We affirm the order insofar as reviewed. Pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201 (c) (2), a plaintiff must plead and prove that the City had prior written notice of a roadway defect, or dangerous or obstructed condition before it can be held liable for its alleged negligence related thereto ( see Estrada v City of New York, 273 AD2d 194). Transitory conditions present on a roadway or walkway such as debris, oil, ice, or sand have been found to constitute potentially dangerous conditions for which prior written notice must be given before liability may be imposed upon a municipality ( see Min Whan Ock v City of New York, 34 AD3d 542; Estrada v City of New York, 273 AD2d at 194; White v Town of Islip, 249 AD2d 464, 465; Almodovar v City of New York, 240 AD2d 523; Rogers v Town of Ramapo, 211 AD2d 775; Baez v City of New York, 236 AD2d 305). The only two exceptions to compliance with prior written notice statutes are where the municipality affirmatively created the alleged defect or dangerous condition, or where a special use conferred a special benefit upon the municipality ( see Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d 471, 474; Ferreira v County of Orange, 34 AD3d 724, 724-725).
In opposition to the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it, the plaintiffs conceded, in effect, that there was no prior written notice of this condition, but argued that garbage bags are a "transitory condition" and, as such, are not covered by Administrative Code § 7-201 (c). This argument is without merit ( see Estrada v City of New York, 273 AD2d 194, 194-195; White v Town of Islip, 249 AD2d 464; Almodovar v City of New York, supra; Rogers v Town of Ramapo, 211 AD2d 775), as is the plaintiffs' further contention that the City may be liable for such a defect or obstruction on the basis of constructive notice ( see Quinn v City of New York, 305 AD2d 570, 572). Although the City may be held liable, even in the absence of prior written notice, where it has affirmatively created the condition that allegedly caused the plaintiffs injuries ( see Hyland v City of New York, 32 AD3d 822; Katsoudas v City of New York, 29 AD3d 740; Yarborough v City of New York, 28 AD3d 650, 651), the plaintiffs failed, in opposition to the City's motion, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City did so here.
The State of New York is not an insurer of the safety of its roads and no liability will attach unless the State's alleged negligence in maintaining its roads in a reasonable condition is a proximate cause of the accident (see Andrews v State of New York, 168 A.D.2d 474, 474-475 [1990]; Stanford v State of New York, 167 A.D.2d 381 [1990]). Upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the claimant (see Krakofsky v Fox-Rizzi, 273 A.D.2d 277, 278 [2000]), we nonetheless find that she failed to make a prima facie showing that anything other than her own culpable conduct in running through a stop sign proximately caused or contributed to her vehicular accident (see Sinski v Town of Brookhaven, 276 A.D.2d 547 [2000]; see also White v Town of Islip, 249 A.D.2d 464, 465 [1998]; Andrews v State of New York, supra; Muhlrad v Town of Goshen, 231 A.D.2d 615, 616 [1996]). Therefore, the Court of Claims properly granted the State's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 and dismissed the claim for the claimant's failure to prove a prima facie case
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. Pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201(c)(2), a plaintiff must plead and prove that the City had prior written notice of a street defect before it can be held liable for its alleged negligence in failing to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition (see, Woodson v. City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 936; Katz v. City of New York, 87 N.Y.2d 241; David v. City of New York, 267 A.D.2d 419 [2d Dept., Dec. 27, 1999]; Solone v. City of New York, 238 A.D.2d 332). It is also settled that transitory slippery conditions, such as those presented by oil (see, Baez v. City of New York, 236 A.D.2d 305), sand (see, White v. Town of Islip, 249 A.D.2d 464; Herman v. Town of Huntington, 173 A.D.2d 681), loose dirt (see, Rogers v. Town of Ramapo, 211 A.D.2d 775), or ice (see, Grant v. Incorporated Vil. of Lloyd Harbor, 180 A.D.2d 716), are the types of potentially dangerous conditions for which prior written notice must be given before liability will attach. The plaintiff did not plead, and the municipal defendants did not receive, prior written notice of the oil spill that allegedly caused the plaintiff's accident.
The record supports the TOWN's assertion that there were no incidents, occurrences, reports or prior complaints that the area where the accident occurred was hazardous, unsafe or in any respect unreasonably dangerous "for those who obey the rules of the road" (Levi v Kratovac, supra, at 550). It follows, similarly, that the TOWN had no actual or constructive notice of any alleged dangerous or defective condition (see e.g., Berlowitz v Town of Brighton, 259 AD2d 983, 983; White v Town of Islip, 249 AD2d 464; Town Law § 65-a; Town of Oyster Bay Code of Ordinances, § 160-1[A]).