Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-cv-38
05-02-2022
DAMION D. WHITAKER, Plaintiff, v. ERIC ARMEL, et al ., Defendants.
W. Scott Hardy District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMONDATION
Lisa Pupo Lenihan United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's “Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order” (ECF No. 22) be construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order and be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff, Damion Whitaker, a prisoner currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and confined at SCI-Fayette, initiated this case in January 2022. Pursuant to this Court's Order dated April 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint that was docketed on April 28, 2022. (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint names as defendants SCI-Fayette and 27 individuals, all of whom appear to be employees at SCI-Fayette. While his claims are difficult to decipher, it appears that they stem from an incident that involved the use of force and OC spray on November 4, 2021.
Currently pending before the Court is what Plaintiff has labeled an “Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, ” which will be construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order against the defendants (“Motion”). In it, Plaintiff states that the defendants have harassed and retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit by, among other things, putting him on grievance restriction, denying him access to the court, refusing him his yard time, losing his commissary orders, destroying his property and legal work, calling him a “rat” to gang members, throwing his food on the floor, denying him dental care, and making him stay in a cell with sewage water in the sink. He requests that the Court order the defendants to stay away from him and prohibit them from talking about this lawsuit to anyone.
B. Standard of Review
Motions for preliminary injunctive relief are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. To obtain a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, a movant “must satisfy the traditional four-factor test: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest favors such relief.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the movant's burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).
Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1). In contrast, a “court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney” if certain conditions are met. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1).
Preliminary injunctive relief “is not granted as a matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982), see also Thomas v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 3:13-CV-2661, 2014 WL 3955105, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (“An injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy' that is never awarded as of right.”). Rather, the decision to grant or deny such relief is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1982).
Generally, preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that places precise burdens on the moving party, and “[t]he preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). Further, where the requested preliminary injunctive relief “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnet v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). Mandatory injunctions should be used sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982).
For a party to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998); Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. “As these elements suggest, there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.'” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). “To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the moving party must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action.” Sutton v. Cerullo, 3:CV-10-1899, 2014 WL 3900235, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014). To establish irreparable injury, “the moving party must establish that the harm is imminent and probable.” Stilp v. Contino, 629 F.Supp.2d 449, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2009). “The mere risk of injury is not sufficient to meet this standard.” Id. And the burden of showing irreparable injury “is not an easy burden” to meet. Moore v. Mann, 3:CV-13-2771, 2014 WL 3893903, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug 7, 2014). In assessing a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the court must also consider the harm to the defendants and whether granting the preliminary injunction will be in the public interest. New Jersey Retail Merchants Ass'n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 2012).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
C. Discussion
With the above considerations in mind, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is warranted in this case. First and foremost, Plaintiff has not established a nexus between the injuries claimed in his Motion and the conduct asserted in the Amended Complaint. Specifically, the issuance of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the court has an opportunity to rule on the merits of the pending lawsuit. However, the injuries claimed in his Motion appear to bear no relation to the pending action. See Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that “there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint”); Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 111 F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of interim equitable relief is to protect the movant, during the pendency of the action, from being harmed or further harmed in the manner in which the movant contends [he] was or will be harmed through the illegality alleged in the complaint.”); Ball, 396 Fed.Appx. at 838 (affirming the denial of injunctive relief because the individuals whose conduct the plaintiff sought to enjoin were not named as defendants in the action and because most of the relief she was requesting was completely unrelated to the allegations in her amended complaint); Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that because plaintiff's motion was based on new assertions of mistreatment that are entirely different from the claim raised and the relief requested in the original lawsuit, they cannot provide the basis for a preliminary injunction); Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is maintenance of the status quo until a decision on the merits of a case is rendered.”); see also Spencer v. Stapler, No. 04-1532, 2006 WL 2052704, *9 (D. Ariz. July 21, 2006) (denying plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief because it concerns events that are unrelated to the subject of his complaint and concerns conduct of persons other than the named defendants); Westbank Yellow Pages v. BRI, Inc., No. 96-1128, 1996 WL 255912, *1 (E.D. La. May 13, 1996) (determining that a preliminary injunction is not an appropriate vehicle for trying to obtain relief that is not sought in the underlying action); Williams v. Platt, 2006 WL 149124, *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18, 2006) (concluding that “[a] preliminary injunction would be inappropriate to address wrongs wholly unrelated to the complaint”). Specifically, the Motion for Injunctive Relief contains new assertions of mistreatment by the defendants that are different than the claims raised by Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff believes that these new allegations of misconduct somehow violate his constitutional rights, then he must pursue them in a separate civil action.
Nevertheless, based solely on the allegations in the Motion itself, and to the extent any of them do actually bear relation to those within the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has not shown an immediate irreparable injury justifying the grant of the relief he is requesting. Irreparable injury is established by showing that the plaintiff will suffer harm that “cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm”). In this context, the word irreparable has a specific meaning and connotes “that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, [or] atoned for ....” Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (citations omitted). Thus, an injunction will not issue “simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury . . . .” Id. at 655 (citation omitted). Plaintiff, who has the burden of showing an imminent threat of irreparable injury, has failed to meet this precise burden with respect to his request for preliminary injunctive relief.
Moreover, granting the requested preliminary injunctive relief would “effectively have the federal courts making ad hoc, and individual, decisions concerning the treatment of a single prisoner, [which] could harm both the defendants' and the public's interest.” Kelly v. Merrill, 2014 WL 7740025, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014); see generally Jenkins v. Crayton, 2013 WL 3467191, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2013) (“The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the ‘operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.'” (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974)). Accordingly, the balance of the hardships also does not weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff his requests for preliminary injunctive relief.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's “Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order” (ECF No. 22) be construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order and be denied.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.