White v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.

8 Citing cases

  1. Daly v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.

    C.A. No. 17-95-LPS (D. Del. Sep. 30, 2018)

    The Court believes all relevant documents must be considered. See Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am., 644 F.3d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("Far from suggesting that one plan document must contain all the legally relevant terms and language, the statutory text clearly contemplates multiple relevant documents."); see also, e.g., Killebrew v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 2017 WL 1519500, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2017), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded on other grounds, 723 F. App'x 133 (3d Cir. 2018) (considering multiple documents as part of plan to assess discretionary review); Strott v. Dimensional Inv., LLC Health & Welfare Plan, 2015 WL 1299773, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2015) (same); but see White v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 908 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626-27 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (concluding that "ERISA Statement" was not part of Plan and cannot be source of discretionary review); Orantes v. CNH Grp. Ins. Plan, 2011 WL 1376069, *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2011) (same). Here, the ERISA Information section describes basic details about the Plan, such as the name, type, and number of the Plan and the procedures for presenting claims and appealing any denials, and provides a "Statement of ERISA Rights," required by law.

  2. Naphys v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.

    Civil Action No. 16-1450 (JBS-JS) (D.N.J. Sep. 21, 2018)

    In support of this argument, Plaintiff primarily relies on two non-binding cases, wherein the court found that the claimant's mental conditions at issue were caused by a physical condition. (Id. at 28) (citing Morgan, 755 F. Supp. 2d. at 645, and White v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 908 F. Supp. 2d 618, 636-37 (E.D. Pa. 2012)). Unlike in those cases, Plaintiff here fails to show that his ADD or depression are directly linked to his gastroparesis.

  3. Ho v. Goldman Sachs & Co. Grp. Long Term Disability Plan

    Civ. No. 2:13-cv-6104-KM-MAH (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2016)   Cited 4 times

    It is true that courts in the Third Circuit, even when applying a de novo review standard, have considered an LTD plan administrator's procedural and fact-finding errors. See, e.g., White v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 908 F. Supp. 2d 618, 637-39 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Moros v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 12-5468, 2014 WL 323249, at *10-18 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2014). But as Judge Easterbrook has explained, the Supreme Court's opinion in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch directs trial courts not to undertake a "review," but rather to issue an independent decision:

  4. Horn v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.

    Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-3699 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 20, 2015)   Cited 1 times
    Holding that substance abuse bar did not apply because plaintiff's addiction "stemmed from a physical condition . . . that had already rendered her disabled"

    Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 19; R. at 575. This district addressed a similar policy restriction in White v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 908 F. Supp. 2d 618 (E.D. Pa. 2012), in which the plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury in a rollover automobile accident and, as a result of the injury, suffered from depression and anxiety. The plaintiff's insurance policy included a limitation with respect to disabilities "due in whole or part to mental illness."

  5. Herbert v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.

    Civil Action 14-2599 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2014)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that the above-quoted language from Prudential's Group Contract "does not inform the beneficiary that Prudential has unlimited discretion. . . . Rather, this statement clearly limits Prudential's discretion to revise the plan document to times when the contract does not conform to state or federal law or regulation."

    Considering that the Viera Court specifically adopted the reasoning of the Herzberger court, I believe the Third Circuit would also find the term "when Prudential determines" is insufficient to confer discretion. 642 F.3d at 415, 417. I note that my conclusion is in accord with several courts of this district. White v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 908 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Orantes v. CNH Grp. Ins. Plan, 10-CV-7215, 2011 WL 1376069 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2011); Farina v. Temple Univ. Health Sys. Long Term Disability Plan, 8-CV-2473, 2009 WL 1172705 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 27, 2009); Elms v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 6-CV-5127, 2008 WL 4444269 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2008). Third, the Group Insurance Contract states, "If the provisions of the Group Contract do not conform to the requirements of any state or federal law or regulation that applies to the Group Contract, the Group Contract is automatically changed to conform with Prudential's interpretation of the requirements of that law or regulation.

  6. Moros v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-5468 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2014)   Cited 2 times

    Heim v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Amer., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38257, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2012) (citing Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Amer., 642 F. 3d 407, 413-414 (3d Cir. 2011)). See also White v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 908 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 n. 9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2012) ("When a de novo standard of review is applied to an administrative record ... the Court resolves disputes of material fact, and is not required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as required under Rule 56.") (citing MacFarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted)). In instances where a benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary the requisite discretionary authority, a court must apply the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review.

  7. Sallavanti v. Unum Life Ins. Co.

    980 F. Supp. 2d 664 (M.D. Pa. 2013)   Cited 3 times
    Finding that factual disputes preclude summary judgment, including "disputes as to the credibility of medical opinions contained in the record, which the Court is even less capable of resolving without the opportunity to hear the medical experts' testimony in open court, on both direct and cross examination; to ask questions of the medical experts, if necessary; and to observe their demeanor while testifying."

    Defendant's support for this claim comes from a footnote in a recent case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See White v. Prudential Ins. Co., 908 F.Supp.2d 618, 625 n. 9 (E.D.Pa.2012) (citing Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir.2012)). However, while the White court does indeed support the Defendant's statement, the Third Circuit case that White itself cited for the same proposition states exactly the opposite.

  8. Sallivanti v. Unum Life Ins. Co.

    (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2013)

    Defendant's support for this claim comes from a footnote in a recent case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See White v. Prudential Ins. Co., 908 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing MacFarian v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2012)). However, while the White court cited fordoes indeed support the Defendant's statement, the Third Circuit case that White itself the same proposition states exactly the opposite.