Opinion
C. A. 6:21-cv-03512-RMG-KFM
03-15-2022
Andrew Wheeler, Plaintiff, v. Bryan Sterling, Warden Tonya James, Steven Holiness, Sgt. Sally Crowe Defendants.[1]
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, while a state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff has submitted a notice of change of address, which indicates that he is no longer incarcerated (doc. 19).
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on October 27, 2021 (doc. 1). By Order filed January 13, 2022, the plaintiff was informed that his complaint was subject to summary dismissal because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that he could attempt to cure the defects identified in his complaint by filing an amended complaint within 14 days (doc. 14). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his case be dismissed (id. at 6-7). On January 31, 2022, the plaintiff's amended complaint was entered on the docket (doc. 17). Because the plaintiff's amended complaint likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the case.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, now a former state prisoner, brings this action seeking damages from the defendants for an incident that occurred while he was a prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and located at Kershaw Correctional Institution (“Kershaw”) (doc. 17).
The plaintiff alleges that on June 16, 2021, in his dorm at Kershaw, a cell in his dorm caught fire (id. at 5-6). The plaintiff began to smell smoke and then wet a towel and covered his mouth with it to protect himself from the smoke (id. at 6). The plaintiff and other inmates kicked and screamed to get SCDC employees' attention and an inmate used a cell phone to call SCDC for help (id. at 6-7). SCDC employees came to the cells and let the inmates out of the cells because of the smoke from the fire (id. at 7). The plaintiff alleges that he has had mental health problems since the fire and his grievances have been denied (id.). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id. at 8).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, when he filed this action, the plaintiff was a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), seeking “redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This case is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when a cell near him caught fire and Sgt. Crowe was not at her station, so he was forced to inhale smoke until SCDC employees let him out of his cell (doc. 17 at 5-7). The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment regarding the conditions of his confinement, a prisoner must prove that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Here, assuming that being subjected to smoke inhalation constituted the deprivation of a basic human need, the plaintiff has not alleged how the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the deprivation (see doc. 17). For example, the plaintiff's complaint indicates that he was let out of his cell once SCDC employees realized that there was a fire (see doc. 17 at 7). Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff alleges negligence by the defendants because they did not respond sooner to the fire (id. at 8), negligence is not actionable under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 & n.3 (1986); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the plaintiff's only alleged injury is mental suffering and emotional distress; however, there is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, mental anguish, or psychological stress. See Williams v. Pruitt, C/A No. 8:13-cv-01812-JMC, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Tex., 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1989)). As such, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief.
The plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim fails even if he contends that the defendants failed to protect him from the fire/smoke inhalation. To plausibly state a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege sufficient factual allegations to show that a prison official had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and disregarded that substantial risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); see also Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating the standard of deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge and disregard of a substantial risk of serious injury). First, other than alleging that Sgt. Crowe was not at her guard position, the plaintiff's complaint contains no personal allegations of wrongdoing by the defendants. Additionally, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants (including Sgt. Crowe) were aware that the neighboring cell had caught fire or that the defendants were aware but delayed in responding to the plaintiff's cell block and letting him out of his cell (see doc. 17). Likewise, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants ignored or disregarded a substantial risk with respect to the fire in the cell neighboring the plaintiff's. As such, the plaintiff has not stated a failure to protect Eighth Amendment claim. Thus, based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim is subject to summary dismissal.
The plaintiff's amended complaint also appears to assert that defendants Dir. Sterling, Warden James, and Captain Holiness are liable in their supervisory capacities at Kershaw (doc. 17 at 6-7); however, the plaintiff's claims are subject to summary dismissal because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was “so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). Here, the plaintiff has not alleged that these defendants were on notice that the plaintiff's rights were being violated - and staff meetings, and his grievances and complaints (filed after the incidents in question) do not satisfy that element of a supervisory liability claim. Moreover, the plaintiff cannot seek supervisory liability against these defendants based upon their denial of his grievances or trouble filing grievances because it is well-settled that an inmate's access to and participation in a prison's grievance process is not constitutionally protected. See Taylor v. Lang, 483 Fed.Appx. 855, 858 (4th Cir. 2012); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). As such, these claims are also not cognizable against these defendants in their supervisory capacities under § 1983. See Ford v. Stirling, C. A. No. 2:17-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017); London v. Maier, C. A. No. 0:10-00434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010). Thus, the plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a claim for relief.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued January 13, 2022, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment. Despite filing an amended complaint, the plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the order dated January 13, 2022 (doc. 14). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court decline to give the plaintiff further leave to amend his complaint and dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (in a case where the district court had already afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, the district court was directed on remand to “in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order”) (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)); see also Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2020). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
February 15, 2022 Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).