When one tortfeasor chooses to settle and another chooses to litigate, inequality in the ultimate cost does not signalize bad faith. (See Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167 [ 175 S.E.2d 769, 771-772].)" ( River Garden, 26 Cal.App.3d at p. 997.)

When one tortfeasor chooses to settle and another chooses to litigate, inequality in the ultimate cost does not signalize bad faith. (See Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167 [ 175 S.E.2d 769, 771-772].) On the other hand, if the policy of encouraging settlements is permitted to overwhelm equitable financial sharing, the possibilities of unfair tactics are multiplied.

Capital Transportation Company v. Compton, 187 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1951); Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. McDonald, 125 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1942); Duncan v. Montgomery Ward Co., 108 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1940); Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2533. Our Court of Appeals has adopted the Federal construction Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 175 S.E.2d 769. The question has not been directly presented to this Court, but the Federal construction of the rule was approved in a dictum statement in Hensley v. Ramsey, 283 N.C. 714, 199 S.E.2d 1.

Soucy Trucking and Caron had the burden of proving that the settlements were not made in good faith. Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 170, 175 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1970). However, the trial court by its ruling concluded defendants had not met their burden.

See, e.g., North Carolina Baptist Hosp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 323 N.C. 528, 533, 374 S.E.2d 844, 846 (1988). Indeed, the Uniform Act contemplates that settlements are to be encouraged, Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 171, 175 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1970), and even provides an incentive for early settlement. The Uniform Act permits a tort-feasor to enter into a good faith settlement and release with an injured party and relieve himself of further liability to remaining joint tort-feasors for contribution. G.S. 1B-4. The rule Parks proposes that this Court adopt by decision would remove this statutory incentive for early settlement. For example, a defendant who was sued in tort with another co-defendant and who sustained personal injury or property damage, would be discouraged from settling with the plaintiff and pleading the settlement in bar of his co-defendant's contribution claim.

We agree. Where one tort-feasor has settled with the injured party, the other tort-feasor, who has gone to trial, is entitled to have the judgment reduced by the amount of the settlement. Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 175 S.E.2d 769 (1970). We do not find it necessary to discuss the question of whether the trial judge had jurisdiction to amend the judgment once notice of appeal had been given. While the record indicates that the trial judge was aware at one time of the fact that plaintiff had taken a voluntary dismissal as to the defendant Huffman upon the payment of $2,000, it does not appear that this fact was called to his attention when he signed the judgment for the full $18,000.00. Regardless, the law is clear that

By introducing evidence, defendants waived their first motion, Overman v. Products Co., 30 N.C. App. 516, 227 S.E.2d 159 (1976), and their assignment of error directed to the denial of that motion will not be considered on this appeal. Plaintiff contends that defendants are not entitled on this appeal to rely upon their assignment of error directed to the denial of their second motion, made at the close of all evidence, because in making that motion defendants failed to "state the specific grounds therefor" as required by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50 (a). Plaintiff correctly points out that this requirement is mandatory. Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 175 S.E.2d 769 (1970). "However, the courts need not inflexibly enforce the rule when the grounds for the motion are apparent to the court and the parties."