Opinion
Case No. 4:21-cv-437-AW-MAF
2022-09-07
Seth Elias WHIDDON and Hannah Nicole Letchworth, Plaintiffs, v. SERVICE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL, et al., Defendants.
Jackie Lee Fulford, Law Office of Jackie Fulford, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiffs. Ted Christopher Craig, GrayRobinson PA, Miami, FL, for Defendants Service Corporation International, SCI Funeral Services of Florida LLC. Aubrey Gage Smith, Smith Gambrell & Russell LLP, Jacksonville, FL, Richard Edward Ramsey, Wicker Smith O'Hara etc., Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant Wilbert Funeral Services Inc.
Jackie Lee Fulford, Law Office of Jackie Fulford, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiffs. Ted Christopher Craig, GrayRobinson PA, Miami, FL, for Defendants Service Corporation International, SCI Funeral Services of Florida LLC. Aubrey Gage Smith, Smith Gambrell & Russell LLP, Jacksonville, FL, Richard Edward Ramsey, Wicker Smith O'Hara etc., Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant Wilbert Funeral Services Inc. ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT Allen Winsor, United States District Judge
Plaintiffs sued a funeral home and related entities, asserting several state-law causes of action. The crux of Plaintiffs' claim is that they suffered emotional harm after defendants mishandled their child's burial. Defendant Wilbert Funeral Services moved for summary judgment, ECF No. 62, and this order grants that motion.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" when it might impact the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id.
At the summary-judgment stage, a court's role is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In making that determination, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995).
BACKGROUND
The following are the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. SCI Funeral Services of Florida, LLC (SCI Florida), does business as Culley's MeadowWood Funeral Home. See ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 7. Plaintiffs contracted with Culley's to bury their child. ECF No. 74 at 5. Culley's ordered a 30-inch casket, but before the burial, Culley's told the mother (Plaintiff Nicole Letchworth) that they ordered a longer casket because the 30-inch model was too small. Id. at 5-6.
Parties must cite "particular parts of materials in the record" to support their factual assertions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The court "need consider only the cited materials," and I have declined to consider materials provided but not cited. See id. 56(c)(3); accord N.D. Fla. Loc. R 56.1(F).
SCI Florida was originally a defendant but has since settled. See ECF No. 83.
SCI Florida contracted with Wilbert Funeral Services to perform the burial. Id. at 9. As the casket was lowered into the ground, Letchworth noticed it was not level. ECF No. 74-5 ¶ 13. A Culley's funeral director told her it would be "fixed" and would "settle." Id. ¶ 14. But sometime after the burial, Letchworth saw "a portion of the vault above the ground." Id. at ¶ 17. Then, at Plaintiffs' request, Wilbert Funeral Services disinterred the vault and reburied it. Culley's staff was there for the reburial, as were Plaintiffs. ECF No. 74 at 8. The father (Plaintiff Seth Whiddon) helped carry and rebury the casket, and both parents sat with—and touched—the casket during the process.
Defendants contend that no part of the vault was above ground, but I accept Plaintiffs' account at this stage.
The record includes photos of both parents leaning on the casket, of Whiddon carrying it, and of Letchworth lying on top of it. ECF No. 74-4 at 1-6.
Since the reburial, Letchworth sometimes "can't go to [the] grave without puking" or getting headaches. ECF No. 74-1 at 2:8-10. Letchworth has also experienced nausea, "not getting out of bed," anxiety, panic attacks, and headaches. ECF No. 62-4 at 7:2-9. And Whiddon has experienced, among other things, inability to focus, upset stomach, lack of sleep, sweaty palms, lightheadedness, and dizziness. ECF No. 62-6 at 11-12. see also ECF No. 74-2 at 8:4-8; ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 104.
Based on these facts, Plaintiffs claim negligence (Count I), gross negligence (Count II), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count III), intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress (Count IV), tortious interference with a dead body (Count V), and tortious outrage (Count VI). Plaintiffs' claims all arise under Florida law, which binds the court in this diversity action. See LaTorre v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 538, 540 (11th Cir. 1994).
ANALYSIS
Counts I and III
"[B]efore a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another, the emotional distress suffered must flow from physical injuries sustained in an impact." Rowell v. Holt, 850 So. 2d 474, 477-78 (Fla. 2003) (quoting R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995)). This rule—known as the "impact rule" serves "primarily as a limitation to assure a tangible validity of claims for emotional or psychological harm." Id. at 478 (collecting cases).
Wilbert Funeral Services moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' negligence claims—Counts I and III—contending that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the impact rule. Plaintiffs respond that, as shown in the photos, their leaning on the casket, carrying it, and helping bury it satisfy the impact rule.
The problem with Plaintiffs' argument is that voluntarily touching the casket is not an "impact" under Florida law. "In numerous cases . . . the courts have found that the impact rule was not satisfied because, although there may have been some 'touching,' it did not rise to the level of impact." Zell v. Meek, 665 So. 2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (Fla. 1995) (citation omitted). For example, in an emotional-distress claim based on a medical misdiagnosis, "the touching of a patient by a doctor and the taking of blood for ordinary testing would not qualify" as an "impact." R.J., 652 So. 2d at 364. If taking of a patient's blood is not an impact, it is hard to see how voluntarily touching or holding a casket is.
Plaintiffs' fallback argument is that their case meets an exception to the impact rule: If emotional distress is "manifested by physical injury," the plaintiff was " 'involved' in the incident by seeing[ or] hearing" it, and the physical injury manifested " 'within a short time' of the incident," a plaintiff can recover even without a physical impact. Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, LLC, 967 So. 2d 846, 850 (Fla. 2007) (quoting and citing with approval Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)). But "intangible, mental injuries are insufficient." R.J., 652 So. 2d at 364. And Plaintiffs rely on symptoms mirroring those courts found intangible, mental injuries rather than physical. See, e.g., id. (hypertension); Elliott v. Elliott, 58 So. 3d 878, 882 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (anxiety, headaches, diabetes, sleep apnea, insomnia, hair loss, bowel trouble).
Plaintiffs specifically point to their vomiting as a physical injury, but this too is insufficient. Recovery for emotional injury evinced by vomiting has only been allowed after ingesting a contaminated food or drink, see Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 804 So. 2d 1234, 1240-41 (Fla. 2001) (listing relevant cases), because ingestion itself is an impact, id. at 1242. Here, where Plaintiffs suffered no impact, "there is no accurate method of separating the natural grief resulting from the death of a loved one from the additional grief suffered as a result of mishandling of the body." Gonzalez v. Metro. Dade Cnty. Pub. Health Tr., 651 So. 2d 673, 676 (Fla. 1995).
Plaintiffs have not provided evidence from which a jury could conclude they suffered physical impact or injury. Wilbert Funeral Services is thus entitled to summary judgment on Counts I and III.
Counts II, IV, V, and VI
The impact rule does not preclude claims based on outrageous, willful, or wanton conduct. Williams v. Boyd-Panciera Fam. Funeral Care, Inc., 293 So. 3d 499, 501 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020); see also Gonzalez, 651 So. 2d at 676 (holding recovery of emotional distress damages in an action for mishandling "a dead body requires proof of either physical injury or willful or wanton misconduct"). Plaintiffs' Counts II, IV, V, and VI all require proving this heightened level of conduct. Wilbert Funeral Services seeks summary judgment on these counts, arguing there is no evidence it acted willfully, wantonly, or maliciously.
See Matsumoto v. Am. Burial & Cremation Servs., Inc., 949 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (construing claim for tortious interference with dead body as "claim for outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress"); id. (noting that Florida torts of outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress have same elements); cf. also Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658, 669-70 (Fla. 1982) (holding plaintiffs did not plead action for "wanton and willful negligence" because complaint did not allege instances of "malice" or "gross negligence").
Beyond largely conclusory statements that Wilbert Funeral Services "intentionally, knowingly, and purposely" caused their distress (ECF No. 74 at 22), Plaintiffs primarily rely on (1) Culley's ordering too small of a casket and (2) the Culley's funeral director's knowing the casket was unlevel and his nonetheless leaving a portion of it protruding from the ground.
First, Plaintiffs have not shown that conduct attributable to Culley's is relevant to their claim that Wilbert Funeral Services acted wantonly. But even assuming Culley's mistakes were attributable to Wilbert Funeral Services, they would be just that: mistakes. Plaintiffs offer no evidence suggesting Wilbert Funeral Services' conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency." Ponton v. Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (quoting Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 278-79 (Fla. 1985)); see Williams, 293 So. 3d at 502 (affirming summary judgment that defendant funeral home's loss of person's remains was merely negligent at most, not wanton or outrageous). Wilbert Funeral Services is thus entitled to summary judgment on Counts II, IV, V, and VI.
CONCLUSION
Wilbert Funeral Services' motion for final summary judgment (ECF No. 62) is GRANTED, and all claims against Wilbert Funeral Services are DISMISSED on the merits. I do not direct entry of judgment under Rule 54(b). Judgment will issue later after claims against Defendant SCI Florida no longer remain pending. See ECF No. 84.
SO ORDERED on September 7, 2022.