Westport Paper-Board Co., Inc. v. Staples

5 Citing cases

  1. Connecticut Bank Trust Co. v. Brody

    392 A.2d 445 (Conn. 1978)   Cited 5 times

    "Gifts to a group designated as children, grandchildren and the like have been so uniformly construed by us as made to a class which opens to let in after-born members that the words have acquired a definite significance." Westport Paper-Board Co. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115, 124, 15 A.2d 1; Hill v. Birmingham, 131 Conn. 174, 177-78, 38 A.2d 604. It follows that since it was possible that another grandchild of the testator might be born at some undetermined time after his death and thus become a member of the grandchildren class of beneficiaries, then the grandchildren cannot be regarded as "lives in being" for the purpose of applying the rule. It was the children of the testator who were the measuring lives and since a great-grandchild could have been born more than twenty-one years after the death of the children, the provision for the great-grandchildren violated the rule against perpetuities.

  2. Smith v. Groton

    147 Conn. 272 (Conn. 1960)   Cited 8 times

    Presumptively, words have the same meaning when repeated in a will, unless the context indicates a contrary intent. Hershatter v. Colonial Trust Co., 136 Conn. 588, 592, 73 A.2d 97; Westport Paper-Board Co. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115, 125, 15 A.2d 1; Beardsley v. Johnson, 105 Conn. 98, 107, 109, 134 A. 530. From a consideration of the entire will, it is clear that the term "legal representatives" was employed in the residuary clause as a term of limitation and not of purchase. See Johnson v. Edmond, supra; Tarrant v. Backus, 63 Conn. 277, 283, 290, 28 A. 46. The plaintiffs did not acquire any interests as devisees under the provisions of the residuary clause.

  3. Queen's Hospital v. Hite

    38 Haw. 494 (Haw. 1950)   Cited 4 times

    ) Nevertheless, where as here the ambiguous clause of paragraph thirteen is fairly open to two possible constructions of opposite import, the one of discretionary power, turning as it does the provision of gift to the issue of Albert into an illegal perpetuity, will not be preferred over the other of mandatory power if such other upholds the validity of that provision consistently with the rule. (See In re Peck's Estate, 96 Vt. 183, 118 A. 527; Singhi v. Dean, 119 Me. 287, 110 A. 865; Westport Paper-Board Co., Inc. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115, 15 A. [2d] 1; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] ยง 633.) The construction of mandatory power exercisable upon the death of the annuitants as urged by The Queen's Hospital renders the provision of gift to the issue of Albert valid and operative so as not to transgress the rule against perpetuities.

  4. Hershatter v. Colonial Trust Co.

    136 Conn. 588 (Conn. 1950)   Cited 12 times

    Presumptively, a word has the same significance when repeated in a will unless it clearly appears to have been used in a different sense. Beardsley v. Johnson, 105 Conn. 98, 107, 134 A. 530; Ansonia National Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 752, 136 A. 588; Westport Paper-Board Co. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115, 125, 15 A.2d 1. It should also be noted that, when using the word "sum" on the second and third occasions, the testator characterized it in each instance as the "said sum."

  5. Hill v. Birmingham

    38 A.2d 604 (Conn. 1944)   Cited 10 times
    In Hill V. Birmingham, 131 Conn. 174, 38 A.2d 604, the testator bequeathed certain property to his widow for life with remainder to his grandchildren, the grandchildren to receive the benefit of the income until the youngest should reach the age of twenty-five, at which time they were to receive the corpus equally divided.

    The other three grandchildren of the testator were her children, born respectively in 1922, 1924 and 1925. The testator's widow was alive when this action was begun but has since died. The gift to the testator's grandchildren was a class gift. Westport Paper-Board Co., Inc. v. Staples, 127 Conn. 115, 124, 15 A.2d 1. It is not necessary for the solution of the problem before us to decide whether the class closed when, at the death of the testator's widow, the fund was to be paid into a trust for the grandchildren "in equal shares." No grandchild could be born to the testator later than the time when the survivor of his son and daughter died, with a possible addition of nine months representing the period of gestation, and consequently the class would necessarily close at that time.