Later authorities have employed a more subtle analysis. In White v. Sturns, 651 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.App. — Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the plaintiff had been appointed district judge by an outgoing governor, but prior to Senate confirmation the new Governor had obtained a return of the nomination and had made a new appointment. Plaintiff sought to have himself declared judge on the basis that Article V, Section 28 did not require Senate confirmation of judicial appointees.
One such principle applicable here is that "[a] general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is no more specific rule." Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989); see also White v. Sturns, 651 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e) ("The specific statute is thus regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, any previously enacted general statute on the same subject, which must yield in its scope and effect to the specific provisions of a later statute."). With this principle in mind, the Court concludes that the clear statutory text applicable to this exact situation controls over the broader provision applicable across a range of actions.
"An appointment of the Governor made during a session of the Senate shall be with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate present." TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 12(b); see also White v. Stums, 651 S.W.2d 372, 375-76 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that persons appointed to fill judicial vacancies pursuant to Texas Constitution article V, section 28, are subject to Senate confirmation under article IV, section 12). Absent Senate confirmation, a person appointed during the session will not be entitled to hold the office. See Denison v. State, 61 S.W.2d 1017, 1020-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), writrefd, 61 S.W.2d 1022 (Tex. 1933) (per curiam); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0006 (2002) at 2.
Further, section 52-b, which deals with the financing of a particular kind of road or bridge construction, namely the construction of toll roads and bridges and which, as we have noted, is the only constitutional provision authorizing such financing, is more specific in its language than section 52-a's grant of authority for financing "the development or expansion of transportation," and would for that reason, as well, prevail in the event of any such inconsistency. See Clapp, 639 S.W.2d at 952; ("[I]n construing apparently conflicting provisions of the same constitution, the more general provision must yield to the more specific provision."); Rooms With A View, 7 S.W.3d at 846; White v. Sturns, 651 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.026(b) (Vernon 1998). It has, however, been suggested that TxDOT might expend monies other than those "out of the state highway fund" for TTA toll road projects without a requirement of repayment.
When a statute makes a general provision that is apparently applicable to all criminal cases and another statute makes a different provision for particular cases, the latter prevails insofar as the particular case or class is concerned. See Magnolia Fruit Produce Co., Inc. v. UnicopyCorp. of Tex., 649 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1983, writ dism'd); White v. Sturns, 651 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex.App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the situation you pose, the amount of credit to be awarded for jail time served as a result of a proceeding in a justice or municipal court is the more specific provision.
They are to be read together. White v. Sturns, 651 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e). The latter provision declares that vacancies in the office of judges of "the supreme court, the court of criminal appeals and the district courts" shall be filled by the governor "until the next succeeding general election."
It is a principle of law that such action by the electorate shows that no departure from that practice was intended. White v. Sturns, 651 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.App. — Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We conclude that the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to consider the fact question of the great weight and preponderance of the evidence in this instance exists by the terms of the constitution independent of court decisions.
The Senate must confirm these appointments. See White v. Sturns, 651 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). On March 5, 1982, the governor appointed Mrs. Tucker to the board.
When two statutes conflict with regard to the same subject, the more specific provision controls over the general. White v. Sturns, 651 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.App.-Austin 1983, no writ). The specific nonresident tuition exceptions about which you inquire appear in the same section of the Education Code which establishes tuition rates.