Rather, it becomes property of the tenant of record's estate. (see Westway Plaza Associates v Doe, 179 A.D.2d 408, 409, 578 N.Y.S.2d 166 [1st Dept 1992]).
Upon a tenant's death, the unexpired lease does not terminate but instead becomes the personal property of the tenant's estate. (De Christoforo v Shore Ridge Assoc., 116 A.D.2d 123, 126 [2d Dept 1986]; Westway Plaza Assoc. v Doe, 179 A.D.2d 408 [1st Dept 1992]; Joint Properties Owners, Inc. v Deri, 113 A.D.2d 691 [1st Dept 1986].) The estate retains particular rights and obligations for the remaining term of the lease, including payment of rent, De Christoforo, 116 A.D.2d at 126, quoting Schnee v Jonas Equities, Inc., 109 Misc.2d 221 (App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 1981); Deri, 113 A.D.2d at 693, and to bring a licensee proceeding, 100 W. 72nd St. Assoc. v Murphy, 144 Misc.2d 1036 (Civ Ct, NY County 1989); 1682-1700 Sterling Place Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v Stewart, 2006 WL 6872287 (Civ Ct, Kings County 2006).
Rather, it becomes the property of the tenant's estate. Westway Plaza Associates v. Doe, 179 AD2d 408, (1st Dept 1992), Remford Corp. v. Rosenfeld, 274 AD2d 769 (1st Dept 1948). The instant proceeding was brought prior to the expiration of the lease of Elizabeth Ann Davies.
Rather, it becomes the property of the tenant's estate. Westway Plaza Associates v. Doe, 179 A.D.2d 408, (1st Dept 1992), Remford Corp. v. Rosenfeld, 274 A.D.2d 769 (1st Dept 1948). The instant proceeding was brought prior to the expiration of the lease of Elizabeth Ann Davies.
Although CPLR 1001 would appear to apply to summary eviction proceedings (see, City of New York v Parker, NYLJ, Apr. 4, 1994, at 27, col 4, supra), the appellate courts have repeatedly held, without first undertaking a CPLR 1001 analysis, that dismissal of the petition is mandated where a person found to be a necessary party has not been named in or served with the petition. (E.g., Westway Plaza Assocs. v Doe, 179 A.D.2d 408 [1st Dept 1992]; 508 W. 172nd St. Corp. v Infante, NYLJ, June 15, 1990, at 21, col 2, supra; Stahl Assocs. Co. v Goodstadt, NYLJ, Jan. 13, 1984, at 6, col 2 [App Term, 1st Dept].) While Westway (supra) does not specifically address the requirements of CPLR 1001, its reasoning is instructive as to why dismissal of a summary eviction proceeding will often be required where a necessary party has not been joined.
The Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA) (L 2019, ch. 36), amended RPAPL 711(2) to provide, inter alia, that where a tenant dies during the term of the lease, a nonpayment proceeding may be commenced naming the occupants of the apartment "seeking a possessory judgment only as against the estate." However, "[a]n estate is not a legal entity and any action for or against the estate must be by or against the executor or administrator in his or her representative capacity" (Grosso v. Estate of Gershenson, 33 A.D.3d 587, 822 N.Y.S.2d 150 [2006] [quotation marks and citation omit- ted]; see Extell Belnord LLC v. Uppman, 113 A.D.3d. 1, 12, 976 N.Y.S.2d 22 [2013]; Westway Plaza Assoc, v. Doe, 179 A.D.2d 408, 578 N.Y.S.2d 166 [1992]). Here, it is undisputed that no executor or public administrator has been appointed for the deceased tenant’s estate.
to provide, inter alia, that where a tenant dies during the term of the lease, a nonpayment proceeding may be commenced naming the occupants of the apartment "seeking a possessory judgment only as against the estate." However, "[a]n estate is not a legal entity and any action for or against the estate must be by or against the executor or administrator in his or her representative capacity" (Grosso v Estate of Gershenson, 33 A.D.3d 587 [2006][quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Extell Belnord LLC v Uppman, 113 A.D.3d 1, 12 [2013]; Westway Plaza Assoc. v Doe, 179 A.D.2d 408 [1992]). Here, it is undisputed that no executor or public administrator has been appointed for the deceased tenant's estate.
Thus, upon the death of Kochi Ichida, his interest did not pass to his estate, rather, it passed automatically to his wife, respondent-tenant Seiko Ichida (seePHH Mtge. Corp. v. Burt , 176 AD3d 1242, 1244 [2019] ). Therefore, the estate of the deceased tenant is not a necessary party (seePHH Mtge. Corp. v Burt , 176 AD3d at 1244 ; cf.Joint Props. Owners v. Deri , 113 AD2d 691, 693-694 [1986] ; Westway Plaza Assoc. v. Doe , 179 AD2d 408 [1992] ). Accordingly, respondents' cross motion to dismiss for failure to join the deceased tenant's estate should have been denied and petitioner's motion to amend should have been granted.
Vincent argues that, because it is undisputed that Uppman has not lived in the apartment for years, plaintiff's claim for judgment declaring that Uppman does not reside in the apartment is moot. However, in the context of a proceeding brought by a landlord seeking to terminate the rights of all existing tenants or licensees, this Court has held that even the death of the tenant of record does not obviate the need to join a representative of the tenant's estate as a necessary party ( see Westway Plaza Assoc. v. Doe, 179 A.D.2d 408, 578 N.Y.S.2d 166 [1st Dept. 1992] ). Plaintiff seeks the termination of Uppman's lease on the ground that she breached the lease by failing to maintain the apartment as her primary residence.
We reverse. As a general rule, absent a provision in a lease to the effect that the lease terminates upon the death of the tenant, a "lease for a term of years which has not expired is not terminated by the death of the lessee" ( 100 W. 72nd St. Assoc. v Murphy, 144 Misc 2d 1036, 1038-1039 [Civ Ct, NY County 1989]; see Westway Plaza Assoc. v Doe, 179 AD2d 408; Joint Props. Owners v Deri, 113 AD2d 691). The tenant's Section 8 lease contained no provision to the effect that it would terminate upon the death of the tenant.