A The first case is Wheeler v. Board of Trustees of Fargo Consolidated School District, 200 Ga. 323, 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946). In Wheeler, the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether the Georgia Legislature's proposal to the electorate of a new constitution was a permissible manner of revising the constitution.
1. "The instrument contained in Ga. L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the Constitution of 1877, but is a completely revised or new Constitution," and is valid. Wheeler v. Board of Trustees of Fargo Consolidated School District, 200 Ga. 323 ( 37 S.E.2d 322). 2.
Unlike ordinary legislation, the people โ not merely elected legislators โ are the "makers" of the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. X, Sec. I, Par. II (proposals to amend or replace constitution require a vote of the people); see also Wheeler v. Bd. of Trustees of Fargo Consolidated School Dist. , 200 Ga. 323, 333 (3), 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946) ("The fiat of the people, and only the fiat of the people, can breathe life into a constitution."). If the subjective intent of one legislator out of 236 casts little light on the meaning of ordinary legislation, such subjective views can hardly carry more weight for a Constitution that had hundreds of thousands of citizens who voted on its ratification.
The fact that certain individuals labeled the 1983 Constitution as "new," or even "revitalized," does not rebut the presumption arising from Dayโs consistent and definitive construction. We had characterized the 1945 Constitution as "new," see Wheeler v. Bd. of Trustees of Fargo Consol. Sch. Dist., 200 Ga. 323, 330 (2), 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946), and yet determined the meaning of certain provisions of that constitution by applying the prior constructions of similarly worded provisions found in the 1877 Constitution, see e.g., Aldrich, 220 Ga. at 133-134, 137 S.E.2d 463 (determining meaning of self-incrimination clause and citing cases interpreting and decided under 1877 Constitution); Hancock, 211 Ga. at 432, 86 S.E.2d 511 (construction of provision of 1877 Constitution regarding purposes for which counties may levy taxes was controlling as to meaning of same provision in 1945 Constitution). To presume that the meaning of text changes simply because it is readopted in a "new" constitution ignores the heavy emphasis courts place on history and context in interpreting text.
Unlike ordinary legislation, the peopleโnot merely elected legislatorsโare the "makers" of the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. X, Sec. I, Par. II (proposals to amend or replace constitution require a vote of the people); see also Wheeler v. Bd. of Trs. of Fargo Consolidated School Dist., 200 Ga. 323, 333 (3), 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946) ("The fiat of the people, and only the fiat of the people, can breathe life into a constitution."). If the subjective intent of one legislator out of 236 casts little light on the meaning of ordinary legislation, such subjective views can hardly carry more weight for a Constitution that had hundreds of thousands of citizens who voted on its ratification.
Art. II, Sec. I, Par. II of the Georgia Constitution does not require that qualified citizens be allowed to vote in any particular manner. See Wheeler v. Bd. of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 334 ( 37 SE2d 322) (1946) ("The legislative branch of our government is charged with the duty of providing the manner of holding elections"). Instead, a qualified elector is guaranteed the fundamental right to vote provided he or she uses one of the procedures put forth by the legislature, assuming those procedures do not offend the constitution.
"Amendment of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or changes some provision, or adds something thereto. . .[.] A law is amended when it is in whole or in part permitted to remain, and something is added to or taken from it, or it is in some way changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made, or some other object or purpose."Wheeler v. Bd. of Trustees of Fargo Consolidated School Dist., 200 Ga. 323, 330 (2) ( 37 SE2d 322) (1946). If, as the majority holds, the General Assembly had intended to express the legislative intent in 2000 that the word "components" as it appeared in the 1997 revision of OCGA ยง 48-8-3 (34) (A) exclude repair parts, then the 2000 legislation presumably would have provided for a renewal of the limited exemption that had been granted by the 1997 revision only to "machinery components purchased to upgrade . . . machinery."
A written constitution is "the original law by which our system of government was set up." Wheeler v. Bd. of Trustees of Fargo School Dist., 200 Ga. 323, 331 (3) ( 37 S.E.2d 322) (1946). This Court is authorized to promulgate the Rules "in order to provide for the speedy, efficient and inexpensive resolution of disputes and prosecutions.
The Constitution of Georgia is the original law by which the government of this state was established. Wheeler v. Bd. of Trustees of Fargo Consolidated School Dist., 200 Ga. 323, 331 (3) ( 37 S.E.2d 322) (1946). As such, our constitution should not be subject to judicial amendment so as to express whatever a majority of this Court happens to conclude at any given time is the more enlightened viewpoint on a particular controversial issue.
Its purpose was to stop corporate tax immunity so that the previously immune tax dollars could go into the treasury and then to the retirees. Although the 1877 Constitution was repealed in its entirety by the 1945 Constitution, Wheeler v. Trustees of Fargo School Dist., 200 Ga. 323, 330 ( 37 S.E.2d 322) (1946), it was the instrument that gave life to Georgia's strong state policy of providing benefits to those who benefit the State. The Legislative History of The 1877 Constitution