However, this is not the case here. See also White v. Exch. Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Defendants assert, however, that Plaintiffs are estopped from opposing the award of attorney's fees, relying on MCG Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. Technogroup, Inc., 149 So. 3d 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
As a threshold matter, I determine that the Best Plaintiffs are without standing to recover any damages, including from the claimed lapse of the '255 Patent, from Rad Source that Best allegedly suffered as a result of a breach of the License Agreement. See White v. Exch. Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (“[i]t is elementary that a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to sue for its breach.”).
Based on the language of the consent form and taking all inferences in favor of Super, Super has not sufficiently alleged that it received an assignment of Wu's rights under his contract with Mega. Second, even if Super had sufficiently alleged such an assignment, Super has not alleged that it was in privy to the contract between Mega and Wu. See White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) ("It is elementary that a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to [sue] for its breach."). Therefore, Super's claim for breach of contract, based on the alleged assignment contained in the consent form, fails to state a claim and is dismissed.
"It is elementary that a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to sue for its breach." White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (citations omitted). As the November 28, 2000 assignment to Cibran was ineffective, Cibran lacks standing to sue for breach of the CM Agreements. Cibran argues, however, that the Court should allow it to substitute Mr. Cibran, in his individual capacity, as the Plaintiff in this action.
If the assignments were not valid, then as a non-party to the insurance contracts Gables Recovery would have no right to sue. See White v. Exch. Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) ("It is elementary that a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to sue for its breach."). The issue, then, is whether the Matusow and Difilippi assignments were valid to give Gables Recovery standing to bring the breach of insurance contract claims on their behalf.
Courts have held that "a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to use [sic] for its breach." White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). Banco Ficohsa was not a party to the reinsurance agreement because "an ordinary contract of reinsurance, in the absence of provisions to the contrary, operates solely as between the reinsurer and the reinsured."
Moreover, the Fund, as a non-party to the settlement agreement, has no standing to enforce it. A person not a party to nor in privity with a contract has no right to enforce it. White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). When a contract is designed solely for the benefit of the contracting parties, a third party cannot enforce its provisions even though the third party may derive some incidental or consequential benefit from the enforcement.
We find merit in appellant's argument before the trial court that the revisions in the fourth amended complaint are not material and do not state a cause of action. The allegations of Count One either failed to meet the Miller requirements for preciseness and sufficiency, or otherwise showed, through the attached "proposed mortgage" and mortgage note, an agreement in which M-G and Oaks of Kanapaha, Inc., but not Davis individually, were parties. See White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (person not a party to, or in privity with, a contract lacks the right to sue for its breach). Davis alleged alternatively that he was a beneficiary of the agreement.
Turning now to the judgment of the counterclaim we reverse, first, because the damages sought were recovered under a theory that would be supportable only as an antitrust violation, which is the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Scherer Sons, Inc., 132 So.2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961), approved Scherer Sons, Inc. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 142 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1962); Freeman v. Bee Machine Company, Inc., 319 U.S. 448, 63 S.Ct. 1146, 87 L.Ed. 1509 (1943); Blumenstock Brothers Advertising Agency v. Curtis PublishingCompany, 252 U.S. 436, 40 S.Ct. 385, 64 L.Ed 649 (1920), and second, because the evidence fails to establish a clear undertaking on the part of the appellant of the responsibilities and obligations of a previous supplier of merchandise to the appellee. White v. Exchange Corporation, 167 So.2d 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); Pulsnation Enterprises, Inc. v. Appliance Plan Company, 141 So.2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). Therefore for the reasons above stated the final judgment in favor of the plaintiff is affirmed with directions to the trial court to eliminate the surplus language.