This Court has explained that in enacting the Official Code, it was the intent of the legislature to recodify, revise and modernize the general laws of Georgia. Whaley v. State, 260 Ga. 384 ( 393 S.E.2d 681) (1990). See also Kumar v. Hall, 262 Ga. 639, 643 ( 423 S.E.2d 653) (1992) (Michie Code only intended as a recodification and modernization of the old Code).
Because the legislature did not intend to limit the punishment for armed robbery, we hold that the trial court had authority to sentence Echols to life imprisonment for armed robbery. See OCGA § 1-1-2 (1990); Worley, 265 Ga. at 253; see also Whaley v. State, 260 Ga. 384 ( 393 S.E.2d 681) (1990) (applying the former law when the official Code altered the substantive law by omitting a Code section). See Worley, 265 Ga. at 254 (Carley, J., concurring).
In applying § 1-1-2 to the present case, we must determine what was the preexisting law concerning the tolling of statutes of limitation for persons with mental disabilities, and whether the Legislature intended to effect a change in that substantive law when it enacted the Official Code of Georgia. Tuten v. City of Brunswick, 262 Ga. 399 ( 418 S.E.2d 367) (1992); Whaley v. State, 260 Ga. 384 ( 393 S.E.2d 681) (1990). See also Danuel v. State, 262 Ga. 349, 351-352 (2, 3) ( 418 S.E.2d 45) (1992).
] See Whaley v. State, 260 Ga. 384, 385 ( 393 S.E.2d 681) (1990): As provided in OCGA § 1-1-2, the enactment of the Official Code was intended to resolve conflicts which existed in the law and to repeal those laws which had become obsolete, which had been declared unconstitutional or invalid, or which had been superseded by the enactment of later laws. [Id. at 385.
to recodify, revise and modernize the general laws of Georgia. Whaley v. State, 260 Ga. 384 ( 393 S.E.2d 681) (1990). See also Kumar v. Hall, 262 Ga. 639, 643 ( 423 S.E.2d 653) (1992) (Michie Code only intended as a recodification and modernization of the old Code).