Opinion
No. 05-10-01249-CV
Opinion Filed October 26, 2011.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. cc-10-05809-A.
Before Justices MOSELEY, LANG, and MYERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Stephanie White appeals the trial court's judgment granting Curtis Fritz damages of $375 and possession of certain property. White brings four issues on appeal. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
White leased a residence from Fritz for the term of September 15, 2009 to September 30, 2010. White's rent was paid by a government program. The lease required White to maintain the lawn, pay the utilities, and keep the residence in "good and sanitary condition and repair." The lease prohibited White from changing or adding locks without Fritz's permission. The lease provided that if White defaulted on any condition in the lease, Fritz could declare the lease terminated or forfeited. On August 2, 2010, Fritz gave White notice to vacate the property within seventy-two hours because White had not taken care of the lawn and Fritz had to mow it three times, White had failed to pay the utilities resulting in the services being cancelled, and the residence had been damaged and not repaired. On August 6, 2010, Fritz filed a complaint for forcible detainer in the justice court. On August 18, 2010, the justice court awarded Fritz possession of the property. White then appealed to the county court.
At the hearing before the county court at law, Fritz testified he conducted an inspection of the property during the term of the lease and found the utilities had been turned off, the toilets were full of "BM" to the lid, and one of the doors had been kicked in. He also told the court that the property failed an inspection by the Dallas Housing Authority when White had deadbolted the doors and refused to admit the inspector. He also testified he received a citation from the City for the grass being too tall and that he had to mow the lawn three times. He testified that White had added deadbolt locks to some of the doors. Fritz told the court he was owed $375 for mowing and for damage to the property.
White testified she would have had the lawn mowed but that Fritz mowed it first. She testified the utilities were turned off because she had been unable to pay the electric bill due to the neighbors taking electricity; however, she testified the City had since paid the bill. Much of White's testimony also concerned her problems with Fritz, including her dislike of his touching her and her belief that he entered the residence when she was not at home and went through her possessions. White also testified she was ready to move out of the residence on October 5, 2010. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court signed an order awarding Fritz possession of the property as of October 8, 2010 and $375 in damages.
Appellant represents herself on appeal. Although we liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211-12 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). To do otherwise would give pro se litigants an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel. Mansfield State Bank, 573 S.W.2d at 185; In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d at 212.
The rules of appellate procedure require that the appellant's brief "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). This Court is not responsible for searching the record for facts that may be favorable to a party's position, and we are not responsible for performing the legal research that might support a party's contentions. Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). Factual statements in a brief must be supported by the record or they will not be considered on appeal. In re A.W.P., 200 S.W.3d 242, 244 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
In her first issue, White asserts, "A landlord has the right to evict a tenant as under Texas Property Law. There is nothing in Texas Property Law that supports Fritz['s] frivolous claim as to why he filed eviction for personal gain." The argument in appellant's brief does not address whether the trial court erred by determining that White breached the lease and that under the terms of the lease Fritz was entitled to possession of the property. Instead, much of White's brief concerns her personal problems with Fritz and allegations against Fritz that are unsupported by the record. White admits in her brief that she "had no documentation to support her claim of wrong doing [sic] from her landlord." The record contains evidence that White breached the lease, and White's brief does not demonstrate that the trial court erred in determining that Fritz was entitled to possession of the property. Furthermore, regardless of whether she breached the lease, White does not explain why Fritz was not entitled to possession of the property on October 8, 2010, more than a week after the lease had expired. We overrule White's first issue.
White's second, third, and fourth issues assert the following:
Issue 2: Fritz claimed non-compliance on White's eviction in court. Fritz basically claimed White failed inspection. [Tex. Gov. Code Ann. § 10.006; 74th Leg., ch. 137, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995]. [Texas Government Code, title 2, subsection 18.001] is what will discredit Fritz['s] claim.
Issue 3: Fritz claimed White was the cause of a citation for his violation of beautification. [Texas Government Code, title 2, subsection 18.001] is what will discredit Fritz['s] claim.
Issue 4: Fritz claimed part of his reasoning for White's eviction is due to her mental state of mind. [Texas Government Code, title 2, subsection 18.001] is what will discredit Fritz['s] claim.
The Texas Government Code does not contain sections numbered 10.006 or 18.001. However, White cites chapter 137 of the 74th Legislature, which contains the enactment of sections 10.001 to 10.006 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 137, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 977-78. Accordingly, it appears that White meant to cite to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code when she cited to the Texas Government Code.
Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code concerns sanctions for frivolous pleadings and motions. Section 10.006 provides, "Notwithstanding Section 22.004, Government Code, the supreme court may not amend or adopt rules in conflict with this chapter." Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 10.006 (West 2002). Section 22.004 governs the Texas Supreme Court's authority to enact rules of practice and procedure in civil actions. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.004 (West Supp. 2010). Section 10.006 is not relevant to this appeal.
Section 18.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs affidavits concerning cost and necessity of services. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001 (West 2008). The statute provides that an affidavit complying with the section "is sufficient evidence to support a finding of fact by judge or jury that the amount charged was reasonable or that the service was necessary." Id. § 18.001(b). Fritz did not submit an affidavit under this section, and White does not explain how section 18.001 is relevant to the appeal. Contrary to White's assertion, section 18.001 does not discredit Fritz's claims.
White's argument and cited authorities do not support issues two, three, and four. Accordingly, we overrule her second, third, and fourth issues.
Under her "Summary of the Argument," White cites sections 13.001(a) and 13.002 of the Texas Government Code. However, the Texas Government Code does not contain those section numbers. It appears that White meant to cite to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because she quoted the headings for those sections in that code. Those sections concern actions when one party files an affidavit of indigency under rule 145 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. §§ 13.001, .002 (West 2002); Tex. R. Civ. P. 145. Section 13.001 permits a trial court to dismiss an action on finding that the allegation of poverty in the affidavit is false or that the action is frivolous or malicious. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 13.001(a). Section 13.002 concerns the award of costs at the conclusion of the action. Id. § 13.002. Those provisions are not relevant to any issue in this appeal.
In another section of White's brief headed "Reply to Issues Presented," White states, "Fritz claimed that White's sibling gave him inside information pertaining to her mental stability. Fritz has used [hearsay] testimony, has broken under oath privilege and all in the name of personal gain." During the hearing, Fritz testified he told an administrator of the program paying White's rent, "Her sister told me she has psychological problems." White did not object to this testimony. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 states that as a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show the party complained to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Because White did not object, she has not preserved for appellate review any error from the trial court's admission of hearsay testimony.
None of White's issues, arguments, or authorities demonstrate that the trial court erred in granting Fritz possession of the property or in awarding him $375 damages. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.