White v. Exchange Corporation

9 Citing cases

  1. Gardiner v. Westgate Resorts

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-5090 (E.D. Pa. May. 5, 2017)   Cited 1 times

    However, this is not the case here. See also White v. Exch. Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendants assert, however, that Plaintiffs are estopped from opposing the award of attorney's fees, relying on MCG Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. Technogroup, Inc., 149 So. 3d 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).

  2. MDS (Canada), Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc.

    822 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2011)   Cited 22 times
    Finding expert unqualified where education and background had inadequate relationship to subject of proposed testimony

    As a threshold matter, I determine that the Best Plaintiffs are without standing to recover any damages, including from the claimed lapse of the '255 Patent, from Rad Source that Best allegedly suffered as a result of a breach of the License Agreement. See White v. Exch. Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (“[i]t is elementary that a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to sue for its breach.”).

  3. Super Vision Intern., Inc. v. Mega Intern. Commercial.

    534 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2008)   Cited 20 times
    Granting motion to dismiss FUFTA claims against a bank which was alleged to have accepted the debtor's transfers of funds into accounts held by the debtor at the bank

    Based on the language of the consent form and taking all inferences in favor of Super, Super has not sufficiently alleged that it received an assignment of Wu's rights under his contract with Mega. Second, even if Super had sufficiently alleged such an assignment, Super has not alleged that it was in privy to the contract between Mega and Wu. See White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) ("It is elementary that a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to [sue] for its breach."). Therefore, Super's claim for breach of contract, based on the alleged assignment contained in the consent form, fails to state a claim and is dismissed.

  4. Cibran Enterprises, Inc. v. BP Products North America

    365 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (S.D. Fla. 2005)   Cited 16 times
    Explaining that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a part of every contract under Florida law, and that the implied covenant attaches to the performance of a specific contractual obligation

    "It is elementary that a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to sue for its breach." White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (citations omitted). As the November 28, 2000 assignment to Cibran was ineffective, Cibran lacks standing to sue for breach of the CM Agreements. Cibran argues, however, that the Court should allow it to substitute Mr. Cibran, in his individual capacity, as the Plaintiff in this action.

  5. Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc. v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp.

    261 So. 3d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 15 times
    Addressing the statutes and regulations raised by the appellee in its answer brief and holding that because the appellee "did not raise these other statutory and regulatory provisions before the trial court in its summary judgment motion," this Court does not address them "for the first time on appeal"

    If the assignments were not valid, then as a non-party to the insurance contracts Gables Recovery would have no right to sue. See White v. Exch. Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) ("It is elementary that a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to sue for its breach."). The issue, then, is whether the Matusow and Difilippi assignments were valid to give Gables Recovery standing to bring the breach of insurance contract claims on their behalf.

  6. Banco Ficohsa v. Aseguradora

    937 So. 2d 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 2 times

    Courts have held that "a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to use [sic] for its breach." White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). Banco Ficohsa was not a party to the reinsurance agreement because "an ordinary contract of reinsurance, in the absence of provisions to the contrary, operates solely as between the reinsurer and the reinsured."

  7. Gallagher v. Dupont

    918 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 46 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "the insured's liability has been established by the settlement, and the insurer may not later relitigate the issue"

    Moreover, the Fund, as a non-party to the settlement agreement, has no standing to enforce it. A person not a party to nor in privity with a contract has no right to enforce it. White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). When a contract is designed solely for the benefit of the contracting parties, a third party cannot enforce its provisions even though the third party may derive some incidental or consequential benefit from the enforcement.

  8. McKinney-Green, Inc. v. Davis

    606 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that proposed guarantor, a 50% shareholder of subdivision corporation, was merely an incidental beneficiary of corporation's construction-loan agreement with mortgage broker

    We find merit in appellant's argument before the trial court that the revisions in the fourth amended complaint are not material and do not state a cause of action. The allegations of Count One either failed to meet the Miller requirements for preciseness and sufficiency, or otherwise showed, through the attached "proposed mortgage" and mortgage note, an agreement in which M-G and Oaks of Kanapaha, Inc., but not Davis individually, were parties. See White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (person not a party to, or in privity with, a contract lacks the right to sue for its breach). Davis alleged alternatively that he was a beneficiary of the agreement.

  9. N.A.P. Consumer Elec. v. Elec. Tubes

    458 So. 2d 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 1 times
    Vacating state court judgment on federal antitrust counterclaim because it is within the "exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts"

    Turning now to the judgment of the counterclaim we reverse, first, because the damages sought were recovered under a theory that would be supportable only as an antitrust violation, which is the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Scherer Sons, Inc., 132 So.2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961), approved Scherer Sons, Inc. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 142 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1962); Freeman v. Bee Machine Company, Inc., 319 U.S. 448, 63 S.Ct. 1146, 87 L.Ed. 1509 (1943); Blumenstock Brothers Advertising Agency v. Curtis PublishingCompany, 252 U.S. 436, 40 S.Ct. 385, 64 L.Ed 649 (1920), and second, because the evidence fails to establish a clear undertaking on the part of the appellant of the responsibilities and obligations of a previous supplier of merchandise to the appellee. White v. Exchange Corporation, 167 So.2d 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); Pulsnation Enterprises, Inc. v. Appliance Plan Company, 141 So.2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). Therefore for the reasons above stated the final judgment in favor of the plaintiff is affirmed with directions to the trial court to eliminate the surplus language.