Opinion
1:20-cv-209
03-17-2022
KENNETH A. WHITE, Petitioner v. BRAD TRATE, Respondent
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Presently pending is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by pro se Petitioner Kenneth A. White (Petitioner) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 5. Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the agency responsible for implementing and applying federal law concerning the computation of federal sentences, erred in computing his sentence. For the following reasons, Petitioner's § 2241 petition must be denied.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
II. Report
A. Background
On June 4, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio to a 103-month term of imprisonment in criminal case numbers 1:09-cr-00017and 1:10-cr-00442. ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 4(h). The sentencing judge ordered Petitioner's 103-month terms of imprisonment for each of those cases to be served concurrently. ECF No. 13-7 at 3.
While he was serving that term of imprisonment, a jury in the Northern District of Ohio convicted Petitioner of one count of conspiracy to defraud the government (Count 1) and six counts of false claims (Counts 2-3 and 5-8) in a separate criminal case at number l:14-cr-00185. ECF No. 13-8. On April 3, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment on Count 1 and 55 months imprisonment on each of Counts 2-3 and 5-8, with the 55-month sentences on the latter counts running concurrently. Id. The court ordered 35 months of the 55-month false claims charge to run consecutive to the 120-month conspiracy charge, with the remaining 20 months running concurrently, resulting in a combined sentence of 155 months. Id. The court then directed that the entire 155-month sentence run consecutive to the 103-month sentence previously imposed in l:10-cr-442. Id. This resulted in an aggregated term of imprisonment of 258 months. Id. In imposing the sentence, the sentencing judge also indicated that Petitioner would "be given credit for any time you've already served." ECF No. 5-8.
Based on the foregoing, the BOP computed and audited Petitioner's federal sentence based on a 258-month aggregate term of imprisonment commencing June 4, 2012. ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 4(j). Petitioner was given 706 days of prior custody credit for several periods that he spent in official detention prior to his 103-month sentence. Id. Based on those computations, Petitioner is scheduled for release from BOP custody via Good Conduct Time Release on January 31, 2029. Id.
The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenges the BOP's calculation of his federal release date. Petitioner contends that the BOP failed to award him prior credit for "15 months and 1 day ... for which [he] had already been in custody" while awaiting sentencing in l:14-cr-00185. See ECF No. 5 at 4.
Under § 2241, district courts have authority to grant habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions." Petitioner is confined at FCI McKean, which is located within the territorial boundaries of the Western District of Pennsylvania.
B. Analysis
For federal prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers habeas jurisdiction over an inmate's challenge to the execution - as opposed to the validity - of his sentence. Car dona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012). Two types of claims may ordinarily be litigated in a § 2241 proceeding. First, a prisoner may challenge conduct undertaken by the BOP that affects the duration of his custody. For example, a prisoner can challenge the BOP's computation of his federal sentence, see, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990), or the constitutionality of a BOP disciplinary action that resulted in the loss of good conduct sentencing credits, Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). Secondly, a prisoner can challenge BOP conduct that "conflict[s] with express statements in the applicable sentencing judgment." Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536; Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243. Because the allegations in the instant habeas action challenge the BOP's computation of Petitioner's federal sentence, this Court has jurisdiction under § 2241 to consider Petitioner's claim.
To determine whether the BOP correctly computed an inmate's federal sentence, a reviewing court must separately determine: (1) the date on which Petitioner's federal sentence commenced, and (2) whether Petitioner was entitled to credit for time spent in custody prior to the commencement of his sentence. Each of these determinations is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585.
With respect to the commencement date, 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) provides that a federal sentence "commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served." When an inmate is only facing service of a federal sentence, the application of § 3585(a) is straightforward: the BOP will simply designate the inmate to a federal detention facility and calculate the federal sentence to have commenced on the date it was imposed.
Here, Petitioner does not appear to dispute that his aggregate federal sentence commenced on June 4, 2012, or that he initially received credit for all prior time served that was not credited against another sentence. Rather, he maintains that the BOP abused its discretion by disregarding the sentencing court's directive in l:14-cr-00185 that he be given credit for time spent in pretrial custody.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), a defendant is entitled to receive credit for time served "(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another sentence." Id. (emphasis added). The intent of the last clause of § 3585(b) is to prohibit an inmate from receiving double credit for his prior time in detention. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992) (explaining that with the enactment of § 3585(b), "Congress made it clear that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time."). Thus, the BOP may not grant prior custody credit under § 3585(b) for time that has been credited against another sentence. See, e.g., Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
In the instant case, Petitioner was already in federal custody serving the 103-month sentence imposed in case numbers l:09-cr-00017 and l:10-cr-00442 when he was indicted, convicted, and ultimately sentenced in l:14-cr-00185. Thus, the entire time that he spent in pretrial detention while awaiting the disposition of 1:14-cr-00185 was credited against his prior 103-month sentence. While Petitioner is correct that the sentencing court ordered him to receive credit for any time already served, that recommendation did not and could not apply to time spent in pretrial detention that was already credited against another sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Because he received credit against the sentences in 1:09-cr-00017 and 1:10-cr-00442 for the time that he spent in custody while awaiting trial in 1:14-cr-00185, it appears that Petitioner received the credit that he was entitled to under § 3585. As such, the BOP did not abuse its discretion and Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied.
Although Petitioner claims that the BOP failed to credit him for "15 months and 1 day" of time spent in pretrial custody, he has not explained how he arrived at that length of time or what dates he believes he should have been credited for.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.
Because "[f]ederal prisoner appeals from the denial of a habeas corpus proceeding are not governed by the certificate of appealability requirement," the Court need not make a certificate of appealability determination in this matter. Williams v. McKean, 2019 WL 1118057, at *5 n. 6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2019) (citing United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012)); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B).
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).