ADKINS, Justice. By petition for certiorari we have for review a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal ( White v. State, 348 So.2d 368 (Fla.3d DCA 1977)), which allegedly conflicts with a prior decision of the court ( Cone v. State, 285 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1973)), and a subsequent decision of the court ( Johnson v. State, 366 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1978)) on the same point of law. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Appellant, defendant below, was convicted of robbery, unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense, and aggravated assault.

Unlike Jackson v. State, 421 So.2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), in which the state attorney asked whether the jury would buy a used car from the defense lawyer, we view the present comment, not as a forbidden and usually fatal attack on the character of counsel personally, but as a permissible comment on the quality of the defendant's case itself. See Lewis v. State, 377 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1979); White v. State, 348 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), approved in part, quashed in part, 377 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 1979). Moreover, even if, contrary to this determination, the comment was indeed wrong, it was, standing alone, and in the context of the entire case, not enough to vitiate the entire trial and require a new one.

Affirmed. See and compare Williams v. State, 441 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); White v. State, 348 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845, 101 S.Ct. 129, 66 L.Ed.2d 54 (1980).

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. State v. Jones, 204 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1967); White v. State, 348 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).

The defendants also urge a series of points which for convenience sake we treat under one heading as extended discussion thereon does not seem warranted. We are unpersuaded that the court or the prosecuting attorney indirectly commented on the defendants' failure to testify in this cause, see e.g., Gosney v. State, 382 So.2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); White v. State, 348 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 377 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 1980). We fail to perceive any error in the co-defendant Henry Page's initial refusal to testify before the jury in this cause because he gave no grounds therefor which might be prejudicial to the defendants and, in any event, changed his mind and did, in fact, testify against the defendants; as such, the instant case is distinguishable on these points from Kaplow v. State, 157 So.2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), relied upon for reversal herein.

PER CURIAM. We affirm the judgments of conviction upon a holding that (1) the prosecutor's comment, "We have shown it beyond a reasonable doubt, since there wasn't one statement from that witness stand that conflicted with that conclusion," addressed the evidence as it existed before the jury, not the defendant's failure to testify, and was therefore within permissible bounds, State v. Jones, 204 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1967); White v. State, 348 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); and (2) defendant's contention that the evidence of concealment was insufficient to support a conviction on the count charging him with carrying a concealed firearm is rejected, because (a) this contention was not preserved for review where the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal claimed merely that the weapon was not shown to be a firearm, V.J.T. v. State, 390 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Daley v. State, 374 So.2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), and (b) the evidence of concealment was, in any event, sufficient, Oliver v. State, 393 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Affirmed.

Iannucci asserts that he was substantially prejudiced when the trial judge rebuked defense counsel during final arguments. However, defense counsel did not object to the judge's comment at trial and therefore, unless the comment was so prejudicial as to constitute fundamental error, Iannucci waived his right to raise this issue on appeal. See White v. State, 348 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), reversed in part, 377 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 1979), vacated in part, 379 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The judge's comment does not appear to us as severely prejudicial, and in fact appellant's counsel invited the judge's comment by his own attempt to mislead the jury as to the kinds of crimes for which Iannucci had previously been convicted.

A possible explanation of the Supreme Court's failure to follow Pinder in that instance is that White merely attacked the sentence, not the conviction. See White v. State, 348 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

PER CURIAM. WHEREAS, the judgment of this court was entered on July 19, 1977, 348 So.2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) affirming the judgment and sentences of the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, in the above styled cause; and WHEREAS, on review of this court's judgment, by certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida by its Opinion and judgment filed September 27, 1979, 377 So.2d 1149, and mandate now lodged in this court, reversed in part, and affirmed in part this court's judgment and sentences remanded the cause with instructions;

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. White v. State, 348 So.2d 368 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1975); Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1974); Rivers v. State, 226 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1969); Rohme v. State, 222 So.2d 431 (Fla.3d DCA 1969); Matera v. State, 218 So.2d 180 (Fla.3d DCA 1969); State v. Jones, 204 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1967).