White Plains v. Sports Inter

18 Citing cases

  1. Times Square JV LLC v. 1601 Enters. (In re Times Square JV LLC)

    659 B.R. 408 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Under New York law, terms such as those listed above are regularly enforced, as "[a] complete, clear, and unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms . . . ." See PRG Associates LP v. Planet Organic Holding Corp., 205 A.D.3d 1058, 169 N.Y.S.3d 647, 648 (2d Dept. 2022); see also White Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Town Sports Intern., LLC, 79 A.D.3d 1025, 914 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225 (2d Dept. 2010) ("[W]hen parties set down their agreement in a clear, complete document, their writing should . . . be enforced according to its terms . . . [and] [t]his rule is especially important in commercial transactions negotiated between sophisticated parties . . . ."). For these reasons, there is no material factual dispute as to the elements of Plaintiff's breach of contract claim against 1601 Enterprises, and summary judgment is therefore GRANTED with respect to that claim.

  2. Summit Mountain Holding Grp. v. Summit Vill. Dev. Lender 1

    1:21-cv-00110-DBB-JCB (D. Utah Nov. 27, 2024)

    Loughlin v. Meghji, 186 A.D.3d 1633, 1639, 132 N.Y.S.3d 65, 73 (2020) (citing Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v 538 Madison Realty Co., 1 N.Y.3d 470, 475, 807 N.E.2d 876, 879 (2004)). White Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Town Sports Int'l, LLC, 79 A.D.3d 1025, 1028, 914 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225 (2010); Wallace v. 600 Partners Co., 86 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 658 N.E.2d 715, 717 (1995) (internal citations omitted). “Clear, unambiguous contractual terms must be enforced according to their plain meaning; when the terms are clear and unambiguous, the court cannot look beyond the four corners of the contract.

  3. PRG Assocs. P'ship v. Planet Organic Holding Corp.

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 3410 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)

    Hochberger appeals, and the plaintiff cross-appeals. A complete, clear, and unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms (see W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162; White Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v Town Sports Intl., LLC, 79 A.D.3d 1025, 1027). Here, in support of its cross motion, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that the clear and unambiguous terms of Hochberger's guaranty applied to the payment obligations of Mrs. Green's under the lease agreement during a holdover period following the expiration of the lease term on February 14, 2015.

  4. Spodek v. Neiss

    200 A.D.3d 952 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)   Cited 2 times

    , the Supreme Court did not violate the law of the case doctrine when it, upon renewal, denied their motion to dismiss the Fried defendants’ cross claims insofar as asserted against them, because, among other reasons, the law of the case doctrine does not prevent a proper motion for leave to renew under CPLR 2221 (seeMatter of Quattrone v. Erie–2–Chautauqua Cattaraugus Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 148 A.D.3d 1553, 1554, 50 N.Y.S.3d 208 ; Stern v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 59 A.D.3d 930, 931–932, 872 N.Y.S.2d 618 ; Ferguson v. Shu Ham Lam, 59 A.D.3d 388, 389, 872 N.Y.S.2d 530 ). Moreover, the doctrine is not binding on an appellate court (seeWhite Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Town Sports Intl., LLC, 79 A.D.3d 1025, 1027, 914 N.Y.S.2d 222 ). The court correctly, upon renewal, denied the Neiss defendants’ motion in light of the newly discovered facts elicited at trial, particularly the trial testimony of the attorney who had simultaneously represented the Neiss defendants and the Fried defendants, which supported the court's conclusion, in effect, that the Neiss defendants should be equitably estopped from invoking the statute of limitations defense with respect to the Fried defendants’ cross claims (seeZumpano v. Quinn, 6 N.Y.3d 666, 673–674, 816 N.Y.S.2d 703, 849 N.E.2d 926 ; Quadrozzi v. Estate of Quadrozzi, 99 A.D.3d 688, 691, 952 N.Y.S.2d 74 ).

  5. Ahmed v. Carrington Mortg.

    189 A.D.3d 960 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)

    As such, law of the case is necessarily amorphous in that it directs a court's discretion, but does not restrict its authority’ " ( Matter of Mazur Bros. Realty, LLC v. State of New York, 117 A.D.3d 949, 952, 987 N.Y.S.2d 74, quoting People v. Evans, 94 N.Y.2d at 503, 706 N.Y.S.2d 678, 727 N.E.2d 1232 ). Moreover, "this Court is not bound by the Supreme Court's prior determination pursuant to the law of the case doctrine" ( Odierna v. RSK, LLC, 171 A.D.3d 769, 772, 97 N.Y.S.3d 199 ; seeWhite Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Town Sports Intl., LLC, 79 A.D.3d 1025, 1027, 914 N.Y.S.2d 222 ; Wynkoop v. County of Nassau, 139 A.D.2d 731, 732, 527 N.Y.S.2d 482 ). We agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the plaintiff failed to prove damages on the breach of contract cause of action.

  6. Seabring, LLC v. Elegance Rest. Furniture Corp.

    188 A.D.3d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)   Cited 7 times

    "In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial court, and the Appellate Division may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses" ( Moshell v. Alter , 186 A.D.3d 702, 703, 127 N.Y.S.3d 332 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the lease entitled the plaintiff to recover "holdover rent" equal to 150% of the last monthly base rent for the period from January 1, 2013, to April 15, 2013 (seeWhite Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Town Sports Intl., LLC , 79 A.D.3d 1025, 1027, 914 N.Y.S.2d 222 ). Furthermore, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination that Yuan was personally liable for "holdover rent" and other expenses from January 1, 2013, through April 15, 2013, since the limited personal guaranty provided that the guaranty would remain in effect after the expiration of the lease if, among other things, Elegance remained in possession of the leased premises (seeStephen LLC v. Zazula , 171 A.D.3d 488, 95 N.Y.S.3d 819 ).

  7. Loughlin v. Meghji

    186 A.D.3d 1633 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)   Cited 4 times

    Paragraph 10.11 of the PSA clearly sets forth the intent of the parties, two sophisticated businesspeople with the benefit of counsel, that, should litigation arise out of the PSA, the "substantially prevailing party" is entitled to two times reasonable attorneys' fees. Where, as here, "there is no deception or overreaching" in the making of such agreement, the agreement should be enforced as written ( Lawrence v. Graubard Miller, 11 N.Y.3d 588, 596 n 4, 873 N.Y.S.2d 517, 901 N.E.2d 1268 ; seeWhite Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Town Sports Intl., LLC, 79 A.D.3d 1025, 1028, 914 N.Y.S.2d 222 ; Glen Banks, New York Contract Law § 22:42 [28 West's N.Y. Prac Series Aug. 2020 Update] ). Moreover, while each party asserted in the Supreme Court, and asserts on appeal, that he should prevail and be treated as the prevailing party for the purpose of paragraph 10.11, neither party contended in the Supreme Court that the double attorneys' fees provision of paragraph 10.11 should not be enforced.

  8. White Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Cappelli Enterprises, Inc.

    127 A.D.3d 1220 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    CEI further agreed to pay promptly, when due, all “rents, tax increase payments, operating increase payments and any and all other charges of any nature due from [TSIWP] under the [commercial] Lease” from the time TSIWP vacated the demised premises. Upon the petitioner's appeal from the 2009 judgment, this Court reversed the 2009 judgment insofar as appealed from, and awarded the petitioner additional damages (see White Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Town Sports Intl., LLC, 79 A.D.3d 1025, 914 N.Y.S.2d 222 ). In 2011, the Supreme Court entered a judgment (hereinafter the 2011 judgment) in the petitioner's favor and against TSIWP for the unpaid additional damages.

  9. White Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Cappelli Enters. Inc.

    108 A.D.3d 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)   Cited 11 times

    Upon the petitioner's appeal from the 2009 judgment, this Court reversed the 2009 judgment insofar as appealed from, and awarded the petitioner additional damages ( see White Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v. Town Sports Intl., LLC, 79 A.D.3d 1025, 914 N.Y.S.2d 222). In 2011, the Supreme Court entered a judgment (hereinafter the 2011 judgment) in the petitioner's favor and against TSIWP for the unpaid additional damages.

  10. Powell v. Kasper

    84 A.D.3d 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 9 times

    As such, upon Kasper's resubmission of his summary judgment motion to Justice Kelly, the Supreme Court was barred from making a new determination on the issue of the motion's timeliness ( see Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d 162, 165; RPG Consulting, Inc. v Zormati, 82 AD3d 739; Baldasano v Bank of N.Y., 199 AD2d 184, 185). However, because the law of the case doctrine does not bind an appellate court ( see Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d at 165; White Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v Town Sports Int'l., LLC, 79 AD3d 1025, 1027; Lehman v North Greenwich Landscaping, LLC, 65 AD3d at 1295), we must consider whether Kasper's motion was untimely pursuant to the 90-day deadline set forth in the stipulation. The stipulation provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny party may submit a summary judgment motion within 90 days following completion of EBTs."