Where no legislative history exists, this court will resort to general maxims of statutory construction, PGE, 317 Or. at 612, including the maxim that where no legislative history exists the court will attempt to determine how the legislature would have intended the statute be applied, had it considered the issue. Westwood Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Lane County, 318 Or. 146, 158, 864 P.2d 350 (1993) (citing PGE, 317 Or. at 612), adhered to as modified 318 Or. 327, 866 P.2d 463 (1994). Were we to read ORS 250.035 (6) as an unconditional ban on the certification of ballot titles that resemble each other, as petitioner urges us to do, we would have to conclude that the legislature intended to force this court to resolve a conflict between two irreconcilable results.

PGE, 317 Or at 612. See Westwood Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Lane County, 318 Or. 146, 158, 864 P.2d 350 (1993) (when legislative history does not reveal intent of the legislature, the court attempts to determine how the legislature would have intended the statute to be applied had it considered the issue) adhered to as modified on reconsideration, 318 Or. 327 (1994). A purpose of the 1981 amendment was to give insureds more options to purchase enhanced protection from the acts of underinsured motorists.

Argued September 3, 1993 Submitted September 3, 1993 decision of the Court of Appeals and judgment of the circuit court affirmed December 16, 1993, petition for reconsideration allowed by opinion February 3, 1994 See 318 Or. 327, 866 P.2d 463 (1994) In Banc

It is not necessary that the constitutional argument would necessarily prevail; rather, it may be invoked where "there is even a tenable argument of unconstitutionality. Westwood Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Lane County , 318 Or. 146, 160, 864 P.2d 350 (1993), adh'd to as modified on recons. , 318 Or. 327, 866 P.2d 463 (1994) (rejecting proposed interpretation that ‘arguably would infringe on the constitutional rights’ of parties)." Rodriguez , 217 Or. App. at 34, 175 P.3d 471.

As it pertains to real property, the word "attach," in turn, generally refers to the binding of a legally recognized claim, lien, charge, or liability as an encumbrance on the property. See, e.g ., Vukanovich v. Kine , 251 Or. App. 807, 814, 285 P.3d 733 (2012), rev. den. , 353 Or. 203, 296 P.3d 1275 (2013) (holding that a "notice of lis pendens is an encumbrance * * * because it is a claim or charge that attaches to and binds real property"); ORS 205.450(1) (defining "encumbrance" as "a claim, lien, charge or liability attached to and binding property"); Westwood Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Lane County , 318 Or. 146, 155, 864 P.2d 350 (1993), adh'd to as modified on recons , 318 Or. 327, 866 P.2d 463 (1994) (quoting with approval definition of "encumbrance" in Black's Law Dictionary 527 (6th ed. 1990) as a "claim, lien, charge, or liability attached to and binding real property; e.g . a mortgage; judgment lien; mechanics’ lien; lease; security interest; easement or right of way; accrued and unpaid taxes"). With those legal meanings of "right" and "attach" in mind, the statutory framework pertaining to judicial foreclosure of mortgages in which ORS 88.110 and ORS 88.120 function provides context for our analysis.

Westwood Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Lane County , 318 Or. 146, 864 P.2d 350 (1993), adh'd to as modified on recons. , 318 Or. 327, 866 P.2d 463 (1994) (footnotes omitted). In this case, however, plaintiffs did not plead a tort claim for injury to their property interest.

Westwood Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Lane County , 318 Or. 146, 153, 864 P.2d 350 (1993), adh'd to as modified on recons. , 318 Or. 327, 866 P.2d 463 (1994) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). There are a number of statutory liens, including a construction lien, innkeeper's lien, attorney's lien, among many others.

We are mindful of the criticisms that flow from a judicial search for legislative purpose at the third level of analysis under PGE. Jack L. Landau, Statutory Construction in Oregon, 32 Willamette L Rev 1, 57-66 (1996). However, we conclude that no other nontextual canon of construction informs our analysis in any meaningful way. See, e.g., ORS 174.030 (natural rights); Westwood Homeowners' Assn, Inc. v. Lane County, 318 Or. 146, 160, 864 P.2d 350 (1993), adhered to as modified on recons 318 Or. 327 (1994) (statutes should be construed to avoid unconstitutionality). While legislative history is not dispositive, it does provide some guidance when viewed in light of the maxim that we are to construe in accordance with the general statutory purpose.

Ultimately, we must give effect to the policy of the statute in the light of the legislative history and general maxims of statutory construction. Westwood Homeowners Ass'n v. Lane County, 318 Or. 146, 158, 864 P.2d 350 (1993), adhered to as modified on recons 318 Or. 327 (1994). The majority's result is sustainable only if it carries out a policy that the statute imposes.

It asserts that the CCRs are servitudes that authorize defendant to record a lien for delinquent assessments. See Westwood Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Lane County, 318 Or. 146, 152, 864 P.2d 350 (1993), mod 318 Or. 327, 866 P.2d 463 (1994). Plaintiff's first argument concerns the lots without recorded liens for delinquent assessments.