To the extent that Petitioner claims the verdict was ambiguous, this is a matter purely of state law which must be raised in the trial court before the discharge of the jury. Otherwise, it is waived on appeal. Whilden v. State, 301 So.2d 35, 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (form of verdict must be objected to in trial court before discharge of jury or claim is waived); Licata v. State, 88 So. 621, 622 (Fla. 1921) (any words which convey beyond reasonable doubt meaning and intention of jury are sufficient for criminal verdict). The Court can find no constitutional basis for this claim, and therefore, it is not subject to further consideration in this proceeding.
In so deciding, we observe that courts have repeatedly adhered to the requirement of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.570, providing that an objection to any irregularity in a verdict must be raised while the jury is still in court. See, e.g., Whilden v. State, 301 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Pineiro v. State, 615 So.2d 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Wolfram v. State, 568 So.2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Denmark thus waived any challenge to the verdict.
First, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.570 requires that objections to verdicts be raised before the jury is discharged. See also Whilden v. State, 301 So.2d 35, 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). A timely objection and request for cure would have allowed the trial court to cause the jury to further deliberate in order to correct the mistaken verdict. See Griffin v. State, 414 So.2d 1025, 1028-29 (Fla. 1982) (court may send a jury back for further deliberation to correct a mistaken verdict).
and squarely held that a verdict such as the instant one must be set aside. The state contends, first, that since Spadaro did not object to the form of the verdict prior to the jury's initial release, he waived any objection as to form, citing this court's opinion in Whilden v. State, 301 So.2d 35 (1 Fla.App. 1974), and the Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Jones, 204 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1967). In Whilden, this court observed that defense counsel affirmatively stated that he had no objection to the form of the verdict and that the verdict was in such a form that a lesser included offense could be ascertained.
He was convicted of the "lesser included offense" of "breaking and entering or entering without breaking with intent to commit a misdemeanor" (a violation of ยง 810.05, Florida Statutes, 1973). He appeals the judgment and sentence. Appellant recognizes that in Whilden v. State, Fla.App. (1st), 301 So.2d 35 (1974), this court, when confronted with such a verdict and judgment, remanded the case to the trial court "with instructions to enter judgment and sentence on the lesser of the included offenses referred to in the verdict." Appellant requests that we reconsider such previous ruling in the light of O'Neal v. State, Fla.App. 2d, 308 So.2d 569 (1975).
Admission into evidence of collateral offenses which do not fall within one or more of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule is error requiring reversal. Whilden v. State, 25 Ga. 396 (71 Am. D. 181); Cawthon v. State, supra; Alsobrook v. State, 126 Ga. 100 (3) ( 54 S.E. 805); Gay v. State, 115 Ga. 204 ( 41 S.E. 685); Bashinski v. State, 123 Ga. 508 (4) ( 51 S.E. 499); Daniel v. State, supra; Fountain v. State, 149 Ga. 519 (5) ( 101 S.E. 294); Booth v. State, 160 Ga. 271 ( 127 S.E. 733); Cox v. State, 165 Ga. 145 (1) ( 139 S.E. 861); Lanier v. State, 187 Ga. 534 ( 1 S.E.2d 405); Anderson v. State, 206 Ga. 527 ( 57 S.E.2d, 563); Holmes v. State, 12 Ga. App. 359 (2) ( 77 S.E. 187); Shealey v. State, 16 Ga. App. 191 ( 84 S.E. 839); Clarke v. State, supra; Cooper v. State, 13 Ga. App. 697 (2) ( 79 S.E. 908); Livingston v. State, 17 Ga. App. 136 (2) ( 86 S.E. 449); Grace v. State, 19 Ga. App. 606 ( 92 S.E. 231); Williams v. State, 51 Ga. App. 319 ( 180 S.E. 369); Robinson v. State, 62 Ga. App. 355 ( 7 S.E.2d 758); Palmer v. State, supra. It is contended that the record of the previous conviction for a crime of the same sort as that for which the defendant was on trial