Opinion
HHDCV185054433S
08-01-2019
Andre D. WHITE v. Robert C. STEARNS, Jr. et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Dubay, J.
The defendant moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation, on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The plaintiff’s complaint is riddled with conclusory allegations, which taken together, allege that the defendant, Robert C. Stearns, Jr., who is employed as an assistant clerk in the judicial district of Litchfield, knowingly, maliciously, purposefully, or otherwise, failed to properly perform his duties as an assistant clerk. The plaintiff maintains that his attorney provided the defendant with an application for waiver of fees and appointment of counsel for appeal in July 2017, but that the defendant did not act on those filings for over nine months, which resulted in the delay of the plaintiff’s appeal. As a result, the plaintiff claims that the defendant discriminated against him, violated his due process rights, and failed to abide by the duties imparted on him as an assistant clerk. The plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief and monetary damages for attorneys fees and costs in excess of $2 million. The defendant has subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the present action based on absolute judicial immunity and on the grounds that the plaintiff’s claims for relief are moot, as the court has already granted the plaintiff’s motion for waiver of fees and appointment of counsel before the commencement of this action. As a result, the defendant claims that the case should be dismissed as the court lacks jurisdiction and the plaintiff cannot be afforded any practical relief. Although the plaintiff’s complaint is wholly deficient of any succinct factual allegations levied against the defendant, this issue is not currently before the court in this motion to dismiss action and the court will not address the deficiencies contained therein. Accordingly, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this action and therefore, grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
"[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) insufficiency of process; and (4) insufficiency of service of process." Practice Book § 10-30(a). "[J]usticiability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter ... A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Janulawicz v. Commissioner of Correction, 310 Conn. 265, 270, 77 A.3d 113 (2013). "A motion to dismiss properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court ... and mootness implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction." We the People of Connecticut, Inc. v. Malloy, 150 Conn.App. 576, 581-82 n.3, 92 A.3d 961, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 919, 100 A.3d 850 (2014). "[A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction ... The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531-32, 46 A.3d 102 (2012).
"[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute ... It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Ins., 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2015). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). "If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits ... or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings ..." (Citation omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 652, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
"Mootness implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve." Ayala v. Smith, 236 Conn. 89, 93, 671 A.2d 345 (1996). "In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way." Smith-Lawler v. Lawler, 97 Conn.App. 376, 378-79, 904 A.2d 1235 (2006). "It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction ... When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot." Sweeney v. Sweeney, 271 Conn. 193, 201, 856 A.2d 997 (2004). "If there is no longer an actual controversy in which we can afford practical relief to the parties, we must dismiss the [case]. Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. Justiciability requires ... that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Domestic Violence Services of Greater New Haven, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Com’n, 240 Conn. 1, 6-7, 688 A.2d 314 (1997).
In the present case, the plaintiff’s application for waiver of fees and appointment of counsel was granted prior to the initiation of this suit. There was no longer an active question or controversy amongst the parties at the time this suit was filed, as the plaintiff’s application was already granted and any injunctive relief would be wholly unnecessary. The plaintiff would not receive any quantifiable benefit from further litigating this action, as his appeal is pending in the Appellate Court and he is represented by a public defender. The remedy sought by the plaintiff is one in which he has already been afforded, which makes this case moot. Instead of asserting a cognizable claim, the plaintiff makes broad sweeping generalizations against the defendant, without providing the existence actual controversy for which he could receive an ascertainable benefit from a favorable ruling. The plaintiff’s concern that his appeal may be dismissed due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the defendant’s conduct, is unfounded. Instead, the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot, as his appeal is currently pending before the Appellate Court and statutory protections are in place to ensure the validity of the plaintiff’s appeal. The plaintiff has also asserted a vague demand for $2 million in damages from the defendant without providing any rationale for such a substantial award. Without more, the court cannot afford this exorbitant request any credence. As previously mentioned mootness implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and there must be an actual controversy between the parties for a case to be heard. See Domestic Violence Services of Greater New Haven, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Com’n, 240 Conn. 6-7. The plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show that this court retains proper subject matter jurisdiction over this action. As a result, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted, as the plaintiff’s claims are moot and therefore fail to properly assert subject matter jurisdiction.
"Any defendant in a criminal case who is indigent and desires to appeal, and has not previously been determined to be indigent, may, within the time period provided by the rules for taking an appeal, make written application to the trial court for relief from payment of fees, costs and expenses." Practice Book § 63-7. "Unless a different time period is provided by statute, an appeal must be filed within twenty days of the date notice of the judgment or decision is given ... If a motion is filed within the appeal period that might give rise to a new appeal period as provided in subsection (c) of this rule, the appeal may be filed either in the original appeal period, which continues to run, or in the new appeal period." Practice Book § 63-1(a). "If a motion is filed within the appeal period that, if granted, would render the judgment, decision or acceptance of the verdict ineffective, either a new twenty-day period or applicable statutory time period for filing the appeal shall begin on the day that notice of the ruling is given on the last such outstanding motion ... Practice Book § 63-1(c)(1).
Since the plaintiff’s claim is against a state employee, the court must also consider the relevance of statutory immunity as enumerated in General Statutes § 4-165. Section 4-165 provides in relevant part: "(a) No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment. Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter." "[T]o overcome the immunity provided under § 4-165, a plaintiff must produce facts from which a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state of recklessness and malice." (Emphasis omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 102 Conn.App. 315, 325, 926 A.2d 38 (2007). "[I]n order to overcome ... immunity, the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants’ conduct was in excess of their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations." Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 174-75, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).
In the present case, the court cannot find that the defendant’s failure to timely file the plaintiff’s waiver of fees and an appointment of counsel on appeal was done so wantonly, recklessly, or maliciously, as is necessary to overcome § 4-165. The defendant is a state employee serving as an assistant clerk in the judicial district of Litchfield, which falls under the purview of § 4-165. In order to overcome otherwise applicable statutory immunity, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state to satisfy the wanton, reckless, or malicious standards as stated under common law. The plaintiff, however, has failed to present facts that show that the defendant acted with excess authority or possessed an underlying mental state that would supersede their statutory authority and afforded immunity. Without more, the court is unable to make a finding that the defendant acted with wanton, reckless, or malicious disregard necessary to overcome the statutory immunity protections afforded to Connecticut state employee. Therefore, the plaintiff’s complaint is subject to a motion to dismiss based on statutory immunity.
Furthermore, the plaintiff’s complaint is also subject to a motion to dismiss based on absolute or quasi-judicial immunity. "[Absolute judicial immunity] extends only to those who are intimately involved in the judicial process, including judges, prosecutors and judges’ law clerks. The determination is made using a functional approach ... [I]mmunities are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Villages, LLC v. Longhi, 166 Conn.App. 685, 701, 142 A.3d 1162, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 915, 149 A.3d 498 (2016). "Clerks, like judges, are immune from damage suits for performance of tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process." Traylor v. Gerratana, 148 Conn.App. 605, 614, 88 A.3d 552, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 902, 91 A.3d 908 (2014). "Absolute judicial immunity, however, does not extend to every office of the judicial system ... In limited circumstances, however, courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to officials insofar as they perform actions that are integral to the judicial process." Gross v. Rell, 304 Conn. 234, 247, 40 A.3d 240 (2012). "Although the presumption is that qualified immunity is sufficient to protect most government officials in the justified performance of their duties, courts have extended absolute immunity to a variety of judicial and quasi-judicial officers." Id., 248. "The determining factor in all these decisions is whether the official was performing a function that was integral to the judicial process." Id. "In considering whether [persons] ... should be accorded absolute judicial immunity, the United States Supreme Court has applied a three-factor test, which we now adopt ... under our state common law. In its immunity analysis, the court has inquired: [1] whether the official in question perform[s] functions sufficiently comparable to those of officials who have traditionally been afforded absolute immunity at common law ... [2] whether the likelihood of harassment or intimidation by personal liability [is] sufficiently great to interfere with the official’s performance of his or her duties ... [and 3] whether procedural safeguards [exist] in the system that would adequately protect against [improper] conduct by the official." Id., 248-49.
"[T]he duties assumed by a court clerk ... demonstrates that their functions are integral to the judicial process, thus satisfying the first part of the test." Cayo v. O’Garro, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FST-CV-14-6020974-S (August 11, 2014, Truglia, Jr., J.). "[C]ourt clerks who allegedly failed to properly manage the court calendar and delayed the plaintiff’s appeal were entitled to absolute immunity because control of the court’s dockets was part of the judicial function." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1997). "The court finds similarly that the likelihood of harassment and personal liability would substantially interfere with the position[s] of court clerk ... [and] that sufficient procedural safeguards exist to protect against improper conduct by both defendants with respect to their official responsibilities." Id. "Most (if not all) of the work performed by clerks ... is subject to review and final approval by other clerks and judges; most clerks ... are attorneys and subject to discipline for violations of the Code of Professional Conduct. All mediators (and some clerks) who are permanent employees of the Judicial Department are subject to discipline for violations of the Code of Ethics for Public Officials and State Employees." Id.
In the present case, the defendant holds the position of assistant clerk in the judicial district of Litchfield. Due to the numerous responsibilities pertaining to the functionality of daily court proceedings, an assistant clerk acts as an arm of the court and serves as an integral member of the judicial process, satisfying the first element of the Gross test. See Cayo v. O’Garro, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. FST-CV-14-6020974-S. In addition, although our superior court has previously held that court clerks satisfy this first element, the functional requirements of an assistant clerk are also akin to the responsibilities of other judicial positions that are commonly granted immunity. See id. Secondly, due to their constant daily interactions with attorneys and the public, there is a strong likelihood that assistant clerks would be subjected to harassment or intimidation through the threat of personal responsibility. Given the nature of their job responsibilities and their daily interactions with members of the public, it is likely that clerks may be subjected to lawsuits from unhappy litigants for actions not within their control. Without adequate protections, the threat of personal liability and harassment would have a detrimental impact on the job functionality for assistant clerks. See id. For example, in this case, the plaintiff is erroneously seeking a $2 million award against the defendant. Without immunity protections, such an inflated and unwarranted demand could influence and curb clerk’s behavior to the detriment of the court. If clerks were not afforded the protections of judicial immunity, they may face the "danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly [would] vent their wrath on clerks ..." Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C.Cir. 1993). Finally, there are numerous safeguards in place to prevent assistant clerks from engaging in improper conduct. Namely, assistant clerks operate under the authority of the chief clerk of the judicial district, in this case, the chief clerk of the judicial district of Litchfield, and are responsible to the court and the judges on the whole. Additionally, clerks may be subjected to potential discipline for violations of either the Code of Professional Conduct or the Code of Ethics for Public Officials and State Employees if they were to engage in any improper conduct. As a result, the role of an assistant clerk meets all the necessary criteria to fall under the purview of Gross test for absolute immunity. Therefore, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted.
The plaintiff’s claim does not properly invoke subject matter jurisdiction on this court and he has failed to overcome his burden of establishing such jurisdiction. This case is moot because the plaintiff does not have an active controversy in which he may be afforded practical relief, as the Appellate Court has already accepted his appeal. Additionally, the defendant’s position as an assistant clerk is afforded protection by both statutory and judicial immunity, which makes him immune to suit in his personal capacity for acts committed during his employment. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted.