Similarly, in other jurisdictions, many of the cases holding that a partial-release provision survived default have been cases in which the benefit of the provision was claimed by a third-party purchaser. See, e.g. Norris v. Schwartz, 114 Fla. 248, 153 So. 910, 910 (1934); Vawter v. Crafts, 41 Minn. 14, 42 N.W. 483, 485 (1889); Rosenberg v. General RealtyServ., 231 A.D. 259, 247 N.Y.S. 461, 464 (1931); White v.Tegnell, 206 S.W. 213, 215 (Tex.Civ.App. 1918). Some courts explicitly have held that purchasers from the original mortgagor may have the right to enforce a partial-release provision after default, or even after foreclosure proceedings have begun, although the original mortgagor does not. See Bitter Root ValleyIrr., supra, 251 F. at 323; Chrisman v. Hay, 43 F. 552, 554-55 (C.C.S.D.Iowa 1890).
Among the recent cases by the courts in the various jurisdictions involving the question presented here are: Seibert v. Goldstein Co., 99 N.J.L. 200; Koplovitz v. Jensen (Ind.) 151 N.E. 390; Murphy v. Hawthorne (Ore.) 244 P. 79, 44 A. L. R. 1397; Horton v. Bensen (Tex. Civ. App.) 206 S.W. 213 (affirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas) 277 S.W. 1050; Pietraszewski v. American Ry. Ex. Co., 210 App. Div. 866, 206 N.Y. Supp. 950. In the case of Horton v. Bensen, supra, both the Court of Civil Appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas held that a truck which had no satisfactory lights, and which was completely stopped or parked on a highway by the driver, was being "operated on the highway" within the meaning of the statute requiring lights upon motor vehicles "while being operated during the night."