Opinion
23-220-cv
01-18-2024
FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: STEVEN L. BLOCH, Silver Golub & Teitell LLP, Burlington VT (Erin Green Comite, Scott + Scott Attorney at Law LLP, Colchester, CT, on the brief). FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: ASHLEY C. PARRISH, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC (Keri E. Borders and Rebecca B. Johns, King & Spalding LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Livia M. Kiser, King & Spalding LLP, Chicago, IL, on the brief).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of January, two thousand twenty-four.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Hurd, J.).
FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: STEVEN L. BLOCH, Silver Golub & Teitell LLP, Burlington VT (Erin Green Comite, Scott + Scott Attorney at Law LLP, Colchester, CT, on the brief).
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: ASHLEY C. PARRISH, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC (Keri E. Borders and Rebecca B. Johns, King & Spalding LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Livia M. Kiser, King & Spalding LLP, Chicago, IL, on the brief).
PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges, SARALA V. NAGALA, District Judge.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED and REMANDED.
Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal from the district court's order dismissing their claims without prejudice in deference to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under what is known as the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Defendant-Appellee Beech-Nut Nutrition Company (Beech-Nut), a baby food manufacturer, alleging seventy counts based on Beech-Nut's sale of baby food products allegedly containing elevated levels of certain toxic metals. Beech-Nut filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively sought to stay the lawsuit, arguing that the FDA had primary jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims. The district court agreed and dismissed Plaintiffs' claims without prejudice. We assume the parties' familiarity with the remaining underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
"We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc., 51 F.4th 491, 503 (2d Cir. 2022). "When a district court invokes the primary jurisdiction doctrine, our standard of review is likewise de novo." Id.
"The federal courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.'" Palmer, 51 F.4th at 504 (quoting Tassy v. Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 296 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2002)). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a "'relatively narrow' exception to this obligation." Id. (quoting Goya Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 846 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir. 1988)). The primary jurisdiction doctrine is "concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties" by "allocat[ing] initial decisionmaking responsibility between courts and agencies." Ellis v. Trib. Television Co., 443 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).
Although "[n]o fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction," the Second Circuit has historically considered the four Ellis factors: "(1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional experience of judges or whether it involves technical or policy considerations within the agency's particular field of expertise; (2) whether the question at issue is particularly within the agency's discretion; (3) whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings; and (4) whether a prior application to the agency has been made." Id. at 82-83 (quotation marks omitted). In addition to considering the Ellis factors, "we must also 'balance the advantages of applying the doctrine against the potential costs resulting from complications and delay in the administrative proceedings.'" Palmer, 51 F.4th at 511 (quoting Ellis, 443 F.3d at 83); see also Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n, Inc. v. Am. Tel. &Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 225 (2d Cir. 1995).
Here, we need not weigh the Ellis factors because we conclude that any advantages of deferring to the FDA under the primary jurisdiction doctrine are outweighed by the potential costs resulting from the delay in administrative proceedings. In deferring under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the district court reasoned that the FDA is presently working on its initiative, Closer to Zero: Action Plan for Baby Foods (Action Plan). See In re Beech-Nut Nutrition Co. Baby Food Litig., 651 F.Supp.3d 629, 636 (N.D.N.Y. 2023). The district court explained that under the Action Plan, "by April 2024, the FDA plans to finalize action levels for lead and propose action levels for arsenic, with cadmium and mercury consideration and decisions to follow." Id.
But since the district court's decision, the FDA has abandoned these previously announced timelines. See Closer to Zero: Reducing Childhood Exposure to Contaminants from Food, FDA (Dec. 18, 2023), https://www.fda.gov/food/environmental-contaminants-food/closer-zero-reducing-childhood-exposure-contaminants-foods [https://perma.cc/7HJN-LXR6]. The FDA no longer expects to finalize lead action levels in April 2024 and has also revised its expected timeline for issuing draft guidance on proposed action levels for arsenic and cadmium. For arsenic and cadmium, the FDA now indicates only that it expects to reach the interagency review process sometime in 2024-a step that precedes issuing draft guidance. Given the delays in even proposing action levels, the agency has unsurprisingly provided no timelines for when it expects to finalize action levels.
While this type of agency decisionmaking is typically time-consuming, deferring to the FDA would "unnecessarily prolong [this] case," likely for upwards of several years. See Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 988 F.3d 618, 629 (2d Cir. 2021). On balance, we conclude that the potential costs resulting from these indefinite delays outweigh any possible benefits that could be obtained from deferring to the agency.
For the forgoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.
Judge Sarala V. Nagala, of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.