Opinion
No. 121 C.D. 2012
07-25-2012
Westmoreland County, Petitioner v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Gilman), Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
Westmoreland County (Employer) petitions for review of an order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the decision of a Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) that Roxanne Gilman (Claimant) was injured in the course and scope of her employment and is entitled to benefits. Employer contends that pursuant to 301(c)(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act), Claimant was engaged in personal activity at the time of her injury, and therefore is ineligible for benefits. Upon review, we affirm.
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §411(1).
Claimant works for Employer as a nurse's aide at Westmoreland Manor. In May 2009, when returning from her lunch break, Claimant sustained a foot and ankle injury. Specifically, Claimant suffered her injuries as a result of stepping in a small hole in the grass by Employer's parking lot. Thereafter, Claimant sought medical attention. At the emergency room, x-rays revealed she suffered a fractured right tibia and soft tissue damage. After her injury, Claimant did not work again until October 2009.
Claimant filed a claim petition seeking compensation for lost wages and medical expenses. Employer denied the allegations. Additionally, on the date of the injury Employer issued a notice denying liability, asserting Claimant's injuries occurred outside the course of her employment. Thereafter, at the request of the parties, a WCJ held bifurcated proceedings so the parties could separately litigate the course of employment issue.
Before the WCJ, Claimant testified on her own behalf. Specifically, Claimant testified that on the day of her injury she brought a salad to work to share with her co-workers for lunch. After sharing her salad, Claimant returned her salad bowl to her car, which she parked in Employer's parking lot adjacent to its building, on her way back to work. While walking to her car, Claimant decided to cut through the grass instead of using the available walkway because it was quicker. While doing so, Claimant stepped in a hole and injured her right foot and ankle.
In opposition, Employer presented the deposition testimony of its human resources director, Charles Dominick (Employer's Witness), who conceded Claimant's injury occurred on Employer's property. Furthermore, he testified Employer did not prohibit employees from walking in the grassy area or going to their cars during their lunch breaks. However, Employer's Witness also stated Claimant could have reached her car using the paved walkways, and Employer did not require its employees to stay on its premises during lunch. Moreover, he testified Employer did not require Claimant to put her salad bowl in her car after using it.
Thereafter, the WCJ issued an interlocutory order concluding Claimant sustained her alleged injuries within the course of employment. Specifically, the WCJ determined Claimant's injury occurred during an inconsequential, momentary departure from work. Thus, the WCJ ordered the proceedings to continue.
Subsequently, the parties stipulated to Claimant's period of disability. Additionally, Claimant submitted medical evidence consisting of emergency room records and the notes of the two physicians who treated her. Employer did not present any medical evidence. Claimant also submitted a subrogation exhibit related to her insurer's medical bill payments.
Upon consideration, the WCJ granted Claimant a closed period of wage loss benefits, medical benefits, and attorney fees. Furthermore, the WCJ determined Claimant's insurer was entitled to reimbursement. Employer appealed.
Before the Board, Employer asserted the WCJ erred in determining Claimant sustained her injuries in the course of employment and in granting her insurer's subrogation claim. In short, the Board determined the WCJ did not err on either issue, and it affirmed. Specifically, the Board determined Claimant sustained her injuries on Employer's premises while returning to work at a time proximate to her employment. Therefore, her presence on Employer's premises was so connected to her employment that it was essentially required by it. As such, the Board agreed Claimant's injuries occurred within the course of her employment. Employer now petitions for review.
II. Issue
On appeal, Employer asks whether the Board erred in determining Claimant's injuries occurred within the course of her employment. It asserts Claimant sustained her injuries while acting outside the course of her employment because her job duties did not require her to walk to the parking lot at the time of her injury. Employer contends that because Claimant acted for her own convenience, she is not entitled to benefits.
This Court's review is limited to determining whether an error of law or a constitutional violation was committed and whether the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Myers v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Univ. of Pennsylvania & Alexsis, Inc.), 782 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). --------
III. Discussion
Pursuant to Section 301(c)(1) of the Act, an employee's injury is compensable if it arises in the course of employment and is causally related to her employment. 77 P.S. §411(1). An injury occurs within the course of employment: (1) where the employee is injured while actually engaged in furtherance of the employer's business; or, (2) where the employee, although not engaged in the furtherance of the employer's business (a) is on the employer's premises, (b) is required by the nature of her employment to be on the premises, and (c) a condition of the premises or the employer's business operations causes her injury. U.S. Airways v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Dixon), 764 A.2d 635 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (citing Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Slaugenhaupt) v. U.S. Steel Corp., 376 A.2d 271 (Pa Cmwlth. 1977)).
In this case, as Claimant sustained her injuries during her return to work from her lunch break, rather than while actually engaged in furtherance of her employer's business, we consider whether Claimant was in the course of employment under the second prong. See U.S. Airways. It is undisputed Claimant sustained her injuries because of a condition on Employer's premises. Therefore, our analysis turns only on whether the nature of Claimant's employment required her to be on the premises when and where the injury occurred.
Once an employee is on her employer's premises, going to or leaving her work station is a necessary part of her employment. Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hines), 913 A.2d 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Therefore, when an employee is injured by a condition on her employer's property within the reasonable amount of time before and after her shift, such injury is compensable even though she is not actually working. Id. (citing Newhouse v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Harris Cleaning Serv., Inc.), 530 A.2d 545 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987)).
Likewise, an employee is within the course of employment when she is on her employer's premises going to and from her vehicle and work station to begin or end her lunch break. ICT Grp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Churchray-Woytunick), 995 A.2d 927 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). In ICT Group, this Court considered whether an employee who sustained her injury from slipping on ice on her employer's premises when leaving work for her lunch break was injured within the course of her employment. In sum, although the employee was beginning her lunch break and independently decided to exercise her right to leave employer's premises at that time, this Court determined her presence on her employer's premises was "so connected to [her] employment relationship that was required by the nature of her employment." Id. at 932.
Here, Claimant sustained her injuries on Employer's premises during her return from lunch to her work area. Although Claimant did not leave Employer's premises during her lunch break, as the employee did in ICT Group, such fact is not a material distinction. Rather, just as an employee may be required by the nature of her job to walk to and from her car during her lunch break if she wishes to leave her employer's premises during that time, it was necessary for Claimant to walk from her lunch area to her work area after her break. See ICT Grp. Thus, as Claimant finished her break and was in the process of returning to work, she was in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.
Furthermore, the fact Claimant sustained her injuries during a brief deviation from a direct return to work does not place her outside the course of employment. Baby's Room v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stairs), 860 A.2d 200 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (temporary departures from work to administer to personal comforts or convenience do not interrupt one's course of employment). It is undisputed Claimant chose to return her salad bowl to her car for her personal convenience. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 21a. Additionally, her deviation was minor, and she remained available to Employer by pager during it. R.R. at 25a. Under these facts, Claimant's momentary detour from her return to work did not cause her to leave the course of her employment. See D'Agata Nat., Inc. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (D'Agata), 479 A.2d 98 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) (employee remained in the course of employment when buying a cup of coffee on the way to a meeting).
Nevertheless, Employer contends our Supreme Court's holding in Kmart Corporation v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Fitzsimmons), 561 Pa. 111, 748 A.2d 660 (2000) and this Court's decisions in Wright v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Larpat Muffler, Incorporated), 871 A.2d 281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) and Giebal v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Sears Roebuck & Company), 399 A.2d 152 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) require a contrary result.
In both Kmart Corporation and Giebal, the employees sustained injuries on their employers' premises during their lunch breaks. In both cases, at the time of their injuries, the claimants were acting independent from their employment. Kmart Corporation (employee ate at a public restaurant located on employer's premises); Giebal (employee shopped in her employer's store). Thus, because the nature of their employment did not require them to become patrons on their employers' premises during their lunch breaks, their injuries occurred outside the course of their employment. See also Wright (an employee walking to and from his car to return merchandise he wanted to exchange at his employer's business as a customer was not within the course of employment).
Unlike the employees in the cases cited by Employer, who were not returning to work when their injuries occurred, but rather, were still engaged in their lunch-break activities, Claimant ended her lunch-break activities and was returning to work when she sustained her injuries. R.R. at 20a. Therefore, the cases cited by Employer are distinguishable.
In sum, Claimant was in the course of employment when she walked across Employer's premises to her work area after finishing her lunch break. Furthermore, Claimant did not leave the course of her employment by briefly sidetracking to put her salad bowl in her car. Therefore, the Board did not error in determining Claimant sustained her injury during the course of her employment under Section 301(c)(1) of the Act.
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 25th day of July, 2012, the Order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge