Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-CV-148.
March 23, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Maurice Whichard, a state pretrial detainee at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility (C.F.C.F.), filed a pro se prisoner civil rights form Complaint in this Court on February 8, 2001. The Complaint alleges that Defendants Kenwin Baylor and Clifford Cooper, corrections officers at C.F.C.F., used excessive force against him, causing bodily injury. Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Motion will be denied in part.
I. Background
Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts are as follows. On September 3, 2000, Plaintiff asked Defendants when he could expect to receive some of his necessary personal belongings. Amended Complaint at ¶ 10. In response, Defendants, using vulgar language, told him that they did not care about him or his personal belongings. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff returned to his cell and filled out a grievance slip which Defendants watched him file. Id. at ¶ 12. In retaliation, Defendants entered his cell later that night and assaulted him, spraying him with mace and punching and kicking him in the stomach, face, back, and ribs until another Officer intervened on his behalf. Id. at ¶ 14-18. Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Plaintiff on the basis of a complaint by Defendant Baylor. Id. at ¶ 24.
On September 6, 2002, the Court appointed Morgan, Lewis Bockius, LLP to represent Plaintiff in this matter. On May 22, 2003, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint, which was filed on May 30, 2003. On August 13, 2003, Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count II of the Amended Complaint. II. Legal Standard
On December 3, 2001, the Court appointed attorneys from Dechert, Price Rhoads to represent Plaintiff, but allowed those attorneys to withdraw on February 8, 2002. There were no court filings or proceedings during that period.
The Amended Complaint states six causes of action: use of excessive force (Count I), denial of access to courts (Count II), assault and battery (Count III), malicious prosecution (Count IV), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V), and civil conspiracy (Count VI).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the test is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Med. Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)). "Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The Court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, "there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact' . . . [where the non-moving party's] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of [its] case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (emphasis added).
III. Analysis
Count II of the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Baylor filed a criminal complaint in retaliation for the exercise of Plaintiff's First Amendment right to the redress of grievances. Amended Complaint. at ¶ 39. The Court finds that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the retaliation claim could form the basis of a judgment against Defendants.
Insofar as Count II of the Amended Complaint alleges a denial of access to the courts, it fails, because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate any actual injury from the alleged denial.See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) ("the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim"). Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff's access to the courts was limited. He was successfully able to file grievances against Defendants, to bring this action, and has been able to pursue no fewer than six other civil claims before this Court, apparently without hindrance.
"Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution actionable under section 1983." McGrath v. Johnson, 67 F. Supp.2d 499, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1999); see also Figueroa v. Regan, 2003 WL 1751612, *3 (E.D. Pa. 2003). "Therefore, the alleged retaliation need not amount to an independent violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights in order to maintain a § 1983 action." Figueroa, 2003 WL 175612, at *3, citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).
In order to prevail on a retaliation claim, a prisoner plaintiff must prove that the conduct which led to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected; that the defendant took adverse action against him; and that his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's action. Figueroa, 2003 WL 175612 at *3, citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Of these three elements, Defendants challenge only whether the conduct that led to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's filing of a grievance was not a constitutionally protected activity. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 5. In support of this assertion, they cite Wilson v. Horn, 971 F. Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997), where a plaintiff attempted to bring suit for failure to respond to grievances. As Judge Katz made clear, there is no constitutional right to have one's grievances answered. Wilson, 971 F. Supp. at 947.
However, Wilson does not hold that guards may freely retaliate against prisoners who file grievances. In fact, it is clear in this District that prisoners can sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when guards do so. See Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997) ("an otherwise legitimate and constitutional government act can become unconstitutional when an individual demonstrates that it was undertaken in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment speech"); Hill v. Blum, 916 F. Supp. 470, 473-74 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (filing an administrative grievance or a civil action constitutes an exercise of First Amendment rights); Figueroa, 2003 WL 1751612 at *4 ("Plaintiff's alleged remark did not indicate an intention to file a grievance, which would be constitutionally protected conduct"). Furthermore, the filing of a grievance is the first step in exhausting administrative remedies, which is required for a prisoner to file suit under § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Thus, retaliation against Plaintiff for filing a grievance directly implicates Plaintiff's constitutionally protected right of access to the courts. Whether the retaliation takes the form of illegal physical abuse or the filing of a criminal complaint is irrelevant, since even conduct that is normally permissible may be unconstitutional if undertaken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right. See Anderson, 125 F.3d at 161. Thus, if Defendant Baylor filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff in retaliation for his exercise of a constitutional right, then he would have a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
There is a material issue of fact as to whether Defendant Baylor's criminal complaint against Plaintiff was filed in retaliation for his filing of a grievance. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate at this time.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied in part.