Opinion
3:02-CV-007-G
April 2, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an order of the court in implementation thereof, this case has been referred to the United States magistrate judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the magistrate judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: Type of Case: This is a civil rights complaint brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Parties: Plaintiff is presently confined at the Dick Ware Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division in Colorado City, Texas. Defendants are Judge Cliff Stricklin and Assistant District Attorney Robbie McClung from the Criminal District Court No. 2 in Dallas County, Texas. The court has not issued process in this case. However, on January 24, 2002, the magistrate judge issued a questionnaire to Plaintiff, who filed his answers on February 1, 2002.
Plaintiff notified the court of his current address in his motion to proceed in forma pauperis filed on January 23, 2002.
Statement of Case: The material allegations on which the complaint is predicated stem from a charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, which had previously been dismissed. The complaint alleges that in June 2001 Judge Stricklin entered an unauthorized $1.5 million bond for the charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle without first conducting an arraignment within 72 hours of Plaintiffs arrest. Plaintiff subsequently filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, which Judge Stricklin denied without a hearing. The complaint seeks monetary damages from Judge Stricklin for denying his writ of habeas corpus, and from Defendant McClung for failing to request a hearing on his writ of habeas corpus. (Complaint at 4). Findings and Conclusions: The court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. His complaint is, thus, subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which imposes a screening responsibility on the district court. Section 1915A reads in pertinent part as follows:
The complaint also request a federal investigation to verify that Plaintiff was not arraigned within seventy-two hours of his arrest. (Complaint at 4). Such a request is not cognizable in this civil rights action.
The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b) (emphasis added). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Both sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) provide for sua sponte dismissal if the Court finds that the complaint is "frivolous" or that it "fails to state a claim upon which relief maybe granted." A complaint is frivolous, if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Plaintiff requests monetary damages against the Defendants named in the complaint. Judge Stricklin, however, is absolutely immune from any claim for monetary damages. It is self-evident that the denial of the writ of habeas corpus occurred in Judge Stricklin's capacity and function as a judge, which in and of itself renders him immune from a suit for monetary damages. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); see also Brandley v. Keeshan, 64 F.3d 196, 200-201 (5th Cir. 1995).
Any claim for monetary damages against Assistant District Attorney McClung is also barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity. A district attorney is absolutely immune in a civil rights suit for any action taken pursuant to his/her role as prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings and in presenting the State's case, as well as in his role as an advocate for the State. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123-128 (1997); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 676 (5th Cir. 1997).
The claim against McClung is based on actions taken in his role as attorney for the State in responding to Plaintiffs writ of habeas corpus without first seeking a hearing. Because the above conduct was taken in McClung's role as State advocate, he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 (absolute immunity protected prosecutor from suit for knowingly using perjured testimony and suppressing material evidence at plaintiffs murder trial).
Plaintiffs complaint fails to allege any cognizable claim for relief against the named Defendants under § 1983. Therefore, the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for seeking monetary relief against defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).
RECOMMENDATION:
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiffs complaint be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for seeking monetary relief against defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).