Opinion
No. 1-958 / 01-0429
Filed January 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Darrell J. Goodhue, Judge.
Applicant, Sherman White, appeals from the district court's denial of his application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Patricia Hulting of Roehrick, Hulting, Krull Blumberg, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Sherman White, Jr. appeals from a district court order which denied his application for postconviction relief. We affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
White filed an application for postconviction relief in the Iowa District Court for Lee County challenging the Iowa Department of Correction's (IDOC) calculation of his discharge date from prison. His action was subsequently transferred to Jasper County on a change of venue. Following hearing, the district court denied White's claim for relief. White appealed.
II. Method and Scope of Review.
White's appeal stems from his loss of good conduct time as a prison inmate following a disciplinary violation in 1984. Because White is appealing the loss of good conduct time, the proper method of asking for appellate review is by application for writ of certiorari. See Iowa Code § 822.9 (1999) (requiring appeal under section 822.2(6) to be by writ of certiorari). After the postconviction court denied his claim, White did not file a petition for writ of certiorari identifying how the district court exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally. Since he failed to complete the requirements for a petition for writ of certiorari, the State contends his appeal should be dismissed. Although the State's argument has merit, we deem it appropriate to treat this action as a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.304. As a result, our review is limited to whether the district court exceeded its jurisdiction, or otherwise acted illegally. Iowa R. Civ. P 1.1401.
III. Discussion.
White was sentenced to life in prison in 1972. In 1999 his conviction was reversed and remanded. Following remand, White pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed sixty-five years. The parties appear to agree that since White's original offense took place prior to July 1, 1983 the "old good conduct time" law should be applied in determining his release date. See Iowa Code § 903A.6 (1999). The old good conduct law allowed an inmate to receive what is known as "good" time and "honor" time credit against his sentence. The dispute in this case concerns a forfeiture of good conduct time and honor time which the State has used to increase the duration of White's incarceration.
In 1984, White received a disciplinary report stemming from an incident involving a correctional officer. Following a hearing before an administrative law judge, White lost all the good and honor time he had which accumulated prior to November 9, 1984. The loss of time amounted to 2997 days. Other sanctions were imposed as well. White did not challenge the loss of good time on appeal.
In 2000 the director of the IDOC reduced the loss of time from the 1984 report from 2997 days to 1640 days. Neither party challenges this reduction. Due to additional disciplinary reports subsequent to 1984, White lost an additional 789 days of good conduct time. The IDOC asserts that White has lost a total of 2249 days of good conduct time. White's application for postconviction relief challenges this total.
The postconviction court rejected White's claims after concluding he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in 1984. White challenges this conclusion on appeal. In order to bring an appeal of a disciplinary action, the inmate must appeal both to the warden or the superintendent. and to the director of the IDOC. Aschan v. State, 446 N.W.2d 791, 792 (Iowa 1989). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required if an inmate proves by a preponderance of the evidence that prison officials interfered with the appeals process and that such interference prevented the completion of the process in a timely manner. See Bugely v. State, 464 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1991).
Like the postconviction court, we find that White failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. White's own testimony indicates he submitted appeals to the warden, director, and the district court from the disciplinary action imposed against him in 1984, but failed to claim that his loss of good time was excessive or improperly calculated. His appeal of other disciplinary sanctions was unsuccessful. White contends that there was no reason for him to challenge the loss of good time in 1984 because, at that point, he was serving a sentence of life without parole. He argues that any reports showing he had earned good time credits were meaningless because his sentence could not, by law, be reduced. In rejecting White's argument, the district court concluded that the nature of the sentence White was serving did not eliminate his duty to exhaust all administrative remedies as required by law. The court concluded the application of both credits and forfeitures after White was sentenced to a term of years was logical and consistent. The court stated:
Another way to view it would be that the good time and honor time did not exist until the sentence was converted into a term of years. . . . If White is to be given the advantage of the accrued good conduct and honor time, he must also suffer the forfeitures. The Court's deference to the Department's decision relative to good conduct time and disciplinary actions is well established.
We conclude the district court properly ruled that White failed to exhaust his administrative remedies or establish cause for his failure to meet those requirements. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the postconviction court.