Opinion
C/A: 9:17-02781-RMG-BM
01-19-2018
James Westpoint, Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina; State of South Carolina Taxpayers; Scarlett Wilson, Atty for Defendant; Kevin Hales, Atty Appointed Under Miranda v. Arizona; Respondents of Warrant, # 2015A1010203057, 2015A1010203058, 2017A101020082, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Plaintiff, James Westpoint, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Charleston County Detention Center.
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L.No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a pro se complaint to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).
However, even when considered pursuant to this liberal standard, for the reasons set forth hereinbelow this case is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) [outlining pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].
Discussion
Records from Charleston County indicate that Petitioner was arrested in March 2017 on the charge of accessory/accessory before the fact to a felony. He was previously arrested, in July 2015, on charges of manufacture, distribution, etc. of cocaine base, 1st and possession of fifteen dosage units of MDMA or ecstasy, 1st offense. It appears that Petitioner was previously released on bond as to the 2015 charges, but that those bonds were revoked in May 2017. Counsel has now been appointed for Petitioner in all three of his pending criminal cases. See Charleston County Public Index. http://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=10&CourtAgency=10001&Casenum=2017A1010200802&CaseType=C; http://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=10&CourtAgency=10001&Casenum=2015A1010203057&CaseType=C; http://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/PIError.aspx?County=10&CourtAgency=10001&Casenum=2015A1010203058&CaseType=C (last visited January 19, 2018).
This Court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, C/A No. 0:09-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, *1 n. 1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd 347 F. App'x 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869 at * 2 (E.D.La. September 8, 2008)[noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records]; Williams v. Long, 585 F.Supp.2d 679, 687-88 (D.Md. 2008) [noting that some courts have found postings on government web sites as inherently authentic or self-authenticating].
Initially, Plaintiff filed a letter with the court in October 2017 in which he alleged that Defendant Kevin Hales and the other Defendants:
denied [Plaintiff] access to courts to include however not limited the right to bond/bail reduction and on the grounds of U.S. Const. Amend VIII excessive bond and bail. [Plaintiffs] are detaining me duly [sic] on the sole fact of my poverty.ECF No. 1 at 1-2. Plaintiff was directed to complete, sign, and return a standard "Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights" form (see ECF No. 8), which he did. Supplemental Complaint, ECF No. 1-2. On the complaint form, Plaintiff alleges that his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he was denied a speedy trial, an excessive bail amount was set, and his equal protection and due process rights were violated. ECF No. 1-2 at 4. He also contends that he has suffered from mental anguish and pain and suffering from being away from his children and family, and requests release from prison and dismissal of his criminal charges. ECF No. 1-2 at 8.
First, to the extent that Plaintiff is requesting to be released from incarceration, such relief may only be obtained in a habeas action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)[complaint or petition challenging the fact or duration of confinement should be construed and processed as a habeas corpus petition, while a complaint or petition challenging the conditions of confinement should be construed and processed as a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983]. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Fourth Court reiterated that release from prison is not a remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481(1994)[stating that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983"]. Therefore, any such claim should be dismissed.
Plaintiff also appears to be requesting that this Court intervene in his pending criminal cases in Charleston County. However, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). In Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that federal district courts should abstain from constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Id. at 52. Here, Plaintiff is not foreclosed from raising the issues he raises in his Complaint and having them ruled on in his ongoing state criminal prosecution by a state court judge. Moreover, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, expressly prohibits this court from enjoining such proceedings. See Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) ["Congress and the federal judiciary have consistently recognized that federal courts should permit state courts to try state cases, and that, where constitutional issues arise, state court judges are fully competent to handle them subject to Supreme Court review."]; cf. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983)[federal courts cannot review state court proceeding in appellate sense]; Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg Cty., 411 F.2d 586, 587-88 & nn.2-4 (4th Cir. 1969)[federal courts may not issue writs of mandamus against state courts]. Thus, this action should be dismissed because this Court should not intervene in Plaintiff's pending criminal proceedings.
Additionally, Defendant Scarlet Wilson, as Solicitor for Charleston County, is entitled to absolute immunity for activities performed as "an officer of the court" where the conduct at issue was closely associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-343 (2009). For example, when a prosecutor "prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding," "appears in court to present evidence in support of a search warrant application," or conducts a criminal trial, bond hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pre-trial "motions" hearings, absolute immunity applies. Id. at 343; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000). In the instant action, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Wilson involve the prosecution of Plaintiff's criminal case. Therefore, Defendant Wilson is protected from Plaintiff's claims for damages by prosecutorial immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)[absolute immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability"].
Plaintiff may also be attempting to assert claims against an "unknown Judge." ECF No. 1 -2 at 5. However, judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit for all actions taken in their judicial capacities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987)[a suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates]; Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985)["It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions."]; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) [immunity presents a threshold question which should be resolved before discovery is even allowed]; accord Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000) [discussing judicial immunity of United States District Judges and United States Circuit Judges].
Defendant Hales is also entitled to summary dismissal as a party Defendant because Plaintiff has alleged no facts to indicate that Hales, who Plaintiff describes as a "private attorney" (ECF No. 1-2 at 2-3), acted under color of state law. An attorney, whether retained, court- appointed, or a public defender, does not act under color of state law. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-324 nn. 8-16 (1981)["A lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor 'under color of state law' within the meaning of § 1983."]; Conner v. Donnelly, 42 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir.1994)[noting that while state employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor, that is not true in the case of a public defender]; Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-1156 & nn. 2-3 (4th Cir. 1980)[court-appointed attorney]; Deas v. Potts, 547 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1976)[private attorney].
In order to state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) "some person has deprived him of a federal right," and (2) "the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or [federal] law." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Plaintiff also includes allegations that his previous attorney, Michael Loignon, failed to protect his right to a speedy trial, violated his right to have his charges weighed by a grand jury, and was his attorney when his alleged excessive bail was set. However, Loignon has not been named as a defendant in this action. In any event, Loignon, as Plaintiff's attorney, would not have acted under color of state law. See, discussion hereinabove, supra.
In the caption of his initial filing, Plaintiff also lists the State of South Carolina, the State of South Carolina Taxpayers and "Respondents of Warrant" as defendants. Because Plaintiff failed to allege any specific claims against these Defendants, he was informed that the letter he submitted failed to comply with Fed.R.Civ. P. 8(a), which requires a pleading to set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim" and the relief requested. Plaintiff was directed to complete, sign, and return a standard "Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights" form (which, as noted above, he did) and to submit completed service documents for all Defendants. ECF No. 8. On the complaint form, Plaintiff named only Scarlett Wilson and Kevin Hales as Defendants, ECF No. 1-2, and he only returned service documents for Defendants Wilson and Hales. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff is no longer bringing this action against Defendants State of South Carolina, State of South Carolina Taxpayers, or "Respondents of Warrants". Even if he was still attempting to bring this action against these Defendants, however, they are subject to summary dismissal for the reasons previously discussed. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to state any claims against these Defendants. Moreover, to the extent the Defendant State of South Carolina taxpayers are private individuals, they are subject to summary dismissal because such persons or entities are not state actors pursuant to § 1983.
Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
/s/_________
Bristow Marchant
United States Magistrate Judge January 19, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).