Opinion
No. 3:02-CV-688-D.
April 29, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b) and an order of the District Court, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge follow:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. Parties
Plaintiff is an inmate confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. He brings this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is proceeding pro se, and the Court has granted him permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Defendants are Judge Cliff Stricklin and Assistant District Attorney Kim Judin from the Criminal District Court No. 2 in Dallas County, Texas.
II. Background
Plaintiff's allegations stem from a charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Plaintiff alleges that in August 2001, he filed a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus in Judge Stricklin's court. Judge Stricklin denied the petition. Plaintiff now seeks monetary damages from Judge Stricklin for denying this petition. Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages against Defendant Judin because she failed to request a hearing on Plaintiff's petition for habeas corpus. Finally, Plaintiff requests that this Court order federal investigators to investigate the filing of his state habeas corpus petition, and requests that this Court order the state court to hold a hearing on his state petition.
III. Discussion
Plaintiff's complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That section provides in pertinent part:
The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit.28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B).
Both sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) provide for sua sponte dismissal if the Court finds the complaint is "frivolous" or that it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." A complaint is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Plaintiff requests monetary damages against Judge Stricklin. Judges, however, have absolute immunity for actions taken within the scope of their jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff's claims arise out of Judge Stricklin's rulings in adjudicating Plaintiff's writ of habeas corpus. The Court therefore concludes that Judge Stricklin is entitled to judicial immunity and that Plaintiff's claims against Judge Stricklin should be dismissed as frivolous.
Any claim for monetary damages against Assistant District Attorney Judin is also barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity. A district attorney is absolutely immune in a civil rights suit for any action taken pursuant to his or her role as prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings and in presenting the State's case. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123-128 (1997); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 676 (1997). The claim against Judin is based on actions taken in her role as attorney for the State in responding to Plaintiff's writ of habeas corpus. Because Judin's conduct was taken in her role as State advocate, she is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Impler, 424 U.S. at 430.
Finally, Petitioner seeks a court order for federal investigators to investigate and confirm that he filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus, and he requests that this Court order the state court to hold a hearing on his state petition. Plaintiff's claims are in the nature of a mandamus. Federal courts, however, lack the general power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial officers in the performance of their duties. See Moye v. Clerk, Dekalb County Sup.Ct., 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973). The petition lacks an arguable basis in law and should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1). See Santee v. Quinlan, 115 F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of petition for writ of mandamus as frivolous because federal courts lack the power to mandamus state courts in the performance of their duties).
RECOMMENDATION
The Court recommends that Plaintiff's action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.