Wheeler v. Des Moines City Railway Co.

7 Citing cases

  1. Petersen v. Chicago, Great Western Ry. Co.

    3 F.R.D. 346 (D. Neb. 1943)   Cited 11 times

    Womochil v. Peters, 226 Iowa 924, 285 N.W. 151; Kliebenstein v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 193 Iowa 892, 188 N.W. 129; Olson v. Des Moines City R. Co. 186 Iowa 384, 170 N.W. 466; Merryman v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., 135 Iowa 591, 113 N.W. 357; Code of Iowa, § 11210; (all of which the plaintiff had cited in a trial brief presented to the court). Wheeler v. Des Moines City R. Co., 205 Iowa 439, 215 N.W. 950, 55 A.L.R. 473; Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, 209 Iowa 313, 228 N.W. 320. Essentially, these instructions correctly reflected the Iowa law and, though in somewhat altered language, they are embodied in the court's charge. Thereafter and, at 2:30 p.m. of the same day, on the threshold of the opening of argument, and, therefore, still within the time allowed by Rule 51, the single instruction No. 6 was presented to the court and requested by the plaintiff.

  2. Fisher v. Des Moines Transit Co.

    111 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1961)   Cited 1 times

    In other words, it must appear that the carrier breached its duty to the injured passenger on such vehicles by an operation which was unusual, unnecessary, dangerous, excessively severe, violent or extraordinary. If the facts disclose such a breach of duty, the negligence may be found actionable. Edwards v. Des Moines Transit Co., supra; Walters v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 196, 179 N.W. 865; Wheeler v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 205 Iowa 439, 215 N.W. 950, 55 A.L.R. 473; Fitch v. Mason City and Clear Lake Traction Co., 124 Iowa 665, 100 N.W. 618; Waterloo Savings Bank v. Waterloo, Cedar Falls Northern Railroad, 244 Iowa 1364, 60 N.W.2d 572; Fanelli v. Illinois Central R. Co., 246 Iowa 661, 69 N.W.2d 13; Oklahoma Railway Co. v. Jones, 207 Okla. 476, 250 P.2d 472; Rozmajzl v. Northland Greyhound Lines, 242 Iowa 1135, 49 N.W.2d 501. Thus it is plaintiff's position that he did establish by relevant and satisfactory evidence that defendant breached its duty to him by making an abnormal start, which, because of its violence, caused him to fall and be injured. [4, 5] III. The duty of a carrier toward its passengers is to exercise care commensurate with the necessity reasonably apparent.

  3. Edwards v. Des Moines Transit Co.

    99 N.W.2d 920 (Iowa 1959)   Cited 8 times

    Cahill v. Illinois Central R. Co., 148 Iowa 241, 246, 125 N.W. 331, 28 L.R.A., N.S., 1121; 35 Iowa Law Review 393. The.accident causing the injury must be such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those in charge of the vehicle use proper care. Sample v. Schwenck, 243 Iowa 1189, 1198, 54 N.W.2d 527, and citations; 65 C.J.S., Negligence, section 220(8), page 1007; 38 Am. Jur., section 295, page 989. It is, therefore, the. primary duty of the injured party to disclose facts which in law are recognized as those that speak for themselves or disclose a situation wherein it may be said that, but for defendant's negligence, the injury and damage could not have occurred. Walters v. Des Moines City Railway Co., 191 Iowa 196, 179 N.W. 865; Wheeler v. Des Moines City Railway Co., 205 Iowa 439, 215 N.W. 950, 55 A.L.R. 473. Stated otherwise, in this type of case the plaintiff only needs to show that the injury resulted from some irregular or unusual operation or movement of the passenger carrier, the nature of which the defendant has or is charged with knowledge. [5] It is true we have also said the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence originally based on the theory that he who has charge of the thing that causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it. Brown v. Sioux Building Corp., 248 Iowa 948, 83 N.W.2d 471, and citations; 38 Am. Jur. 995, section 299; Savery v. Kist, 234 Iowa 98, 103, 11 N.W.2d 23, 25; Van Heukelom. v. Black Hawk Hotels Corp., 222 Iowa 1033, 1043, 270 N.W. 16, and cases cited.

  4. Waterloo Sav. Bk. v. Waterloo, C.F. N.R

    60 N.W.2d 572 (Iowa 1953)   Cited 42 times
    In Waterloo Savings Bank v. Waterloo Cedar Falls Northern Ry., 244 Iowa 1364, 60 N.W.2d 572 (1953), the Iowa court said: "We take judicial notice of this cheapening of the currency and we consider the amount allowed by the jury in light of the lessening buying power of the dollar."

    Walters v. Des Moines City Railway Co., 191 Iowa 196, 179 N.W. 865; Patterson v. Omaha Council Bluffs Railway Bridge Co., 90 Iowa 247, 57 N.W. 880; Root v. Des Moines City Railway Co., 113 Iowa 675, 83 N.W. 904; Heinze v. Interurban Railway Co., 139 Iowa 189, 117 N.W. 385, 21 L.R.A., N.S., 715; McMurray v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 178 Minn. 561, 228 N.W. 154; Cassels v. City of Seattle, 195 Wn. 433, 81 P.2d 275. Wheeler v. Des Moines City Railway Co., 205 Iowa 439, 215 N.W. 950, 55 A.L.R. 473, and other cases cited and relied upon by defendant are distinguishable on their facts. II.

  5. Harrington v. Portland T. Co.

    168 Or. 548 (Or. 1942)   Cited 2 times

    There are cases involving collisions at curves between street cars and other vehicles in which it is held that the motorman was warranted in relying on the assumption that the driver of a horse-drawn wagon or the operator of an automobile would take care to avoid the outswing of the rear end of the street car, and, therefore, there was no evidence of negligence: Louisville Railway Co. v. Ray, (Ky.) 124 S.W. 313; Ryan v. Milwaukee Northern Railway Co., 186 Wis. 537, 203 N.W. 340; Wheeler v. Des Moines City Railway Co., 205 Iowa 439, 215 N.W. 950, 55 A.L.R. 473; South Covington C. Street R. Co. v. Besse, 33 Ky. L. 52, 108 S.W. 848, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 890; while in others, where there was evidence that the motorman or the conductor of the street car either actually knew or should have known of the impending danger of collision with the other vehicle, the question of whether the defendant exercised ordinary care to avoid injuring the plaintiff was held to be one of fact for the jury: Metropolitan R. Co. v. Blick, 22 App. D.C. 194; Frank Bird Transfer Co. v. Krug, 30 Ind. App. 602, 65 N.E. 309; Charles P. Anderson, Inc. v. St. Paul City Railway Co., 203 Minn. 119, 280 N.W. 3. See, also, to the same effect, Forbes v. United Electric Railways Co., 49 R.I. 465, 468, 144 A. 154, 62 A.L.R. 305, annotation p. 307, in which a demurrer to the complaint was overruled.

  6. Miller v. Utah Light and Traction Co.

    96 Utah 369 (Utah 1939)   Cited 4 times

    The court further held, according to the syllabus that plaintiff's placing himself within reach of the "overhang" of the car, and not the acceleration of its speed, was the proximate cause of the injury. To like effect are the following cases: Kiley v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 207 Mass. 542, 93 N.E. 632, 31 L.R.A., N.S., 1153; Wheeler v. Des Moines City R. Co., 205 Iowa 439, 215 N.W. 950, 55 A.L.R. 473; Widmer v. West End St. R. Co., supra; Riddle v. Forty-Second St. R. Co., 173 N.Y. 327, 66 N.E. 22. We find no error in the action of the trial court 8 and the judgment is affirmed.

  7. Knudson v. Des Moines City Railway Co.

    228 N.W. 270 (Iowa 1929)

    The question is, Were these facts sufficient to go to the jury, either on the question of the negligence of the receivers, as operators of the railway, or on the question of plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence? On this question the appellees rely upon what we said in Wheeler v. Des Moines City R. Co., 205 Iowa 439. In that case, the plaintiff, while the full width of the street was available to him, approached a street car so closely that he was caught by the outswing of the rear end, as the car made its turn. He was in no sense crowded into such perilous position.