Accord Mahathiraj, 617 N.E.2d at 741. In any event, we conclude the third view accords best with our previous expressions of the purpose of the Act, i.e., that it"contemplates that settlements are to be encouraged," Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 171, 175 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1970), and that "it is . . . desirable that settlements be made promptly and with finality," Matthews v. Hill, 2 N.C. App. 350, 354, 163 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1968). Further, the third approach provides maximum flexibility to our trial courts and is "more workable," Mahathiraj, 617 N.E.2d at 741, in that the court considers the totality of the circumstances to determine if a settlement has been reached in good faith, id.; see also Velsicol Chemical, 811 P.2d at 563 (court should base decision on "all relevant facts available").

(N.C. Super. Ct. June 30, 2021); see also Kirkpatrick & Assocs., Inc. v. Wickes Corp., 280 S.E.2d 632, 636 (N.C. Ct. App 1981) (where an indemnitor received notice of the underlying claim and is invited to assume the defense but refuses to do so, “[a] settlement is presumed to be fair and reasonable, and the burden of showing a lack of good faith is upon the party asserting it.”) (citing Wheeler v. Denton, 175 S.E.2d 769, 772 (N.C. App. 1970)); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Ogden Plant Maintenance Co. of North Carolina, 548 S.E.2d 807, 811-812 (N.C. App. 2001).

When one tortfeasor chooses to settle and another chooses to litigate, inequality in the ultimate cost does not signalize bad faith. (See Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167 [ 175 S.E.2d 769, 771-772].) "On the other hand, if the policy of encouraging settlements is permitted to overwhelm equitable financial sharing, the possibilities of unfair tactics are multiplied.

When one tortfeasor chooses to settle and another chooses to litigate, inequality in the ultimate cost does not signalize bad faith. (See Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167 [ 175 S.E.2d 769, 771-772].)" ( River Garden, 26 Cal.App.3d at p. 997.)

When one tortfeasor chooses to settle and another chooses to litigate, inequality in the ultimate cost does not signalize bad faith. (See Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167 [ 175 S.E.2d 769, 771-772].) On the other hand, if the policy of encouraging settlements is permitted to overwhelm equitable financial sharing, the possibilities of unfair tactics are multiplied.

See Barmat, 797 P.2d at 1227-28 ("We note that other jurisdictions that have adopted the [UCATA] place the burden on the challenging party to prove lack of good faith. . . . We presume that [parties to an agreement] acted in good faith and require the challenging party to prove the lack thereof."); Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 175 S.E.2d 769, 772 (N.C.Ct.App. 1970) ("The burden of showing a lack of good faith is on the party asserting it."); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 235 Va. 136, 144, 366 S.E.2d 93, 98 (1988) ("Although not amounting to fraud in this context, `bad faith' runs counter to the presumption that contracting parties have acted in good faith."). The party alleging bad faith must prove this contention by clear and convincing evidence.

Capital Transportation Company v. Compton, 187 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1951); Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. McDonald, 125 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1942); Duncan v. Montgomery Ward Co., 108 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1940); Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2533. Our Court of Appeals has adopted the Federal construction Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 175 S.E.2d 769. The question has not been directly presented to this Court, but the Federal construction of the rule was approved in a dictum statement in Hensley v. Ramsey, 283 N.C. 714, 199 S.E.2d 1.

Failure to state the specific grounds for the motion precludes an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Wheeler v. Denton , 9 N.C. App. 167, 169, 175 S.E.2d 769, 770 (1970). Furthermore, "grounds not asserted in the trial court may not be asserted on appeal."

As this Court has previously held, "[u]pon failure to state specific grounds, an appellant cannot question on appeal the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict." Love v. Pressley , 34 N.C. App. 503, 511, 239 S.E.2d 574, 580 (1977), disc. review denied , 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978) (citing Wheeler v. Denton , 9 N.C. App. 167, 175 S.E.2d 769 (1970) ). During trial, Plaintiff’s counsel stated the following to the trial court: "I got -- for the record, Plaintiff makes a motion for directed verdict."

Despite this error, we exercise our discretion to address the merits of defendant's argument. Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 168, 175 S.E.2d 769, 770 (1970) ("[T]he name of the motion is not as important as the substance."). B. Standard of Review