To delineate the testimony of the several witnesses here can serve no useful purpose. It is sufficient to say that there is substantial evidence shown by the record to establish gross negligence on authority of our opinion and judgment in Gittleman v. Dixon et al., 148 Fla. 583, 4 So.2d 859; Cormier v. Williams, 148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525; Wharton v. Day, 151 Fla. 772, 10 So.2d 417. The Second Question is:
To put it another way, if the course of conduct is such that the likelihood of injury to other persons or property is known by the actor to be imminent or "clear and present" that negligence is gross, whereas other negligence would be simple negligence. This likelihood of injury to other persons is established sufficiently to show conduct more culpable than mere simple negligence where the defendant drives an automobile into a highway and into the path of on-coming traffic without first looking, Nelson v. McMillan, 1942, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So.2d 565; Motes v. Crosby, Fla., 1953, 65 So.2d 478; or drives rapidly around a curve to the left of the center of the road where vision is obstructed failing to observe other vehicles, Wharton v. Day, 1942, 151 Fla. 772, 10 So.2d 417; or drives along a highway at night knowing that he is sleepy and in a condition of stupor, Johnson v. State, supra; or drives a car with tires known to have been worn smooth along a slippery highway at high speed, Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So.2d 715, 716. In the latter case we said, speaking through Mr. Justice Thomas, after reference to the rate of speed, slickness of the road and smoothness of the tires, that "disaster might well have been anticipated if the driver lost control."
The challenged instruction went to the point of contributory negligence and must be considered in light of all other instructions given on this point. Wharton v. Day, 151 Fla. 772, 10 So.2d 417; Bassett v. Edwards, 158 Fla. 848, 30 So.2d 374. We have reviewed assignments based on other instructions given by the trial court of its own motion and those given by the trial court upon the request of counsel for plaintiffs-appellees; also many instructions requested in writing by counsel for defendants-appellants but were not given by the trial court for various reasons.
Requested charges numbered 8 and 11 supra have been carefully considered in light of other charges or instructions to the jury appearing in the record. The rule is that if the requested charges are covered by the general instructions when considered in their entirety and the points raised by the requested charges appear to have been fairly presented to the jury in the general charge, then assignments based on the requested charges must fail. Wharton v. Day, 151 Fla. 772, 10 So.2d 417. Affirmed.
Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So.2d 715. But it was also held in that case that the testimony of two highway patrolmen, who visited the wreck shortly after it occurred, as to their opinion as to the speed of the car based on their observation of the scene, and their experience, was properly excluded. See Also Wharton v. Day, 151 Fla. 772, 10 2d 417; Winthrop v. Carinhas, 142 Fla. 588, 195 So. 399, and McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So.2d 867. In this last cited case, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice BUFORD, held that "gross negligence" as used in the guest statute, is synomymous with wilful and wanton misconduct, and that to constitute gross negligence the act complained of must be of such character "that the operator of the automobile would know, or should know, that by doing the act in the manner and at the time alleged he placed others in danger of injury."
To put it another way, if the course of conduct is such that the likelihood of injury to other persons or property is known by the actor to be imminent or 'clear and present' that negligence is gross, whereas other negligence would be simple negligence. "This likelihood of injury to other persons is established sufficiently to show conduct more culpable than mere simple negligence where the defendant drives an automobile into a highway and into the path of oncoming traffic without first looking, Nelson v. McMillan, 1942, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So.2d 565; Motes v. Crosby, Fla. 1953, 65 So.2d 478; or drives rapidly around a curve to the left of the center of the road where vision is obstructed failing to observe other vehicles, Wharton v. Day, 1942, 151 Fla. 772, 10 So.2d 417; * * *." This rule apparently has been applied generally in Florida courts.
Actually each view is reasonable and the question was for the jury. See Wharton v. Day, 151 Fla. 772, 10 So.2d 417; Faircloth v. Hill, Fla. 1956, 85 So.2d 870; Cadore v. Karp, Fla. 1957, 91 So.2d 806. Affirmed.
In determining the correctness of the charge we looked not only at the portion which the appellant isolated, but examined and considered the entire charge given by the court. See Police Firemen's Ins. Ass'n v. Hines, 134 Fla. 298, 183 So. 831, 833; Wharton v. Day, 151 Fla. 772, 10 So.2d 417, 418; Adams v. Royal Exchange Assur., Fla. 1953, 62 So.2d 591, 595. On reading the complete charge on the subject it is found that the issues relating to the release were presented to the jury on proper and adequate charges by the court.
Cases so holding are too numerous to justify citation. Examples are: International Lubricant Corporation v. Grant, 128 Fla. 670, 175 So. 727; Duval Laundry Co. v. Reif, 130 Fla. 276, 177 So. 726; Police Firemen's Ins. Ass'n v. Hines, supra; Wharton v. Day, 151 Fla. 772, 10 So.2d 417. On reading the entire charge on the subject we find it to be without error.