Opinion
C. A. 3:22-2119-SAL-PJG
08-11-2022
Reverend Dr. Samuel T. Whatley, Plaintiff, v. Richland County Family Court Columbia South Carolina; Phoebe S. Whatley; Monet S. Pincus; Michelle M. Hurley Leevy-Johnson; GAL Thomas M. Neal, III; Richard G. Whiting; Kristin Cannon; Kelly B. Arnold; Larry Medlin; Christian Counseling Center First Presbyterian Church Columbia SC; Marc Harari; Jewett Dooley; Mary Mundy; Dr. Sobotowica; Cassy Paschal; Wendy Levine; William T. Watlington; Neighbor Destroyed Trees; Richland County Sheriff Department on Truancy et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Samuel T. Whatley, proceeding pro se, purports to bring this action for civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that this action should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff indicates he was involved in a divorce proceeding in the Richland County Family Court in which he was treated unfairly. For instance, Plaintiff claims that in October 2016, Family Court Judge Michelle M. Hurley held a hearing the day after Hurricane Matthew, which Plaintiff was unable to attend because he was trapped in a flooded city. Plaintiff also claims that Judge Hurley lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff because Plaintiff lived out of state, and Plaintiff asserts that Judge Hurley's order that he pay alimony is unconstitutional. Further, Plaintiff believes that Judge Hurley's order regarding visitation of Plaintiff's children is unfair, and that Judge Hurley discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his religion because she did not recognize that Plaintiff has an honorary religious doctorate degree. As to Family Court Judge Monet S. Pincus, Plaintiff claims Judge Pincus signed a summons in October 2014 that did not provide Plaintiff with thirty days to prepare a defense in violation of Plaintiff's right to due process. Plaintiff also names his former spouse, Phoebe S. Whatley, and her attorney, Richard G. Whiting, as defendants in this action, who Plaintiff claims falsified evidence and presented it to the family court. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), seeking damages and equitable relief from the divorce decree.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff also expressly indicates he brings claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), but Bivens applies only to claims of constitutional violations against federal officials, and Plaintiff does not name any federal officials as defendants.
Initially, the court notes that Plaintiff's Complaint is generally subject to dismissal because it fails to state with any particularity what claims he raises, which defendants he brings those claims against, and what facts show that he is entitled to relief against each defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). The Complaint makes it impossible to understand the precise nature of Plaintiff's claims or relief he seeks because it includes general allegations of unfairness and discrimination without identifying the defendant who is responsible or a cognizable legal theory that would support Plaintiff's claim for relief. See North Carolina v. McGuirt, 114 Fed.Appx. 555, 558 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8 where “the complaint . . . does not permit the defendants to figure out what legally sufficient claim the plaintiffs are making and against whom they are making it').
Most of Plaintiff's allegations concern how Plaintiff was treated by Judge Hurley and Judge Pincus. But, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against Judge Hurley or Judge Pincus, these defendants are immune from suit. It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (providing that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment of damages, for judicial actions taken within their jurisdiction); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (“It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions.'). Judicial immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith, nor will a judge “be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). Here, Plaintiff's allegations only concern actions taken by Judge Hurley and Judge Pincus in their adjudicative role as family court judges in Plaintiff's divorce proceeding.
Therefore, Judge Hurley and Judge Pincus are immune from Plaintiff's claims for damages against them.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages from the Richland County Family Court itself, a state court retains its sovereignty under the Eleventh Amendment and is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Shirley v. S.C. Family Court, C. A. No. 9:10-2632-CWH-RSC, 2010 WL 5390123, at *4 (D.S.C. 2010).
Also, to the extent Plaintiff seeks equitable relief from his divorce decree, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this court from granting such relief. See generally Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts may not consider either issues actually presented to and decided by a state court or constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court. We regard the doctrine as jurisdictional.”). Thus, this court may not alter the terms of the divorce decree as Plaintiff requests in the relief section of the Complaint. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 33-34.)
As to the remaining defendants, Plaintiff mostly fails to explain who they are, identify what claims he brings against them, or list a cause of action against them that would plausibly state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution). Nor does Plaintiff provide any facts that could plausibly show that the other defendants are state actors amenable to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally West, 487 U.S. at 49 (“To constitute state action, ‘the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible,' and ‘the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936 n.18 (1982)). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against them upon which relief can be granted. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that the Complaint be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against defendants that are immune from suit, those claims must be dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Smith v. Swanson, Civil Action No. 9:18-251-RMG, 2018 WL 1225110, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2018) (citing Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 1999)); see, e.g., Brown v. Daniel, 230 F.3d 1351, at *4-5 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). The other claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).