Mandell Wright v. Thomas 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969) ("In Texas, when the client, without good cause, discharges an attorney before he has completed his work, the attorney may recover on the contract for the amount of his compensation." (citing White v. Burch, 19 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1929, writ ref'd); White v. Burch, 33 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1930, writ ref'd); Cottle County v. McClintock Robertson, 150 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1941, writ dism'd judgment cor.))). One might well think that the most the client would owe in such circumstances would be the contractual fee prorated for the services the lawyer actually performed.

Mandell Wright v. Thomas 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969) ("In Texas, when the client, without good cause, discharges an attorney before he has completed his work, the attorney may recover on the contract for the amount of his compensation." (citing Myers v. Crockett, 14 Tex. 257 (1855); White v. Burch, 19 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1929, writ ref'd); White v. Burch, 33 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1930, writ ref'd); Cottle County v. McClintock Robertson, 150 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1941, writ dism'd judgment cor.))). One might well think that the most the client would owe in such circumstances would be the contractual fee prorated for the services the lawyer actually performed.

In Texas, when the client, without good cause, discharges an attorney before he has completed his work, the attorney may recover on the contract for the amount of his compensation. Myers v. Crockett, 14 Tex. 257 (1855); White v. Burch, 19 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Civ.App., 1929, writ ref'd); White v. Burch, 33 S.W.2d 512 (Tix.Civ.App., 1930, writ ref'd); Cottle County v. McClintock Robertson, 150 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Civ.App., 1941, writ dism'd, judgment correct). The trial court's judgment awarded Mandell Wright an undivided one-third interest in '* * * all claims, actions, demands, or causes of action arising by operation of law for damages or other amounts due and owing to plaintiff, Mrs. Joseph (Enola M.) Thomas, or the Estate of Joseph Thomas, deceased, husband of plaintiff, because of the death of said Joseph Thomas.'

n attorney, or law firm, employed on a contingent-fee contract to undertake a specific task is discharged without cause? It appears from the annotation entitled, "Measure or basis of recovery by attorney employed under a contingent-fee contract who is discharged without fault on his part," 136 A.L.R. 231, that there is no agreement among the authorities as to the proper measure of damages. The courts of some states permit the discharged attorney to recover the full amount of the contingent fee contracted for. Jones v. Martin (1953), 41 Cal.2d 23, 256 P.2d 905; MacInnis v. Pope (1955), 134 Cal.App.2d 528, 285 P.2d 688; Carter v. Dunham (1919), 104 Kan. 59, 177 P. 533; cited with approval in Sowers v. Robertson (1936), 144 Kan. 273, 58 P.2d 1105, 1107; Harrison v. Johnson (1940), 64 Ohio App. 185, 28 N.E.2d 615; Dolph v. Speckart (1920), 94 Or. 550, 186 P. 32; Williams v. Philadelphia (1904), 208 Pa. 282, 57 A. 578; Bennett v. Sinclair Navigation Co. (D.C. Pa. 1940), 33 F. Supp. 14; and White v. Burch (Tex. 1930), 33 S.W.2d 512. Other courts only permit recovery in quantum meruit for the services performed prior to the discharge as the sole remedy. French v. Cunningham (1898), 149 Ind. 632, 49 N.E. 797, and Clayton v. Martin (1930), 108 W. Va. 571, 151 S.E. 855.

Moreover, the former judgment is decisive of all questions raised and all questions that should have been raised. White v. Burch, 33 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1930, writ ref'd). It is undisputed that plaintiff had a hearing in the Oklahoma legitimation suit at which hearing he and two other witnesses testified.

Myers v. Crockett, 14 Tex. 257 (1855); White v. Burch, 19 S.W.2d 404 (Ft. Worth Tex.Civ.App., 1929, writ ref.); White v. Burch, 33 S.W.2d 512 (Ft. Worth Tex.Civ.App., 1930, writ ref.); Cottle County v. McClintock Robertson, 150 S.W.2d 134 (Amarillo Tex.Civ.App., 1941, writ dism'd, judgment cor.). There is no merit in appellant's contention that the contract cannot be enforced in that it is contrary to the public policy of the State of Texas because, inter alia, the contract provides that Mandell Wright may compromise and settle the claim and sign 'all necessary releases, receipts, acquittances, settlements, discharges, notices or satisfactions of award, judgments or recoveries of whatsoever character, and generally do all acts and things which in their judgment are essential to the handling of this matter.'

Nor does the fact that Consumers, which was not organized either at the time of the original decree in 1915 or at the time of the order of 1938 authorizing its formation, was not a party to either proceeding prevent the application of the doctrine of res adjudicata. White v. Burch, Tex.Civ.App. 33 S.W.2d 512. The judgment, of course, is not res adjudicata of the second question herein decided of whether since the formation of Consumers and the ownership of all its stock by Swift, as authorized by the court decree, Swift has so dominated and controlled Consumers as to make it the mere agent, device, or dummy through which Swift does business, or to make Swift in fact engaged in the cottonseed oil mill and gin business in Texas without a permit to do so.

The petition in this case is skilfully drawn, but when we take the whole picture as presented, it is apparent to us that all facts and issues sought to be presented in this application and alleged to present a defense to appellee's original suit in trespass to try title (except the minutes of the loan company) existed and were in the possession and control of appellants at the time of that trial, and it is the now settled law that all issues that could have been presented and passed upon by the trial court at that time, will be deemed to have been adjudicated. Freeman v. McAninch, 87 Tex. 132, 27 S.W. 97, 47 Am.St.Rep. 79; Cleveland et al. v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063; White v. Burch, Tex.Civ.App. 33 S.W.2d 512, writ refused; Mercer v. Rubey, Tex. Civ. App. 108 S.W.2d 677, writ refused; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pribble, Tex.Civ.App. 130 S.W.2d 332, writ refused. Neither appellants' petition, nor the judgment attached thereto and made a part of the petition, discloses that appellants sought in any way a postponement of the trial when called because their attorneys had lost their evidence which, it is alleged, would show a defense to the original action.

Moreover, the Federal District Court judgment was not only decisive of all questions that were raised in said cross action, but of all questions that were involved therein and that could and should have been raised. White v. Burch, Tex. Civ. App. 33 S.W.2d 512, writ refused; Carter v. Bacle, Tex. Civ. App. 94 S.W.2d 817, writ dismissed; John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Dameron, Tex. Civ. App. 131 S.W.2d 122. There is a striking analogy between this case and the case of Mayfield Co. v. Rushing, 133 Tex. 120, 127 S.W.2d 185, 187, 124 A.L.R. 1210, in which it is said: "It is elementary that if in a former suit an issue which goes to the foundation and existence of a cause of action has been litigated, such issue cannot be again litigated in a later suit, regardless of the form it may take."

easons are cited, that the matters were all adjudicated in the severed cause; that by reason of the judgment plaintiffs have no title; that the title to the disputed land and the oil therein is quieted in appellant's co-tenants; the judgment settled the rights of all parties, including appellant whether named in the judgment or not; and that appellees have been paid for their interest in the land and there has been full accord and satisfaction of appellees' claim; and that by reason of which the court was in error in rendering judgment in this cause. To sustain his position appellant refers to Article 7391 of the statutes and to many cases from our courts, including among them, Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 73 S.W.2d 490; Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 107 S.W.2d 564, 570; Houston Oil Co. v. Village Mills Co., Tex.Com.App., 241 S.W. 122; Stark v. Hardy, Tex.Com.App., 29 S.W.2d 967; Warren v. Houston Oil Co., Tex.Com.App., 6 S.W.2d 341; White v. Burch, Tex.Civ.App. 33 S.W.2d 512, and other cases we have reviewed. The record shows that appellant neither held under nor was he in privity with any of the parties in the judgment.