Summary
In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Blakely, 162 Miss. 854, 140 So. 336 (1932), plaintiff went into the telegraph office to send a message, and while walking from the front to the desk she slipped, fell and injured herself.
Summary of this case from Wallace v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc.Opinion
No. 29880.
March 14, 1932.
1. NEGLIGENCE.
Whether floor of telegraph office on which customer fell was wet and slippery held, under evidence, for jury.
2. NEGLIGENCE.
It is telegraph company's duty to have office in which public are invited to transact business with and for company's benefit kept in reasonably safe condition.
APPEAL from circuit court of Jones county. HON.W.J. PACK, Judge.
Street Street, of Laurel, for appellant.
The verdict in this case, is without substantial support in the evidence and is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence. The verdict is unreasonable because based upon unreasonable testimony.
It is the essence of negligence that the person to be charged should have had knowledge that there was a duty for him to perform. As negligence necessarily involves a violation or disregard of some duty known to the person charged therewith, it follows that knowledge of the facts out of which the duty arises is an essential element for consideration in determining whether one has exercised reasonable care or has been guilty of negligence. Accordingly, the general rule is that in order that an act or omission may be regarded as negligent, the person charged therewith must have knowledge that such act or omission involved danger to another.
45 C.J. 651-652.
The owner is liable to invited persons for injuries occasioned by the unsafe condition of the land or its approaches, if such condition was known to him and not to them, and was negligently suffered to exist, without timely notice to the public to those who were likely to act upon such invitation.
20 R.C.L. 53.
The appellant owed to appellee the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises safe so as not to expose her to unnecessary danger, but it was not an insurer of her safety and the fact that she fell and was injured raises no presumption of negligence on the part of appellant.
45 C.J. 866; Kersge v. Fader, 158 N.E. 174; Spickernagle v. Woolworth Co., 84 A. 909; Woolworth Co. v. Williams, 41 Fed. 2d 971; Bradford v. Woolworth Co., 140 S.E. 105; Graham v. Woolworth Co., 277 S.W. 223; Garland v. Furst Store, 107 A. 38; Torbet v. Woolworth Co., 238 N.W. 140.
A person who enters a public place in connection with the business carried on in the premises occupied the position of an invitee, and the proprietor only owes to such person the duty of exercising reasonable and ordinary care for his safety.
Quinn v. Utah Gas. Co., 42 Utah, 113; Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426; Mona v. Erion, 223 App. Div. 526.
The floors of a railroad station must be frequently washed, and they cannot be washed without becoming to some extent wet and slippery. Therefore, it is difficult to see wherein the defendant was in any wise negligent for having wet and slippery floors at the moment of the accident.
Curtis v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 233 N.Y. 554.
The mere fact that soap suds were on the stairs and that the step was very slippery during the process of washing the stairs did not make out a cause of action against the defendant.
Kerstein v. Goodman, 130 N.Y. Misc. 714.
Collins Collins, of Laurel, for appellee.
In a case where the evidence is conflicting and the verdict depends upon the weight to be given the testimony of the witnesses, and upon inferences to be drawn from facts proven and the conduct of the parties in interest a reversal will not be granted except for clear and manifest error in the rulings of the court, or where the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
Cox v. Tucker, 97 So. 721.
It cannot be said to be negligence to mop a floor with water. But there are times when it is negligence to mop a floor with water and leave water on the floor.
It would be negligence to do the work at a time when the floor was being used by the public provided the floor was not left reasonably safe for the public to use.
Kress v. Rochward, 134 So. 82.
The appellant had knowledge of the condition at the time it was created because its servants created the condition.
Daisy Blakely was plaintiff in the court below, and recovered a judgment for five hundred dollars for personal injuries caused by slipping and falling upon the floor of the office of the appellant, the Western Union Telegraph Company.
It was claimed that said fall was due to a wet and slippery condition of the floor, and the evidence as to the condition of the floor was in conflict.
A plea of general issue was filed by the defendant, appellant here, with notice thereunder that it would prove that the floor was safe, being covered with "tile tex" a standard floor covering widely used throughout the country, and that the floor was not wet on the occasion complained of, and that the injury, if any, to the plaintiff was due to her own negligence and carelessness, in that she was wearing old shoes with run-down heels, worn slick with use and age, and that she was careless in the way she stepped on said floor and in the way she walked, and that she did not take proper regard for her own safety.
The plaintiff, appellee here, testified that she went to the office of the appellant on business, for the purpose of transmitting some money to a relative, or attending to a matter of that kind; that she went into the office between twelve and one o'clock, and was walking from the front to the desk when she slipped and fell and was injured internally. She also testified that the floor was wet and she saw mop streaks upon the floor, and that its condition was slippery and unsafe; that on former occasions she had seen employees of the company mopping the floor with water and a mop, but did not see the floor mopped on the day in question. She was attended by a physician and remained confined to her house, principally in bed, for about three months. The fact that she was confined to her house was not only testified to by the appellee, but also by others; the physician testifying as to her injuries.
The employees of the appellant testified that the appellee slipped in the office, but did not fall, and that she left the building, and they noticed the floor, and it was not wet or slippery, and some testified as to the condition of the shoes worn by the appellee; that the heels were run under, etc. After the appellee left the office, she went to a lawyer's office and there telephoned the Western Union Telegraph Company to send a car to carry her home, and the car was sent. She also telephoned the physician from the lawyer's office.
The employees further testified that several months prior to the occasion when the appellee fell another person (a Mrs. Nesom) had slipped and fallen onto the floor, and that they had quit mopping the floor with water after that injury, and, at the time the plaintiff was injured, the floor in the office had been cleaned with a wire brush only.
It is insisted that the amount recovered by the appellee should not be allowed, because the judgment is not supported by competent evidence.
In our opinion, this evidence was for the jury's decision and if the jury believed from the evidence that the floor was wet and slick, as testified to by the plaintiff, and that it was an unsafe place for a person to walk, the recovery should be upheld. It was the duty of the telegraph company to have the office in which the public are invited to transact business with and for the benefit of the company kept in a reasonably safe condition. Of course, if the jury believe the testimony for the appellant is the truth, there would be no liability.
A jury having the witnesses before them is better acquainted with their standing and credibility than the judges of this court can be.
We find no reversible error in the proceedings, and the judgment will therefore be affirmed.
Affirmed.