Opinion
Civ. 4:22-CV-1692
11-21-2023
CHRISTOPHER P. WHITE, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PA, et al., Defendants.
Conner, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DARYL F. BLOOM, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Introduction
This case comes before this Court for consideration of two motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. (Docs. 46, 48). The plaintiff, Christopher White, is an inmate in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) who is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (“SCI Camp Hill”). White filed this action against several state court judges, assistant district attorneys, his former public defender, and several law enforcement officers arising out of his arrest and prosecution for drug trafficking crimes in Lycoming County in 2019. (Docs. 1, 16). The gravamen of White's amended complaint is that he was falsely arrested and prosecuted because he is an African American man, and that the defendants all conspired to deprive him of his due process and other constitutional rights. (See generally Doc. 16). He also asserts claims against Lycoming County regarding his conditions of confinement at the Lycoming County Prison. (Id.).
The defendants filed motions to dismiss on June 20, 2023. (Docs. 46, 48). The judicial defendants-Nancy Butts, Christian Frey, and Allen Page-have filed their motion asserting, inter alia, that they are entitled to absolute immunity from White's claims since his claims all arise out of their functions as judicial officers during his state criminal proceedings. (Doc. 46). The remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the assistant district attorney (“ADA”) defendants are entitled to absolute immunity, and that White's claims against his former public defender and the law enforcement defendants fail as a matter of law. (Doc. 48). White opposes these motions and filed a motion to amend his complaint to substitute Eric Williams, another assistant district attorney, as a defendant in place of Mark Williamson. (Doc. 55).
After consideration, we conclude that White's claims against these defendants fail as a matter of law and allowing White leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, we recommend that the motion to amend be denied, and the defendants' motions to dismiss be granted.
II. Background
White's amended complaint levels a host of claims against the defendants arising out of his state criminal prosecution for drug trafficking crimes, his incarceration at Lycoming County Prison, and his attempts to file civil lawsuits. White contends that he was arrested in April of 2019 following several controlled buys conducted in January and April, during which it was alleged that White sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant. (Doc. 16 ¶ 2). White was charged in two separate cases, CR-700-2019 and CR-1514-2019. (Id. ¶ 3). White was convicted in CR-700-2019 and acquitted in CR-1514-2019. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 14). White claims that following his arrest in April of 2019, his bail was set at $250,000.00 as a result of the charges and a state parole detainer. (Id. ¶ 2).
White received a sentence of 14 to 48 months in prison, and his case is currently pending on appeal. Commonwealth v. White, CP-41-CR-700-2019. Regarding White's case at CR-1514-2019, the docket for this case does not appear to be publicly available through the Unified Judicial System website.
The amended complaint asserts that while White was incarcerated at Lycoming County Prison on these charges, he was arrested in September of 2019 on new drug charges by Defendants Rachael and Caschera. (Doc. 16 ¶ 4). White alleges that these defendants alluded to the fact that he and others were arrested because they were African Americans, and that they would make sure bail was denied on his new charges. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5). He asserts that Rachael provided false information in his affidavit for an arrest warrant regarding a controlled buy in January of 2019, which White contends is untrue. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7).
White was arraigned on these new charges by magisterial district judge Christian Frey on September 24, 20022, and he had a preliminary hearing on October 10, 2019, in front of magisterial district judge Allen Page. (Doc. 16 ¶ 8). He alleges that Assistant District Attorney Martin Wade approved the criminal complaint and arrest warrant. (Id. ¶ 15). The amended complaint asserts that the charges were bound over for trial because Defendant Loudenslager lied under oath about the controlled buy. (Id. ¶ 8). White also asserts that Defendant Havens, who he claims is not a law enforcement officer, impersonated a law enforcement officer and assisted in the controlled buy. (Id.). At the preliminary hearing, White alleges that ADA Devin Walker directed Defendant Loudenslager to lie under oath about the controlled buy on January 29, 2019. (Id. ¶ 16). White contends that sometime later, his public defender, Jon Higgins, informed him that his motion for bail was denied, and that the Commonwealth would seek to consolidate his criminal cases if he did not accept a plea deal. (Id. ¶ 9). When White refused the plea deal, Higgins withdrew as his counsel, which White claims amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.)
Following White's rejection of the plea deal, ADA Joseph Ruby moved to consolidate White's criminal cases at CR-700-2019 and CR-1514-2019. (Doc. 16 ¶ 11). ADA Ruby also filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of White's prior bad acts at trial, including White's involvement in a failed controlled buy on January 15, 2019. (Id. ¶ 12). White further alleges generally that the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence in his criminal case. (Id. ¶ 13). After a trial on April 5, 2021, White was acquitted by a jury of the charges in CR-1514-2019. (Id. ¶ 14). He asserts that Defendant Rachael was the Commonwealth's only witness, and that Rachael testified falsely regarding the controlled buys that led to White's criminal charges. (Id.). He alleges that ADA Mark Williamson directed Defendant Rachael to lie under oath at trial. (Id. ¶ 17).
White then asserts a blanket allegation that the law enforcement defendants-Rachael, Loudenslager, Caschera, and Havens-conspired with the ADA, judicial defendants and his public defender-Gardner, Wade, Ruby, Walker, Williamson, Frey, Page, Butts, and Higgins-to deprive him of his constitutional rights because of his race. (Doc. 16 ¶ 19). In addition to these allegations regarding his criminal trial, White asserts that Judge Nancy Butts, the President Judge of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas, violated his speedy trial rights because she approved continuances of his criminal trial during the Covid-19 pandemic. (Id. ¶ 21).
White's claims against Lycoming County stem from his arrest and subsequent incarceration at Lycoming County Prison while his charges were pending. White contends that Lycoming County had a policy of arresting and harassing African American males and depriving them of equal protection. (Doc. 16 ¶ 18). He alleges that while he was incarcerated at Lycoming County Prison, he was denied access to the law library under the prison's policy that inmates who are represented by counsel do not get access to the law library. (Id. ¶ 23). He claims that Judge Butts, in her role as a member of the prison board, had an influence on prison policy, such as the policy regarding the law library. (Id.) White also claims that he was placed in the SMU and subjected to early morning showers and strip searches, which he contends was a policy of the prison and amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 28). He further asserts that two secretaries at the prison-Defendants Lepley and Shuck-refused to provide him with his inmate account statements and opened his mail regarding his civil lawsuits. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27). He alleges that these defendants were directed by Judge Butts to take these actions because she was named as a defendant in a civil lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 25).
It is against the backdrop of these allegations that White filed the instant suit against the defendants. (Docs. 1, 16). In his amended complaint, which is currently the operative pleading, White names the judicial defendants-Butts, Frey, and Page; the ADA defendants- Gardner, Ruby, Wade, Walker, and Williamson; his former public defender, Higgins; the law enforcement defendants-Rachael, Havens, Loudenslager, Caschera, and Simpler; and the County defendants- Lycoming County, Shuck, and Lepley. While the amended complaint is not entirely clear, White appears to assert his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of due process and equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and a Monell claim against the County. (Doc. 1 at 19).
White also named the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a defendant. While the docket reflects that the Commonwealth has been terminated, the amended complaint names the Commonwealth as a defendant and asserts some vague factual allegations against it. Accordingly, we will address the plaintiff's claims against the Commonwealth, supra.
The defendants have now filed two motions to dismiss. (Docs. 46, 48). As we have stated above, the judicial defendants argue, inter alia, that they are entitled to absolute immunity because White's claims against them involve their duties as judicial officers in his criminal prosecution. (Doc. 46). The ADAs, the law enforcement defendants, the County defendants, and Higgins, have also filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 48). They argue that the ADA defendants are entitled to absolute immunity, as White's claims against them arise out of their involvement in his prosecution; that White cannot assert a claim of ineffective assistance against Higgins under § 1983; and that the claims against the County and law enforcement defendants fail as a matter of law. (Doc. 48). For his part, White opposes these motions and has filed a motion to amend his complaint to substitute Eric Williams, another ADA in Lycoming County, for Mark Williamson, as a defendant. (Docs. 55, 56).
These motions are fully briefed and are ripe for resolution. For the following reasons, we recommend that the defendants' motions to dismiss be granted, and that the plaintiff's motion to amend be denied.
III. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
The defendants have filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
B. The Defendants' Motions to Dismiss should be Granted.
Our review of the amended complaint reveals that White's claims are fatally flawed in several ways. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we will recommend that the amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
1. The Commonwealth is Entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to states and state agencies that are sued by citizens in federal court. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). The Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law unless that immunity is waived or abrogated by Congress. The Commonwealth has expressly invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). This immunity is fatal to the plaintiff's claims against the Commonwealth.
While the plaintiff asserts that the Commonwealth has waived its immunity because it is covered by the Pennsylvania Counties Risk Pool (PCoRP), we find this argument entirely unavailing. “PCoRP is an intergovernmental trust, the purpose of which is to provide various insurance coverages to Pennsylvania counties by ‘pooling,' or sharing risk and resources.” Pennsylvania County Risk Pool v. Northland Ins., 2009 WL 506369, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2009). White points to no authority, and our research has yielded no authority providing that Pennsylvania's participation in PCoRP constitutes an express waiver of the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
In addition, the plaintiff may not bring a damages action pursuant to § 1983 against the state or its agencies. It is well established that a state and its agencies are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, all claims against the Commonwealth should be dismissed.
2. The Judicial Defendants are Entitled to Absolute Immunity.
White's claims against the judicial defendants-Butts, Page, and Frey-should also be dismissed, as these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity. It is well settled that state judges are entitled to immunity from civil liability for claims arising out of acts taken in their official capacities. As the Third Circuit has explained, “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity from suit.” Kwasnik v. LeBlon, 228 Fed.Appx. 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)).
Here, White's claims against these defendants arise solely out of their duties as judicial officers during his criminal prosecutions. White states that Judge Frey presided over his arraignment on September 24, 2019, and set his bail. (Doc. 16 ¶ 6). Judge Page presided over his preliminary hearing in October of 2019 and the charges were bound over for trial. (Id. ¶ 8). Judge Butts authorized continuances of criminal cases during the Covid-19 pandemic. (Id. ¶ 21). The defendants' were clearly performing their official duties as judicial officers in White's criminal cases, and therefore, the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from these claims.
We note that to the extent White is asserting a speedy trial claim, this claim would fail as a matter of law, absent immunity, since courts in this circuit have held that continuance of criminal trials and tolling of the speedy trial clock due to the Covid-19 pandemic did not violate defendants' speedy trial rights. See e.g., United States v. Briggs, 471 F.Supp.3d 634, 639-40 (E.D. Pa. 2020); United States v. Katz, 2021 WL 1251711, at *2 (D.N.J. April 5, 2021); United States v. Shaner, 2020 WL 6700954, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2020).
We will address White's claim against Judge Butts in her capacity as a member of the prison board along with the merits of the plaintiff's claims against the County and law enforcement defendants, supra.
3. The ADA Defendants are Entitled to Absolute Immunity.
Similarly, White's claim against the ADA defendants should be dismissed because these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity. It is well established that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from false arrest and malicious prosecution claims involving their activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). This is true even where a prosecutor is alleged to have knowingly used false testimony at trial. Id.; Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F.Supp. 351, 366 (D.N.J. 1983) (collecting cases).
White's allegations against these defendants clearly encompass their duties as prosecutors in his criminal cases. The amended complaint asserts that ADA Wade approved the arrest warrant and criminal complaint for White's case in CR-1514-2019 (Doc 16 ¶ 15); that ADA Ruby attempted to consolidate White's criminal cases and introduce evidence of his prior bad acts (Id. ¶¶ 11-12); that ADA Walker directed Loudenslager to testify falsely at White's preliminary hearing (Id. ¶ 16); and that ADA Williamson directed Rachael to lie on the stand at White's trial. (Id. ¶ 17). Thus, White's allegations against these defendants involve their actions in prosecuting his criminal cases. Accordingly, these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity and the claims against them should be dismissed.
In a similar vein, we note that White's motion to amend seeks to substitute another ADA defendant for ADA Williamson, alleging that ADA Eric Williams directed Rachael to lie under oath at trial. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 17). However, White's claim against Williams would similarly fail, as Williams would be entitled to absolute immunity as to this claim. Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion to amend should be denied as futile. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997) (“‘Futility' means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”) (citations omitted).
4. White cannot Assert an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim against his Public Defender under § 1983.
White also asserts a claim against his former defense counsel, Higgins, alleging that Higgins provided ineffective assistance of counsel in his state criminal case. However, “ineffective assistance of appointed counsel in representing a defendant is not actionable under § 1983.” Introcaso v. Meegan, 338 Fed.Appx. 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981)). The Supreme Court of the United States has held that public defenders “do[] not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk, 454 U.S. at 325.
Because Higgins was acting as White's criminal defense counsel at the time of his alleged conduct, he was not acting under color of state law and cannot be subject to liability under § 1983. Accordingly, White's claims against Higgins should also be dismissed.
5. White has not Established Monell Liability against Lycoming County.
White has also failed to establish § 1983 liability with respect to Lycoming County. White alleges, in a broad and conclusory fashion, that the County had a policy of arresting African American men in “round ups,” and that the prison had a policy of subjecting prisoners in the SMU to strip searches and early morning showers, which he contends was punishment.
A municipal entity may be liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983 if the violation was a direct result of the entity's policy, custom or practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695. However, an entity may not be held liable “solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.” Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct causal link” between the alleged constitutional violation and the municipal policy or custom. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). A plaintiff may show that either an official policy of the municipality was the moving force behind the violation, or that the municipality had an informal custom such that it operated as the municipality's policy. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. In either scenario, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the policy or custom was implemented or acquiesced in by a policymaker. Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990).
Here, White's amended complaint asserts nothing more than bare, conclusory allegations regarding the County. As we have noted, White claims that the County had a policy of conducting large round-up style arrests of African American men because of their race. However, White fails to set forth any allegations of an official policy regarding the arrest of African American men. Nor does he allege that a policymaker within the county had knowledge of this alleged custom and acquiesced in the practice. See Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ustom may be established by proving knowledge of, and acquiescence to, a practice.”).
Similarly, with respect to White's claims regarding his incarceration, he alleges that the prison had a policy or custom of subjecting SMU inmates to early morning showers and strip searches, which violated his rights. Not only does White fail to allege any facts to suggest that this policy or custom was implemented or acquiesced in by a decisionmaker, but he fails to allege that this policy or custom resulted in a constitutional violation. With respect to his claim that he was strip searched by prison staff, it is well settled that strip searches, alone, do not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Payton v. Vaughn, 798 F.Supp. 258, 261-62 (3d Cir. 1992) (dismissing an Eighth Amendment strip search claim where the plaintiff failed to allege the search was abusive or conducted with unnecessary force). Additionally, to the extent he is contesting the search of his cell, it is well settled that “the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). Moreover, we are unaware of any authority that states that forcing inmates to shower at a specific time of day constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Finally, White challenges the prison's policy of prohibiting SMU inmates who are represented by counsel from accessing the law library and alleges that this violated his right of access to the courts because he was unable to file a bail motion in his criminal case after his initial bail motion was denied. As to this claim, he asserts that Judge Butts, in her role as a member of the prison board, had influence over the entire prison administration, including this policy.
White sued Lycoming County and Butts, as a prison board member. “In Pennsylvania, the prison board is the authorized policymaker for county prisons, tasked with making policy decisions regarding the ‘safekeeping, discipline, and employment of inmates.'” Tarapchak v. Lackawanna Cnty., 173 F.Supp.3d 57, 85 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting 61 Pa. Const. Stat. § 1731(a)(3)). Accordingly, the prison board, not Lycoming County, would be the proper defendant. See Fleckstein v. Crawford, 2015 WL 5829758, at *27 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2015) (dismissing the County as a defendant because the prison board was the proper Monell defendant); Bradley v. Primecare Medical Inc., 2013 WL 1149267, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2013) (same). Accordingly, this Monell claim against Lycoming County should be dismissed.
6. White's Conspiracy Claims Fail as a Matter of Law.
White further asserts a wide-ranging conspiracy claim against all named defendants, alleging that they conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights because of his race. He also appears to allege a conspiracy among Judge Butts and the prison secretaries, Shuck and Lepley, to deny him access to his inmate account statements.
Noticeably absent from the amended complaint, however, are any allegations that there was a meeting of the minds among any of the defendants to deprive White of a constitutional right, a prerequisite to any § 1983 civil conspiracy claim. Startzell v. City of Phila., Pennsylvania, 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). Instead, White alleges in a conclusory fashion that the defendants conspired to “secure his conviction,” and that ADA Gardner and Judge Butts did not “try to stop” the law enforcement defendants from impersonating law enforcement officers. (Doc. 16 ¶ 19). As to the claim against Judge Butts and the prison secretaries, White contends that the secretaries, under the direction of Butts, opened his mail and denied him access to his inmate account statements. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27). We cannot infer from any of these conclusory allegations that any of the defendants came to an agreement to deprive White of his constitutional rights.
Additionally, to the extent that White is asserting a claim under § 1985(3), he must allege facts showing, inter alia, that the defendants acted with discriminatory animus based on race or another protected class, to deprive him of equal protection of the laws. See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997). Here, other than claiming that the defendants conspired to secure his conviction because of the color of his skin, there are no factual allegations from which we could even infer that the defendants acted with discriminatory animus toward White. Accordingly, these conspiracy claims should be dismissed.
7. White's Claims against the Law Enforcement Defendants and the County Defendants Fail as a Matter of Law.
Finally, White asserts claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution against the law enforcement defendants, claiming that they provided false information in their affidavits and testified falsely under oath to convict him. He additionally asserts that the prison secretaries violated his First Amendment right to petition the courts when they denied him access to his prisoner account statements, which he needed to file his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the instant case.
At the outset, we note that White's false arrest claim is time-barred. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims mirror the state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir. 2009). In Pennsylvania, this limitations period is two years from the date the cause of action accrued. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. A cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). With respect to false arrest claims, such claims “accrue[] when [the plaintiff] appear[s] before a magistrate and was bound over for trial or arraigned on charges.” Baker v. Wittevrongel, 363 Fed.Appx. 146, 150 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-92 (2007)). Here, White's complaint asserts that he was arraigned by a magistrate judge on September 24, 2019. (Doc. 16 ¶ 6). He had a preliminary hearing on October 10, 2019, and the charges were bound over for trial. (Id. ¶ 8). However, he did not file this action until October 27, 2022, more than three years later. Accordingly, this false arrest claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Moreover, White has not pleaded facts from which we can infer that he was arrested without probable cause. To state a claim for false arrest under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts to establish that he was arrested without probable cause. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995). Probable cause exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by the person being arrested.” United States v. Meyers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
Here, White simply asserts that the facts contained in Rachael's affidavit of probable cause, which recounted the controlled buy on January 29, 2019, were “entirely false” and made “with a reckless disregard for the truth[.]” (Doc. 16 ¶ 7). White alleges no facts from which we can infer that Detective Rachael lacked probable cause to arrest and charge him. While White alleges that the statements in Rachael's affidavit were “entirely false,” he provides nothing more than this conclusory allegation to support his claim. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that White has pleaded enough to state a claim for false arrest.
White's failure to allege facts establishing a lack of probable cause is also fatal to his malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. For a malicious prosecution claim, White must allege facts to establish, inter alia, that the defendant initiated the criminal proceeding without probable cause. Thomas v. City of Phila., 290 F.Supp.3d 371, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted)). Malicious prosecution claims may be brought against law enforcement officers if they give false or misleading information to, or conceal information from the prosecuting attorneys. Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 220 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1998). Here, we have determined that White's unsupported allegations fail to establish that Rachael provided false information in his affidavit for an arrest warrant and lacked probable cause to arrest him . Accordingly, we cannot conclude that White has established that the criminal proceeding was initiated against him without probable cause. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521-22 (3d Cir. 2003); Fisher v. Matthews, 792 F.Supp.2d 745, 776 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
Finally, White asserts a First Amendment violation against the prison secretaries-Shuck and Lepley-contending that they violated his right of access to the courts because they withheld his inmate account statements. To state an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff “must establish that he was denied access to the courts and that he suffered an actual injury as a result.” Bacon v. Taylor, 414 F.Supp.2d 475, 481 (D. Del. 2006) (citing Hudson v. Robinson, 678 F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982)). Here, White contends that the actions of Shuck and Lepley hindered him from filing his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case. (Doc. 16 ¶ 27). However, it is undisputed that White, in fact, was able to file his motion and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 8). Accordingly, White cannot show that he suffered an actual injury, and this access-to-courts claim fails as a matter of law.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' motions to dismiss the amended complaint (Docs. 46, 48) be GRANTED, and that the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint (Doc. 55) be DENIED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 21st day of November 2023.