paperwork had been filled out by his union representative and he had signed the form when it was still blank, but Defendant chose not to accept the excuse and decided to terminate Plaintiff's employment, as stated in a Letter of Decision issued to Plaintiff on October 17, 2002. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed his proposed removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), but before his appeal was decided, he entered into a settlement agreement with Defendant, which is discussed in further detail below. Subsequent to entering into the settlement agreement, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant.
DISCUSSION
The settlement agreement entered into by the parties provided that Plaintiff would not be removed from his job, but rather would receive a four-month suspension without pay. (Mot. Dismiss Ex. 14.) In exchange, Plaintiff agreed to release Defendant "from any and all claims which [Plaintiff] now has, might have, or might claim at this time against [Defendant] . . . with respect to the Letter of Decision." (Id.) The settlement agreement states that it was intended to "settle, compromise and resolve fully and completely" the disciplinary action against Plaintiff. (Id.) It further states that "[t]he parties agree that no monetary payments of any kind will be made to [Plaintiff] with regards to the settlement of this case[.]" (Id.) Plaintiff averred in the agreement that he "underst[ood] the meaning and intent of this Settlement Agreement, including its final and binding effect." (Id.)
The settlement agreement was not part of Plaintiff's pleadings, but it is discussed in Plaintiff's opposition and the Court therefore finds that it is incorporated by reference and thus can be considered in the context of a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Gregory, 243 F.3d at 691.
The present action is clearly a claim that arises in relation to the Letter of Decision, in that Plaintiff's central contention is that the investigation giving rise to his proposed termination was in violation of the Privacy Act. Additionally, Plaintiff states that the "adverse effect" he suffered as a consequence of the Privacy Act violations was the four-month suspension provided for in the settlement agreement. (Am. Compl. at 3.) It is clear, therefore, that the action falls within the realm of "claims which [Plaintiff] now has, might have, or might claim at this time against [Defendant] . . . with respect to the Letter of Decision." (Mot. Dismiss Ex. 14.)
As the Supreme Court has long recognized, "public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties." Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931). Under the doctrine of res judicata, "a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties . . . from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." Rivet v. Regents Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981)). "There is simply `no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata.'" Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 401 (quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946)).
The doctrine of res judicata applies not only to decisions of courts, but also to settlement agreements. Greenberg v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 968 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1992). "The preclusive effect of a settlement is measured by the intent of the parties to the settlement" id., which is to be determined from the language of the agreement itself. Hudson v. I.R.S., 2004 WL 1006266, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2004). Here, the language of the settlement agreement made quite clear that the parties intended the agreement to be a final settlement regarding all liability of Defendant with respect to this matter.
Plaintiff does not, in fact, contest that this claim is barred by the settlement agreement if the agreement remains in force (see Pl. Mem. Law Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 13), but instead argues that the settlement agreement is invalid because the MSPB lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff's appeal. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he Board's lack of jurisdiction in Plaintiff's appeal serves to nullify the lawfullness [sic] and enforceability of the settlement agreement and its terms." (Id.) However, the Court finds no reason to hold that the MSPB lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, as Plaintiff properly filed both a grievance under the union's Collective Bargaining Agreement and an appeal to the MSPB, and Plaintiff has not established that the MSPB lacks authority to review proposed terminations. Therefore, this Court is barred by the principle of res judicata from considering Plaintiff's present claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a final judgment of dismissal and to close the case.
SO ORDERED.