"Second, another subcontractor, RC Grading, commenced work on this job in January of 2006, before the construction deed of trust was recorded in February[] 2006, and the commencement of work by one subcontractor triggers the priority of any liens of subsequent trades, even those who began work after that deed of trust was recorded. See Westfour Corporation v. California First Bank (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1562-[156]3 [(Westfour)], and Civil Code section 3106. Since the evidence showed the work of improvement began before the [trust deed] was recorded, [City Wide's] mechanic's liens have priority under this theory as well.
Statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated. Relying on Westfour Corporation v. California First Bank (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1554 (Westfour), Coast Rebar argued whether a mechanic’s lien claimant knows the identity of the lender when it files the complaint is not dispositive and does not preclude it from substituting the lender for a Doe defendant after the 90-day limitations period has passed. Rather, Coast Rebar insisted, the claimant must have actual knowledge of the recording of the deed of trust.
We review the findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard. (Westfour Corp. v. California First Bank (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1558.) The trial court used some of its findings of fact in drawing conclusions of law.
[Citation.] To the extent the trial court drew conclusions of law based upon its findings of fact, we review those conclusions of law de novo. [Citation.]" ( Westfour Corp. v. California First Bank (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1558 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 394].) The trial court stated the following:
(a) Section 3135 applies to the facts of this case Appellants' first contention on appeal is that section 3135 does not apply in this case, based on Westfour Corp. v. California First Bank (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1554 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 394] review denied. Westfour has little precedential value in the matter before this court.
However, Kinetics points to Westfour Corporation v. California First Bank, in which one contractor (Westfour) signed on to complete a building's interior after two years of exterior renovation. The trial court in Westfour found that Westfour “had replaced [the contractor that worked on the exterior] as general contractor” and should be considered “the contractor” for the purposes of subsection (b). 3 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1561–62, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 (1992). The California Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence supported the trial court's finding.
We will uphold the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, and " 'any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision.' " (TME Enterprises, Inc. v. Norwest Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1030; see Westfour Corp. v. California First Bank (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1558.) We review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo.
We review the court's findings of fact for substantial evidence. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 649, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84 ; Westfour Corp. v. California First Bank (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1558, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 (Westfour ).) Under that standard, our review begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the findings below.
( Ibid.) Similarly, the court in Westfour Corp. v. California First Bank (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1561, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 394, adopted this construction of “the contractor” in section 3097, subdivision (b). The court summarized section 3097 as requiring “all persons other than a person who is both ‘under direct contract with the owner’ and ‘the contractor’ to give preliminary notice to a construction lender within 20 days after commencing work on a project.
We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (Westfour Corp. v. California First Bank (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1558 (Westfour). Again, we find that plaintiffs have not met their burden on appeal.