Opinion
CV176011630S
08-27-2019
WESTFIELD MANOR HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC. v. Brian WELSKOPP
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Nada K. Sizemore, Judge
The court issues this written decision after a trial to the court was conducted on August 12, 2019.
The court, having reviewed and considered the testimony of all parties and witnesses, and having reviewed and considered all the briefs, evidentiary and written submissions filed by the parties in this case, is entering judgment for the Plaintiff Westfield Manor Health Care Center, Inc. [hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff Westfield Manor"] in the amount of $6,352.27; and the court enters judgment for the Plaintiff Westfield Manor on the Counterclaim.
The court bases its decision on the following.
Procedural Background
By Complaint dated November 21, 2017, the Plaintiff Westfield Manor brings suit against Defendant Brian Welskopp, the son of Irene Welskopp. Plaintiff Westfield alleges in its complaint that on or about March 27, 2017, the Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written contract called a Resident Admissions Agreement whereby Plaintiff was to provide certain skilled nursing and health care services to Irene Welskopp, "Resident." Plaintiff Westfield provided such services and alleges that Defendant Brian Welskopp was a "Responsible Party" per the terms of the written admissions agreement. During the care at Westfield Manor, some of the bills for Irene Welskopp’s admissions were not fully paid by Medicaid or other insurance and the Plaintiff now seeks to recover those remaining sums from her son, Brian Welskopp.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Brian Welskopp is responsible for the balance owed of $6,352.27, because he assumed that responsibility as a signatory to the Resident Admissions Agreement signed in 2017 as a "Responsible Party."
By Answer dated February 13, 2018, the Defendant as a self-represented party answered the complaint denying the Plaintiff’s claims. He alleges that "at no time was I conservator, power of attorney, guardian, caretaker, administrator over Irene Welskopp. I have no legal obligation to pay for Irene Welskopp bills." Plaintiff replied to this pleading on February 26, 2017.
Defendant Welskopp by "Amended Revised Cross Complaint Counterclaim" dated October 19, 2018 filed claims against the Plaintiff seeking money damages in the amount of $100,000. He alleges that the Plaintiff through its representative Nancy Freese has harassed, threatened and intimidated him and as a result he has suffered emotional distress, depression and anxiety. He further alleges that he has been under a doctor’s care as an outpatient at Wheeler Clinic in New Britain, Connecticut.
Plaintiff Westfield Manor answered the Counterclaim generally denying all its allegations. The pleadings were then closed and the matter was claimed for trial to the courtside calendar.
At trial, the parties presented the following evidence and testimony for court consideration. Plaintiff Westfield Manor presented the witness testimony of Jane DeVries, administrator of Westfield Manor; and the testimony of Andrew Levy, custodian of records from Bank of America. It further introduced the following five (5) exhibits at trial: (1) Exhibit A- Resident Admissions Agreement dated March 27, 2017 between Irene Welskopp, Brian Welskopp and Westfield Care and Rehab Center; (2) Exhibit B- Apple Healthcare Inc. Invoice dated August 8, 2019- $11,438.19; (3) Exhibit C- Bank of America Account Records for Checking Account held by Irene O. Welskopp and Brian C. Welskopp from March 18, 2017 to September 15, 2017; (4) Exhibit D- Motion For Dismissal dated February 15, 2018 signed by Brian Welskopp; and (5) Exhibit E- Letter dated July 13, 2019 from Brian Welskopp to Richard Florentine. In addition, the Plaintiff Westfield Manor submitted a post-trial Memorandum of Law dated August 23, 2019 for court review.
The defendant Welskopp testified himself at trial and he introduced the following exhibits in support of his defense and counterclaim. The court on the record accepted all his previously filed exhibits electronically filed in Edison as full exhibits at this trial. The documents are as follows: (1) Entry No. 103.5- Authorization Statement dated December 22, 2016 signed by Irene Welskopp; (2) Entry No. 121- Letter dated May 8, 2019 from Wheeler Clinic of New Britain, CT; (3) Entry #126- Durable Power of Attorney dated July 1, 2018; (4) Entry No. 127- Probate Court Decree copy dated March 26, 2018- Brian Welskopp appointed Successor Conservator of person Irene Welskopp- Meriden Probate Court Docket No. 17-0287; (5) Entry No. 128- Excerpt of Resident Admission Agreement- pages 21 and (6) Entry No. 129- Exercise of Admission Agreement- pp. 19. The Defendant Welskopp further presented a Memorandum of Law dated August 12, 2019 as well.
LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
In general, when cases are tried to the court, "the [fact finding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in the totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005). "It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony ... It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence ..." (Internal quotations omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact]." Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 847 (1981). "[N]othing in our law is more elementary than the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded their testimony." (Internal quotations omitted.) Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530, 378 A.2d 580 (1977).
In breach of contract cases like this one, the Connecticut courts have long recognized that there must be mutual assent or a meeting of the minds at the time the contract was formed. In order for there to be a meeting of the minds, the parties must agree that they have entered into a contract and must have a similar understanding as to the essential terms. Bridgeport Pipe Engineering Co. v. DeMatteo Construction Co., 159 Conn. 242, 249 (1970).
It is well established that "[t]he elements of a breach of contract action are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of that agreement by the other party and damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 149 Conn.App. 177, 90 A.3d 219 (2014) citing Pelletier v. Galske, 105 Conn.App. 77, 81, 936 A.2d 689 (2007).
"Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms ... [I]n construing contracts, we give effect to all the language included therein, as the law of contract interpretation ... militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous ... If a contract is unambiguous within its four corners, intent of the parties is a question of law requiring plenary review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 149 Conn.App. 117, 90 A.3d 19 (2014); citing Assn. Resources, Inc. v. Wall, 298 Conn. 145, 183, 2 A.3d 873 (2010).
When considering written contracts with nursing homes, the Connecticut Supreme, Appellate and trial courts have particularly looked closely at situations and written language similar to the case at bar. This is particularly so when the court has considered breach of contract claims against family members who were assisting parents and others in nursing home placements. See Emeritus Senior Living v. Lepore, 183 Conn.App. 23, 191 A.3d 212 (2018); Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 463 A.2d 527 (1983); Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, supra, 169 Conn. 527, 151 A.3d 404 (2014); Sunrise Healthcare Corporation v. Azarigian, 76 Conn.App. 800, 821 A.2d 835 (2003); Health Resources of Groton, Inc. v. Karns, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, CV No. 09-6002067 (Leuba, J., Jan. 26, 2012), 2012 WL 527625; Whitney Manor Convalescent Center v. Lumpkin, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, CV 06-5006153 (Keegan, J., April 8, 2010) 2010 WL 1904924; Saybrook Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Klevecz, Superior Court judicial district of New London, CV04-4001606 (Jones, J., Oct. 12, 2006, 2006 WL 3008454; compare Farmington Care Center, LLC v. Matta, Superior Court judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, HHD CV 19-6105710 (Scholl, J., May 2, 2019) 68 Conn.L.Rptr. 429 (2019).
To prevail in this type of breach of contract claim, the plaintiff nursing home has the burden to prove the existence of an enforceable contract by a preponderance of the evidence. Health Resources of Groton, Inc. v. Karns, supra citing Burnham v. Karl and Gelb, 50 Conn.App. 385, 388 (1998).
In the case at bar, the Plaintiff Westfield Manor argues that it has met its burden and that the terms of the Residential Admissions Agreement signed by Defendant Welskopp are clear, unambiguous and contains all essential terms to be enforceable. The Defendant disagrees. He argues that he never agreed to be personally responsible for any amounts owed to the Plaintiff as his mother’s intentions were to take care of her own expenses. He further argues that the terms of this contract are confusing, misleading, vague, ambiguous and unconscionable and he asks this court to not enforce this as a legally binding agreement between himself and the Plaintiff Westfield Manor.
After a careful review of the exhibits, testimony and briefs of the parties, especially the controlling reported Connecticut case law, this court has no choice but to enter judgment for the Plaintiff Westfield Manor. The court finds that the evidence and legal arguments submitted by the Plaintiff Westfield Manor are supported by the reported case law and evidence presented in this case. The testimony and documents presented by the Plaintiff clearly showed that Defendant Brian Welskopp signed this written contract in his capacity as a "Responsible Party." Thus, the written agreement became an enforceable contract against Defendant Brian Welskopp in his capacity as "Responsible Party."
Defendant asks this court to find the contract is ambiguous, unclear, unconscionable and thus unenforceable. However, the statutes, case law and contract language prohibit the court from finding such.
The Connecticut legislature in Section 19a-539(d) has mandated the following:
As part of any resident admission agreement, each nursing home facility shall provide clear and conspicuous notice of the duties, responsibilities and liabilities of the person or persons who sign such agreement with the nursing home facility as a responsible party, including the circumstances under which the responsible party will be held legally liable and in which such party’s personal assets may be pursued for payment to the facility ... Failure to include the notice and obtain the initials of the responsible party or parties shall render the resident admission agreement unenforceable as to the responsible party.
In the case at bar, a plain reading of the Resident Admissions Agreement dated March 27, 2017 shows that it complies with the terms required by C.G.S. Section 19-539 cited above.
At page one of the Residential Admissions Agreement, the contract defines who is a "Resident." Under Section II-FINANCIAL AGREEMENTS, at page 19 of the agreement, the payment and financial terms all refer to the "Resident" as being responsible for personal payment schedules, billing, bed hold charges, late charges and the like. Specifically at Section II, A- the contract reads in pertinent part: "The Resident agrees to pay for all charges including room, board and general nursing care and treatment provided by the Facility and all ancillary charges ..." The Responsible Party is not mentioned in this paragraph. At page 20 of that agreement in Section II, B, the contract further reads: "The Responsible Party does NOT personally guarantee or serve as surety for payment as described in the Agreement; ..."
And, in Section II, Section G at pp. 21- the contract reads:
Responsibility for Payments:
The Resident is personally responsible for payment of all financial obligations arising out of the rendering of care and services to the Resident by the Facility. Execution of this Agreement will constitute an acceptance on the part of the Resident to pay all financial obligations and to be personally liable for the payment obligation as specified in this Agreement.
Further, as one continues reading this agreement, the court finds at page 24 separate notice again about RESPONSIBLE PARTY DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES. The contract further reiterates, in relevant part, that:
Pursuant to Public Act 16-209, Connecticut General Statutes Section 19a-539(d), the facility is informing you that by signing this Agreement as the Responsible Party, you do NOT personally guarantee or serve as surety for payment for the care and services provided to the resident by the facility. However, you are responsible for, agree to and may be personally liable for:
(a) Ensuring that the Resident’s resources are used to pay the facility for the cost of care, services and supplies provided to the Resident during his or her stay and acknowledge that you, as the Responsible Party, have control of or access to the resident’s resources including income and/or assets; and (Emphasis added.)
(b) Apply promptly for, or assist the facility as necessary in establishing eligibility or otherwise applying for, any applicable Medicare or other insurance benefits on behalf of the resident; and ...
And last, as you continue to read the contract, at page 28 in Section VIII under ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, under section 2, the contract again says: "The Responsible Party understands that they are NOT a Guarantor for the Resident; however they may held [be] accountable for failing to complying (sic) with any of the terms of this Agreement."
Based on this court’s review of this contractual language and based on the review of the applicable statute and reported case law, this court concludes that this contract is unambiguous and clear as to the duties of a Responsible Party such as Defendant Welskopp. He has not taken on any personal liability directly for the debt owed by Irene Welskopp. However, as a Responsible Party, he has taken on personal liability under subsection (a) of the contract described above.
In looking at whether Defendant Welskopp had "control of or access" to the resident’s resources including income and/or assets, so as to help satisfy Irene Welskopp’s debts from her admissions to Plaintiff Westfield Manor, this court finds the evidence sufficient to show that he did have such access and control. The evidence showed that he was the joint owner on the checking account with Bank of America; and that he had access to withdraw funds from said account. And he admitted during his testimony that he did access funds in this account, and paid debts owed by Irene Welskopp.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, the court enters judgment for the Plaintiff Westfield Manor.
Counterclaim- Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Defendant Welskopp by Counterclaim dated October 19, 2018 brings suit against the Plaintiff seeking $100,000, on the basis that the plaintiff harassed, threatened and intimidated him and thereby caused him emotional distress, depression and anxiety. In support of this claim, he presented his testimony and a letter dated May 8, 2019 from Wheeler Clinic of New Britain, Connecticut. (Entry #121.)
Based on the evidence presented, this court finds that the Defendant Welskopp failed to sustain his burden of proof on the counterclaim, as the evidence presented was insufficient to support any claims for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress and he failed to support any specific damages.
To prove an emotional distress claim, the Connecticut courts generally require the following. See Gleason v. Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394, 125 A.3d 920 (2015); Hall v. Bergman, 296 Conn. 169, 994 A.2d 666 (2010); Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 876 A.2d 522 (2005); Appleton v. Board of Education of Town of Stonington, 254 Conn. 205, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000); Geiger v. Carey, 170 Conn.App. 459, 154 A.3d 1093 (2017).
"[I]n order to prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm ..." Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 410, 876 A.2d 522 (2005). The elements of a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress are as follows: (1) the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress ; (2) the plaintiff’s distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress. Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 444, 815 A.2d 119 (2003). [T]he elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress do not require proof of any particular level of intent. In fact, intent need not be proven at all to establish a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress . Stohlts v. Gilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634, 645, 867 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 930, 873 A.2d 1000 (2005).
"As to the first and second elements of the claim, they essentially [require] that the fear or distress experienced by the plaintiffs be reasonable in light of the conduct of the defendants. If such [distress] were reasonable in light of the defendants’ conduct, the defendants should have realized that their conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing distress, and they, therefore, properly would be held liable. Conversely, if the [distress] were unreasonable in light of the defendants’ conduct, the defendants would not have recognized that their conduct could cause this distress and, therefore, they would not be liable ..." Larobina v. McDonald, supra, 274 Conn. at 410, 876 A.2d 522. "The third element of the claim is [t]he foreseeability requirement [which] is more specific than the standard negligence requirement that an actor should have foreseen that his tortious conduct was likely to cause harm ... In order to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead that the actor should have foreseen that her behavior would likely cause harm of a specific nature, i.e., emotional distress likely to lead to illness or bodily harm ... Olson v. Bristol-Burlington Health District, [ 87 Conn.App. 1, 5, 863 A.2d 748, cert. granted, 273 Conn. 914, 870 A.2d 1083 (2005)] [ (withdrawn by party after certification granted) ]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that the emotional distress sustained be "severe." Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, supra, 92 Conn.App. at 846, 888 A.2d 104. Negligent infliction of emotional distress requires that the emotional distress be "severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm ..." Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 262 Conn. at 444, 815 A.2d 119. Intentional infliction also requires that the conduct alleged be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. at 211, 757 A.2d 1059.
In the case at bar, whether the Defendant Welskopp is alleging negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress is unclear. However, when applying the above well recognized Connecticut case law to this lawsuit and to the allegations made in his counterclaim, this court cannot find any reasonable basis to find that the Plaintiff Westfield Manor engaged in any negligent or intentional conduct that rises to the level of civil liability for infliction of emotional distress.
The court recognizes the difficult experience of Defendant Welskopp’s loss of his elderly mother and her placement in skilled nursing care with the plaintiff, prior to her death. However, the Plaintiff’s efforts to collect unpaid sums and to pursue this lawsuit against him to collect is not tantamount to be actionable conduct that would foreseeably cause illness or emotional distress.
In addition, even if the court found the conduct to be actionable, the court cannot find that the report of Wheeler Clinic and defendant’s testimony are sufficient to provide any medical basis to demonstrate any proof that his treatment at Wheeler Clinic was proximately caused by the conduct of the Plaintiff Westfield Manor and that his resulting damages were connected in any way with a reasonable degree of medical probability to the conduct of the Plaintiff Westfield Manor.
The court therefore enters judgment for the PLAINTIFF as to the claims made in the counterclaim.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, this court enters judgment in the amount of $6,352.27 for the PLAINTIFF WESTFIELD MANOR on the Complaint.
The court further enters judgment for the PLAINTIFF WESTFIELD MANOR as to the counterclaim.