When a party is in possession of facts which she does not see fit to divulge, we do not feel that it is our prerogative to presume proof that she is charged with making. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Mobley, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W. 611, on certified question, 112 Tex. 528, 249 S.W. 182. Bertie Cucote, according to the evidence, never sought after or sent for Fred McQuarters. She never meddled with the McQuarters' family relationship by telephone, by letter, by visits to their home, or by surreptitious dates.
In my opinion, the contents of the message in this case, when considered in connection with the time of the night it was filed, the interest manifested by R. S. McMillion in returning to the telegraph office on Wednesday morning in order to ascertain whether the message had been delivered, and the other evidence herein referred to, was sufficient to raise fact issues on the ultimate controlling question of constructive notice. Consequently, I cannot say, as a matter of law, there was no evidence tending to show that appellant had such notice as to render it liable for the damages complained of. Herring v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 108 Tex. 77, 185 S.W. 293; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Mobley, 112 Tex. 528, 249 S.W. 182; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hartfield, Tex. Civ. App. 138 S.W. 418, error denied; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Riviere, Tex. Civ. App. 174 S.W. 650; Goodson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., Tex. Civ. App. 188 S.W. 736; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lane, Tex. Civ. App. 152 S.W.2d 780.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Coffin, 88 Tex. 94, 95-97, 30 S.W. 896. These rules have been applied in cases where the relationship involved was that of husband or wife, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild. They have also been held applicable where a stepmother had reared her husband's child by a former marriage. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mobley, 112 Tex. 528, 249 S.W. 182, 183. Where the blood relationship between the party to whom or for whose benefit such a message is sent and the deceased is remote, or where such relationship is by affinity only, such acute suffering on account of being deprived of the privilege of attending the funeral of the deceased as is necessary to constitute mental anguish within the legal meaning, of that term is not inferred, because from such knowledge of the laws of human nature such suffering is not the usual and natural result in such cases. Telegraph Company v. Coffin, supra.