(Punctuation omitted.) Whitaker Acres, Inc. v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 240 ( 316 SE2d 537) (1984). The August 1, 2006 tax deed acquired by Brown Investment at the tax sale of the property did not convey legal title to the property; rather it conveyed "an inchoate or defeasible title, subject to the right of the owner[s, the defendants in fi. fa.,] to redeem within the time prescribed by [OCGA § 48-4-40]."

See Kiel v. Johnson, 179 Ga. App. 43, 345 S.E.2d 131 (1986) (alteration of water flow caused accumulation of silt and debris; restoration costs allowed as measure of damages); Raymar, Inc. v. Peachtree Golf Club, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 336, 287 S.E.2d 768 (1982) (cost of restoring golf course damaged by flow of water, silt, and mud from construction site allowed as measure of damages; court did not elaborate on relative costs); Payne v. Whiting, 140 Ga. App. 390, 231 S.E.2d 796 (1976) (defendant changed flow of water and thereby caused accumulation of sediment in plaintiff's pond; plaintiff built sediment pond to cure, brought suit, and court allowed recovery of cost clear sediment from the original pond — i.e., restoration cost; court did not elaborate on relative costs). But cf. Whitacker Acres, Inc. v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 241-42, 316 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1984) (suggesting that restoration costs are not a proper measure of damages for injuries to land itself — as opposed to improvements only — in cases not involving a continuing trespass). Although Georgia courts have allowed the restoration costs as damages for past invasions, no Georgia opinion directly considers whether such a measure is appropriate when the restoration costs exceed the injured land's diminution in value.

The general rule in Georgia is that "the measure of damages involving real property is the diminution in fair market value of the land, that is, the difference in the value of the property before and after the injury." Whitaker Acres, Inc. v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 241, 316 S.E.2d 537 (1984). The cost of restoration has been used as an exception to the general rule in the following situations: (1) an action "involv[ing] damage to any building or structure of the property," (2) an action "involv[ing] a continuing trespass which can be remedied by the making of certain `repairs' to the property," and (3) an action "involv[ing] the loss of an article having no market value."

]" Coffin v. Barbaree, 214 Ga. 149, 151 ( 103 SE2d 557) (1958). See also Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 240 (2) ( 316 SE2d 537) (1984). It is well-settled that the title acquired by the purchaser of a tax deed is "not a perfect fee simple title, but rather an inchoate or defeasible title subject to the right of redemption.

1. The title acquired by a purchaser of a tax deed "`is not a perfect fee-simple title, but an inchoate or defeasible title, subject to the right of the owner to redeem within the time prescribed by the statute.' [Cit.]" Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk, 70 Ga. App. 238, 240 (2) ( 316 S.E.2d 537) (1984). Appellant's predecessors had an absolute right to redeem the property "[a]t any time within 12 months from the date of the sale," OCGA § 48-4-40 (1), but it is uncontroverted that they failed to exercise that right. Blizzard v. Moniz, 271 Ga. 50, 53 ( 518 S.E.2d 407) (1999); Moultrie v. Wright, 266 Ga. 30, 32 (1) ( 464 S.E.2d 194) (1995).

In so doing, the trial court used the incorrect measure of damages for an intentional trespass. See Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 241 ( 316 S.E.2d 537) (1984). Id.

Although the purchaser at a tax sale receives a deed to the property, this tax deed does not vest in the purchaser absolute title to the property. Whitaker Acres, Inc. v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 240 (2) ( 316 S.E.2d 537) (1984). The "title" that the purchaser acquires is subordinate to the right of the defendant in fi. fa. to redeem the property, "and until the expiration of the period which the law fixes in which [the defendant in fi. fa.] might exercise this right [his] title as owner is not divested."

We are unpersuaded by the claim and find that under the circumstances the appellants’ unauthorized "entry [and cutting of timber] upon the premises would be a trespass upon the possession, actual or constructive, of [Advesco]." Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk , 170 Ga. App. 238, 240 (2), 316 S.E.2d 537 (1984) (citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). The trial court did not err in concluding that Advesco was entitled to recover reforestation damages.

In this respect, the defendant in fi. fa. retains the right to possess the property until the redemption period has been terminated, and the tax deed purchaser “is not entitled to possession, or to rents, issues, and profits during the time allowed for redemption.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Whitaker Acres, Inc. v. Schrenk, 170 Ga.App. 238, 240(2), 316 S.E.2d 537 (1984). Moreover, a tax deed purchaser does not have fee simple title to the property purchased at the tax sale, but rather a defeasible title subject to the defendant in fi. fa.'s right to redeem.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Whitaker Acres, Inc. v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 240 (2) (316 SE2d 537) (1984). Moreover, a tax deed purchaser does not have fee simple title to the property purchased at the tax sale, but rather a defeasible title subject to the defendant in fi. fa.'s right to redeem.