White v. State

3 Citing cases

  1. Dolan v. State

    420 N.E.2d 1364 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that a defendant is entitled to credit time for time spent in confinement for a probation violation as long as the defendant is being held solely on the probation violation

    Both the judge at his arraignment (Judge Hughes) and the judge at his sentencing hearing (Judge Jones) informed Dolan that he could withdraw his plea prior to imposition of the sentence. Although the strict letter of the statute was not followed, we are convinced from the record as a whole, Dolan made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea. Mathis v. State (1980), Ind., 406 N.E.2d 1182; Neeley v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 588, 382 N.E.2d 714; White v. State (1980), Ind. App., 412 N.E.2d 1269. The following statement, found in White, supra, 412 N.E.2d at 1270, is particularly applicable: "Although we again urge trial judges to specifically deal with each part of IC 35-4.1-1-3, under the circumstances of this case and the record before us, it is apparent the guilty plea was freely, knowingly and voluntarily given."

  2. Davis v. State

    446 N.E.2d 1317 (Ind. 1983)   Cited 51 times

    In Mathis, we found that the requirements of Boykin and Ind. Code ยง 35-4.1-1-3 are satisfied when the record provides a sufficient basis for the conclusion that the petitioner was meaningfully informed of the specific rights enumerated in Boykin and in the above code section. Id. at 1183-84; see also Williams v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 165, 325 N.E.2d 827; White v. State, (1980) Ind. App., 412 N.E.2d 1269. The post-conviction hearing court found specifically "[t]hat the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of competent evidence that he was denied due process and fundamental fairness in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws of the State of Indiana in that his plea of guilty to rape was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent."

  3. Ricketts v. State

    429 N.E.2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 6 times

    "The trial judge must address the defendant according to the requirements of the statute and determine that the defendant understands the charges against him; inform him that by pleading guilty the defendant is admitting guilt; inform the defendant that he waives his rights to a jury trial, to confrontation with his accusers, to compulsory process, and to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a trial in which he cannot be compelled to testify; inform the defendant of the range of sentencing to which he is subject; and inform the defendant that the court is not a party to, and is not bound by, the plea agreement." Although the entire record should be considered in determining whether the statutory requirements were met, the record must affirmatively show that they were met. See DeVillez v. State, (1981) Ind., 416 N.E.2d 846; Sims v. State, (1981) Ind. App., 422 N.E.2d 436; Dolan v. State, (1981) Ind. App., 420 N.E.2d 1364; White v. State, (1980) Ind. App., 412 N.E.2d 1269. The record fails to disclose Ricketts' advisement on an item enumerated in the statute as a prerequisite to acceptance of his guilty plea: the possible minimum sentences for the charges. Where there is no indication that a defendant was advised of a particular right, even though all other items in the statute were fully explained, a knowing, intelligent and voluntary entry of a guilty plea cannot be presumed.