The trial court, however, then noted that there was a third "criterion" under § 52-270, that of "other reasonable cause." Citing Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 565, 522 A.2d 288 (1987), it opined that the basic test of "reasonable cause" was "whether or not the litigant had been deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard and that an injustice will occur if a new trial is not allowed" and quoting Black v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 150 Conn. 188, 193, 187 A.2d 243 (1962), stated that "`[t]he statute [§ 52-270] . . . applies only "when no other remedy is adequate" and when in equity and good conscience relief against a judgment should be granted.'" The trial court then decided that the circumstance of this case did not invoke equity and good conscience.

The initial choice of an improper forum to bring an action normally would not create an equitable exception to a statute of limitations period. Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 522 A.2d 288 (1987); Duquay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 464 A.2d 45 (1983). Good faith actions of petitioners and personal hardship do not constitute an equitable basis for granting an exception, Wetzel v. Thorne, supra, 202 Conn. 566; despite the fact that a claim may be meritorious or that the state may have some alleged "honorary obligation" to a claimant.

The conduct of the defense attorneys about which Ms. Bowers complains was not improper, but entirely professional, proper and appropriate. A petition for a new trial does not furnish a substitute for or an alternative to an ordinary appeal. Tilo Co. v. Fishman, 164 Conn. 212, 214, 319 A.2d 409 (1972); Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 564, 522 A.2d 288 (1987). With respect to her claim of "tampering with jury records", Ms. Bowers claims that she should have been able to see letters which jurors wrote to attempt to be excused from jury duty.

" (Emphasis added.) Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 565, 522 A.2d 288 (1987). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for a new trial on the basis of this evidence.

Thus, the trial court's decision regarding the defendant's petition for a new trial as a result of a Brady violation will be overturned only upon a finding of "clear abuse of discretion." Demers v. State, supra, 148; Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 564-65, 522 A.2d 288 (1987); Asherman v. State, 202 Conn. 429, 434, 521 A.2d 578 (1987). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the impeachment value of the Hightower statement was merely cumulative.

At the outset, we note that a petition for a new trial is addressed to the discretion of the trial court whose decision thereon will be set aside on appeal only if it reflects a clear abuse of discretion. Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 564-65, 522 A.2d 288 (1987); Asherman v. State, 202 Conn. 429, 434, 521 A.2d 578 (1987). In deciding upon a petition for a new trial, the function of the trial court is to determine whether the evidence presented at the hearing on the petition together with the evidence presented at the original trial warrants the granting of the petition.

' Id., 149; see United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046, 106 S.Ct. 1263, 89 L.Ed.2d 572 (1986). Thus, the trial court's decision regarding the defendant's petition for a new trial as a result of a Brady violation will be overturned only upon a finding of `clear abuse of discretion.' Demers v. State, [ 209 Conn. 143, 148, 547 A.2d 28 (1988); Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 564-65, 522 A.2d 288 (1987); Ashermanv. State, 202 Conn. 429, 434, 521 A.2d 578 (1987)." State v. Shannon, supra, 212 Conn. 399-400.

" Johnson v. Henry, supra, 720. Although General Statutes 52-270 permits the court to grant a new trial upon proof of "reasonable cause," the circumstances in which reasonable cause may be found are limited. Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 565, 522 A.2d 288 (1987). "The basic test of `reasonable cause' is whether a litigant, despite the exercise of due diligence, has been deprived of a fair opportunity to have a case heard on appeal. . . . `A new trial may be granted "to prevent injustice in cases where the usual remedy by appeal does not lie or where, if there is an adequate remedy by appeal, the party has been prevented from pursuing it by fraud, mistake or accident.

"A petition will never be granted except on substantive grounds. It does not furnish a substitute for, or an alternative to, an ordinary appeal but applies only when no other remedy is adequate and when in equity and good conscience relief against a judgment should be granted." Id.; see Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 564, 522 A.2d 288 (1987). "[A petition for a new trial] is not a substitute for an appeal of a claimed error which the party knew or should have known at the time the appeal could have been taken."

Bleidner v. Searles, supra, 19 Conn. App. 78. In Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561 (1987), our Supreme Court stated that a new trial under the "reasonable cause" standard of § 52-570 depended on whether the petitioner "has been deprived of a fair opportunity to have a case heard on appeal." Id. 565 (italics in original).