Opinion
C.A 4:20-cv-4366-HMH-TER
08-18-2021
JAMES C. WHALEY, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, TYGER RIVER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
Petitioner, James C. Whaley (Petitioner), appearing pro se, filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 17, 2020. (ECF Nos. 1; 11-1). On May 25, 2021, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment along with a return and memorandum. (ECF Nos.33 and 34). The undersigned issued an order filed May 26, 2021, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Petitioner of the motion for summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. (ECF No. 35). Petitioner filed a response on July 12, 2021. (ECF No. 48). Respondent filed a reply on July 26, 2021. (ECF No. 55). Petitioner filed a sur-reply on August 9, 2021, and additional attachments to the sur-reply on August 10 and August 15, 2021. (ECF Nos. 57, 58, and 60).
This habeas corpus case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02, DSC. Because this is a dispositive motion, this report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The undisputed procedural history will be set out below, in part, as set forth by the Respondent.
Petitioner is presently confined in the Aiken County Detention Center. At the time of filing the petition, he was confined in the Perry Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to Orders of Commitment of the Clerk of Court for Aiken County. Petitioner was indicted by the Aiken County Grand Jury for numerous charges during its November 2011 and August 2013 terms of court. Petitioner's indictments included indecent exposure (2013-GS-1272), contributing to the delinquency of a minor (2011-GS-02-1271), criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree (2011-GS-02-1649), lewd act upon a child (2011-GS-02-1648), kidnapping (2011-GS-02-1647), criminal sexual conduct first degree (2011-GS-02-1646), criminal sexual conduct second degree ((2011-GS-02-1645), criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree (2011-GS-02-1644), dissemination of harmful material to a minor (2011-GS 02-1643), and lewd act upon a child (2011-GS-02-1642). He was represented by Brian Katonak, Esquire. Petitioner proceeded to a bench trial before the Honorable Judge Doyet A. Early, III. Following the bench trial, Judge Early found Petitioner guilty on three of the ten charges: indecent exposure (02-1272), disseminating harmful materials to a minor (02-1643) and lewd act upon a child (02-1642). Judge Early sentenced Petitioner to three years imprisonment for indecent exposure with credit for time served, a consecutive fifteen years' imprisonment for Lewd Act upon a minor, and a concurrent ten years' imprisonment for dissemination of harmful material. (ECF No. 33-1 at 191 of 227).
Direct Appeal
Defense counsel filed a notice of appeal. However, the trial transcript was not ordered and the appeal was dismissed on April 10, 2014, and the Remittitur issued on April 18, 2014. (ECF Nos. 33-9; 33-1 at 219 of 227).
PCR Action
Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) on June 8, 2015. Petitioner was represented by Aimee Zmroczek, Esquire. Petitioner raised the following grounds:
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:
a. “being that defense attorney or the S.C. Indigent defense office did not order a transcript leading to dismissal of appeal. Appeal was not knowingly, willfully, or intelligently ignored by appellate. Reference White v. State 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 S.C. 1974). I did not get to fully pursue appeal.
2. “Denied due process/Amendment 14 § 1 notes 2644. 2646-2648"
a. “Though I do not have a transcript to confirm I state amendment 13, section (1) note 2644 false testimony by prosecution witness, ‘…includes situation in which state, although not solicitor, false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. They were notified C.05/11/15 via clerk of court.”
3. Denied due process/ Ineffective counsel/ no counsel(ECF No. 33-1 at 194-201 of 227) (errors in original).
A hearing was convened on May 26, 2017, before the Honorable Diane S. Goodstein. At the hearing, the State conceded that Petitioner was not afforded the opportunity to appeal his conviction, and that a belated appeal should be granted pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C. 110, 108 S.E.2d 35 (1974). (ECF No. 33-1 at 209-216 of 227). However, the State argued that the remaining claims under the PCR application were time-barred for failure to file the PCR application within the 1-year statute of limitations. Judge Goodstein agreed, thereby granting relief pursuant to White v. State for a belated appeal, but otherwise denied and dismissed with prejudice the application as being untimely. Id. An Order of Dismissal was entered on June 22, 2017. (ECF No. 33-1 at 218-221 of 227).
On July 28, 2017, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On July 30, 2018, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Certiorari which asserted the propriety of the belated appeal and asserted error on the part of the PCR court for summarily dismissing the PCR application as time-barred. (ECF No. 33-4). Petitioner also filed a Brief of Appellate pursuant to White v. State. In the belated appeal, Petitioner raised the following issue:
Whether the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence multiple printouts of Facebook messages that were never properly authenticated because the state could only show that the messages came from Facebook account with Petitioner's name on it, not that Petitioner authored the messages, and where the messages were presented as admissions of guilt?(ECF No. 33-5).
On January 16, 2019, the State filed its Return to White v. State belated appeal.
On January 23, 2019, the State filed its Return to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred the case to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 33-8). In an unpublished opinion on August 12, 2020, the South Carolina Court of Appeals granted certiorari for purposes of the belated appeal but denied certiorari to Petitioner's claim that the PCR court erred in dismissing his PCR application as time-barred. (ECF No. 33-9). The unpublished opinion also affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on belated direct appeal finding that the State had satisfied the Rule 901(a) SCRE authentication requirements for the Facebook messages with citation to supportive case law and the facts demonstrate at trial. Id. The Remittitur was issued on September 4, 2020, and was filed with the Aiken County Clerk of Court on September 8, 2020. (ECF 33-10, 33-11).
Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 12, 2020.
HABEAS ALLEGATIONS
Petitioner raised the following allegations in his petition, quoted verbatim:
GROUND ONE: Denied due process. Solicitor did not take action on warrants, for over 600 days, in some charges. All were over due for action.
Supporting Facts: As is evidence on the warrants documenting the filing with the Clerk of court, and date of presentment to a grand jury; and as documented in case history.
GROUND TWO: Consolidation of multiple, unrelated charges.
Supporting Facts: Brian Katonak told Petitioner, pre-trial, that this could not happen, that they cannot combine and try all of these cases in one trial. Petitioner was unprepared, confused, confounded, and could not effectively assist. The State called witnesses in a calculated random order, and mixed the testimony of several different charges. Petitioner felt like the Solicitor tried to present a hopeless trial in order to force acceptance of a plea deal.
GROUND THREE: State witnesses were not sequestered leading to witness changing testimony to match that of another witness.
Supporting Facts: Minor 3 told Police, or, the CAC that she didn't see what was on a phone video, but after hearing Minor 2 testify Minor 3 stated she saw the video content, App. 98, 11-17.
She later testified she “didn't realize what it was”, App. 106, 19.
GROUND FOUR: Ineffective counsel
Supporting Facts: Due to consolidation, I could not effectively assist counsel in my own defense. Petitioner felt overwhelmed and confounded. Also embarrassed. Because Petitioner was ineffective in assisting counsel, thus, counsel was ineffective.
GROUND FIVE: Petitioner claimed habeas corpus rights violation during sentencing.
Supporting Facts: Petitioner stated he “. . Feel(s) like this, this would be in violation of habeas corpus.” App. 188, 11-12. The Court replied, “what's that?” App. 188, 13. Even if the Court nor the Petitioner knew what habeas corpus was or was not should not negate the power of Petitioner's word. Petitioner believes that consolidation and being held for up to over 600 days without action being taken on warrants should be also considered under this pretext; and that his habeas claim would show a motion for habeas corpus in a state court. Petitioner believes this claim should have resulted in an examination of the case in whole or part, and should have received a hearing and ruling. (ECF #11-1, at 66).
GROUND SIX: Petitioner was not given the opportunity to “utter even a single word at his” PCR hearing.
Supporting Facts: It is evident from the hearing transcript that the Petitioner was never called upon to ask if he had any testimony or defense. Petitioner
DID have a defense and was waiting for the Court, or Counsel to call upon him. The hearing was over before Petitioner had time to consider any option to gain the Court's attention to speak for himself. Petitioner had mailed a copy of his defense to Counsel pertaining to the relationship between THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY, and time of the court, Petitioner, and the opposing counsel. (ECF #11-1, at 67).(ECF No. 11-1 at 52-55; 64-67)(errors in original).
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The federal court is charged with liberally construing the complaints filed by pro se litigants, to allow them to fully develop potentially meritorious cases. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The court's function, however, is not to decide issues of fact, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990), nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. If none can be shown, the motion should be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves). Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position through “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with . . . affidavits, if any.” Id. at 322; see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In addition to the standard that the court must employ in considering motions for summary judgment, the court must also consider the petition under the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under § 2254(d),
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the State court proceeding.
Thus, a writ may be granted if a state court “identifies the correct principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle of law” to the facts of the case. Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 216 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). However, “an ‘unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law,' because an incorrect application of federal law is not, in all instances, objectively unreasonable.”Id. “Thus, to grant [a] habeas petition, [the court] must conclude that the state court's adjudication of his claims was not only incorrect, but that it was objectively unreasonable.” McHone v. Polk, 392 F.3d 691, 719 (4th Cir. 2004). Further, factual findings “made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct, ” and a Petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
PROCEDURAL BAR
The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that the procedural bypass of a constitutional claim in earlier state proceedings forecloses consideration by the federal courts, Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Bypass can occur at any level of the state proceedings, if a state has procedural rules which bar its courts from considering claims not raised in a timely fashion. The two routes of appeal in South Carolina are described above, (i.e., direct appeal, appeal from PCR denial) and the South Carolina Supreme Court will refuse to consider claims raised in a second appeal which could have been raised at an earlier time. Further, if a prisoner has failed to file a direct appeal or a PCR and the deadlines for filing have passed, he is barred from proceeding in state court.
If the state courts have applied a procedural bar to a claim because of an earlier default in the state courts, the federal court honors that bar. State procedural rules promote
. . . not only the accuracy and efficiency of judicial decisions, but also the finality of those decisions, by forcing the defendant to litigate all of his claims together, as quickly after trial as the docket will allow, and while the attention of the appellate court is focused on his case.Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984). Although the federal courts have the power to consider claims despite a state procedural bar,
. . . the exercise of that power ordinarily is inappropriate unless the defendant succeeds in showing both “cause” for noncompliance with the state rule and “actual prejudice” resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 533 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84 (1977)). See also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982).
Stated simply, if a federal habeas Petitioner can show (1) cause for his failure to raise the claim in the state courts, and (2) actual prejudice resulting from the failure, a procedural bar can be ignored and the federal court may consider the claim. Where a Petitioner has failed to comply with state procedural requirements and cannot make the required showing(s) of cause and prejudice, the federal courts generally decline to hear the claim. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
Even if a Petitioner cannot demonstrate cause for failure to raise a claim, he can still overcome procedural default by showing a miscarriage of justice. In order to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must show he is actually innocent. See Carrier. 477 U.S. at 496 (holding a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only in extraordinary cases, “where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent”). Actual innocence is defined as factual innocence, not legal innocence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). To meet this actual innocence standard, the petitioner's case must be truly extraordinary. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496.
ANALYSIS
Respondent states in the reply that “. . . Respondent withdraws its arguments that the Petition is barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations..” (ECF No. 55 at 2 of 8).
In Ground One, Petitioner alleges he was denied due process when the Solicitor did not take action on warrants for “over 600 days, ” in some charges.
Respondent asserts Petitioner appears to argue that there has been a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Respondent argues that a violation of a state's speedy trial statute is not a cognizable basis for federal habeas relief. In the alternative, Respondent argues that this issue is procedurally barred.
In his response in opposition, Petitioner argues that this ground is cognizable because “[t]he moment the State violated Rule 3, SCRCrimp also created an issue of violating federal rights against unlawful confinement.” (ECF No. 48 at 3 of 16, quoted verbatim).
Petitioner raises an issue of the application of state rules. A state court's decision on a question of state law is binding in federal court. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Thomas v. Davis, 192 F.3d 445, 449 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1999). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68. “Therefore, when a petitioner's claim rests solely upon an interpretation of state case law and statutes, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review.” Torrence v. Lewis, 2021 WL 3053380, at *3 (D.S.C. July 20, 2021) quoting Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 262 (4th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, this claim is not cognizable for federal habeas review and, therefore, Respondent's motion should be granted with respect to Ground One.
Ground Two
In Ground Two, Petitioner argues ineffective assistance of counsel for telling Petitioner that the State could not combine and try all of the cases in one trial. Respondent argues this issue is procedurally barred because it was not ruled upon at PCR since the application was summarily dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.
To exhaust his available state court remedies, a petitioner must “fairly present to the state court both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles associated with each claim.” Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a federal court may consider only those issues which have been properly presented to the state appellate courts with jurisdiction to decide them. Generally, a federal habeas court should not review the merits of claims that would be found to be procedurally defaulted (or barred) under independent and adequate state procedural rules. Lawrence v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 714 (4th Cir. 2008); Longworth, 377 F.3d 437; see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). As the court held in Fields v. Stevens, 2014 WL 3728163, at *7 (D.S.C. July 25, 2014):
“Under the well-established doctrine of procedural default, a federal habeas court may not review a claim that a state court has found to be clearly and expressly defaulted under an independent and adequate state procedural rule ....” Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 269 (4th Cir.1999); see also Lawrence, 517 F.3d at 714 (holding that a federal habeas court should not review the merits of claims that would be found to be procedurally defaulted under independent and adequate state procedural rules). A state procedural rule is considered “adequate if it is regularly or consistently applied by the state courts, and it is independent if it does not depend on a federal constitutional ruling.” McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir.2007) (citations omitted). As the record reflects that the PCR court dismissed Fields's 2010 PCR application as successive and untimely under state law without ruling on the merits of the application, the court finds that
Ground One is procedurally defaulted. See Hutto v. South Carolina, C/A No. 0:08-2188-TLW-PJG, 2009 WL 2983018, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept.14, 2009) (adopting report and recommendation finding claims dismissed by the PCR court as untimely and successive were procedurally barred); Scott v. Bazzle, C/A Nos. 8:05-2690-GRA-BHH, 8:06-2730-GRA-BHH, 2007 WL 2891541, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept.28, 2007) (adopting report and recommendation and noting that the “South Carolina statute of limitations for PCR applications” is an independent and adequate state ground “which acted as a procedural bar to the petitioner's claims”).
Petitioner's PCR application was dismissed as untimely so that this issue is procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Accordingly, it is recommended that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to Ground Two.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals denied certiorari on the issue raised by Petitioner in the PCR appeal that the PCR court should have ordered an evidentiary hearing, or in the alternative, remanded Petitioner's case for a limited hearing on whether his PCR application was time barred. (ECF Nos. 33-4 at 3 of 13; 33-9).
Ground Three
In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that the witnesses were not sequestered leading to witnesses changing their testimony to match that of another witness. Respondent argues that this is a question of state law citing to the South Carolina Code and state cases regarding sequestration. Therefore, Respondent contends this issue is not cognizable.
As this is an issue of state law, it is not cognizable for federal habeas review. As discussed above, a state court's decision on a question of state law is binding in federal court. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Thomas, 192 F.3d at 449 n. 1. The claim is not cognizable for federal habeas review and, therefore, Respondent's motion should be granted with respect to Ground Three. If Petitioner meant this issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to address this issue to the trial court, it would be procedurally barred in that it was not addressed by the state court since the PCR application was summarily dismissed as untimely. Accordingly, it is recommended that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted with regard to Ground Three.
Ground Four
In Ground Four, Petitioner argues ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner states that “[d]ue to consolidation, I could not effectively assist counsel in my own defense. Petitioner felt overwhelmed and confounded. Also embarrassed. Because Petitioner was ineffective in assisting his counsel, thus, counsel was ineffective.” (ECF No. 11-1 at 64). In his response to summary judgment, Petitioner argues that Ground Four is “inter-connected to Ground Two's allegation of ineffective counsel and this creates a condition under which Ground Four is also cognizable and procedurally sufficient.” (ECF No. 48 at 5 of 16).
First, this issue of ineffective assistance of counsel does not appear to be appropriate. Petitioner states in his argument that because the cases were consolidated, he was overwhelmed and could not help his attorney with his defense, thereby, making his counsel ineffective. Even if Petitioner is arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to “consolidation of cases” as he contends in his responses, the issue is procedurally defaulted as the PCR application was procedurally dismissed as untimely. (See citations set forth in Ground Two, above). In his responses, Petitioner attempts to argue that pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), he can overcome any procedural bar. However, Martinez is not applicable to overcome procedural bar for Petitioner failing to file a timely PCR application. Therefore, it is recommended that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to Ground Four.
Ground Five
In Ground Five, Petitioner argues a violation of his state habeas corpus rights during sentencing. In the motion for summary judgment, Respondent submits that Petitioner's reference for state habeas relief is not cognizable. In response to summary judgment, Petitioner states that he believes there was a violation of state habeas rights. Petitioner argues that at the time of sentencing, he did not know what the exact nature of his habeas violation was, but his counsel did or should have known that the action on the warrants was required within 90 days.
This claim regarding the filing of a state habeas action is an issue of state law and, therefore, not cognizable for federal habeas review. As discussed above, a state court's decision on a question of state law is binding in federal court. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Thomas, 192 F.3d at 449 n. 1. If this claim is found to be a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is procedurally barred in that the PCR application was dismissed as untimely. Thus, it is recommended that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to Ground Five.
Ground Six
In Ground Six, Petitioner argues that the PCR court erred in finding his PCR application untimely and erred in not allowing him to testify to that issue. Petitioner asserts that he was not permitted to raise arguments at his PCR hearing because it was decided on procedural grounds finding it untimely. Respondent argues that this is not a basis for federal habeas relief, thereby, making it not cognizable for federal habeas review. In his responses, Petitioner again argues that he was impeded from presenting his testimony with regard to his procedural argument as to why his PCR was not timely filed. Petitioner contends that based on Martinez, he was denied fair process when he was not allowed to testify to cause to overcome the untimeliness issue of his PCR application. However, Petitioner's argument is misplaced in that Martinez is not applicable to this issue.
As the Fourth Circuit has clearly articulated, “claims of error occurring in a state post-conviction proceeding cannot serve as a basis for federal habeas corpus relief.” Bryant v. Maryland, 848 F.2d 492, 493 (4th Cir.1988). “A state prisoner has no federal constitutional right to post-conviction proceedings in state court.” Lawrence v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 717 (4th Cir.2008) (internal citations omitted). This issue pertains to state procedural rules and is, thus, not cognizable for federal habeas review. Accordingly, it is recommended that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted with regard to Ground Six.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 34) be GRANTED in its ENTIRETY, and the petition be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. It is further recommended that any outstanding motions be deemed moot.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.