Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Preis

20 Citing cases

  1. Moser v. Tex. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co.

    No. 13-19-00452-CV (Tex. App. Sep. 23, 2021)

    The Heirs contend that the "offer to pay" phrase in TFB's Supplemental Payment Provision is ambiguous and that their construction-that the offer must be unconditional- should be adopted. The Heirs first rely on three cases-Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), Baucum v. Great American lnsurance Co., 370 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1963), and Plasky v. Gulf Insurance Co., 335 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1960)-for the proposition that TFB's offers should have been unconditional. These cases posit that an insurance company's tender should be an "unconditional offer by a debtor or obligor to pay another, in current coin of the realm, a sum not less in amount that that due on a specified debt or obligation."

  2. Richard Gill Co. v. Jackson's Landing Owners' Ass'n

    758 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App. 1988)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that demand letter and testimony that demand was made and turned down was sufficient to establish presentment

    No particular form or manner of presentment is required. Ashford Development, Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Services Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. 1983); Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981); Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579, 589 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Manges v. Mustang Oil Tool Co., 658 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The purpose of presentment is to make the opposing party aware that a claim is asserted against him, and to allow him an opportunity to pay the claim or to perform as required and to thereby avoid incurring an obligation for attorney's fees. Carrington v. Hart, 703 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex.App. — Austin 1986, no writ); Various Opportunities, Inc. v. Sullivan Investments, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 115, 119 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1984, no writ); Preis, 695 S.W.2d at 589; Manges, 658 S.W.2d at 730.

  3. Head Industrial Coatings & Services, Inc. v. Maryland Insurance Co.

    981 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App. 1998)   Cited 4 times

    In the Western Casualty case, however, the court explicitly stated that it did not sanction the apparent double recovery of postjudgment interest, but that no point of error was addressed toward that question.Western Cas. Sur. Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Home Indemnity Co. v. Muncy, 449 S.W.2d 312, 315-17 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).Western Cas. Sur. Co., 695 S.W.2d at 591 n. 8.

  4. Carr v. Austin Forty

    744 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. App. 1988)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that letter notifying opposing party of termination of contract and requesting release of letter of credit constituted proper presentment because “[t]he elements of notice, time and proof of amount are all present”

    Id. A) Presentment. The purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the person against whom a claim is asserted an opportunity to pay within 30 days of receiving notice of the claim, without incurring an obligation for attorney's fees. Western Casualty Surety Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579, 589 (Tex.App. 1985, no writ). In order to recover attorney's fees in a suit "founded" on a written contract under this article, a plaintiff must plead and prove that presentment of a contract claim was made to the opposing party and he failed to tender performance.

  5. Texas Nat. Bank v. Sandia Mortg. Corp.

    872 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1989)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that a party's contractual agreement to waive a specific protection the law provides requires specificity, because such a waiver must be an intended relinquishment of a known right

    " Thus, we must liberally construe the attorney's fees chapter as it applies to the situation at hand. See Western Casualty Sur. Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.App. Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref. n.r.e.). 1. Claim for an Oral or Written Contract

  6. Puga v. N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-CV-381 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 25, 2021)

    D.E. 44. A Stowers demand is presentment only of the negligence action, not the contract action on the policy because the contract debt is not yet owed. Sikes v. Zuloaga, 830 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ) (citing Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579, 591 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); see also Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 216 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. 2006) (holding that contract liability under a UM/UIM provision in a policy does not arise until a judgment determines the liability of the tortfeasor in an amount exceeding its insurance coverage). Plaintiffs have not pled a postjudgment demand against New York Marine.

  7. Safeway Ins. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co.

    707 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1997)   Cited 12 times
    Recognizing that "the insurer's control of whether post-judgment interest is incurred requires the insurer to pay such interest on the entire amount of the judgment"

    rev. denied, 641 So.2d 1346 (Fla. 1994); Southeast Atl. Cargo Operators, Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 791, 795, 456 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1995) (same); Hartford Acc. Indem. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 173 Ill. App.3d 665, 123 Ill.Dec. 312, 527 N.E.2d 950 (1988) (same), aff'd, 132 Ill.2d 79, 138 Ill.Dec. 145, 547 N.E.2d 114 (1989); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Milne, 424 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Iowa 1988) (same); Glenn v. Fleming, 247 Kan. 296, 309, 799 P.2d 79, 87-88 (1990) (same); McLemore v. Fox, 565 So.2d 1031, 1037-38 (La.App.) (same), cert. denied, 569 So.2d 966 (La. 1990); Matich v. Modern Research Corp., 430 Mich. 1, 25-27, 420 N.W.2d 67, 77-78 (1988) (same); Stibal v. Carland, 381 N.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Minn.App. 1986) (same); Coventry v. Steve Koren, Inc., 1 Ohio App.2d 385, 205 N.E.2d 18 (same), aff'd, 4 Ohio St.2d 24, 211 N.E.2d 833 (1965); Bossert v. Douglas, 557 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Okla.App. 1976) (same); Incollingo v. Ewing, 474 Pa. 527, 537-38, 379 A.2d 79, 84-85 (1977) (same); Western Cas. Sur. Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.App. 1985) (same); and McPhee v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 57 Wis.2d 669, 205 N.W.2d 152, 159 (1973) (same), with, e.g., Faulkner v. Smith, 747 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1988) (holding that insurer's liability for interest was limited to interest on policy limits); Shnarch v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 144 A.D.2d 795, 535 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1988) (same); Crook v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241 (1960) (same). The Supreme Court of Colorado stated the majority view as follows:

  8. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Milne

    424 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa 1988)   Cited 83 times
    In Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Milne, 424 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa 1988), a liability case, the Iowa court refused to override the parties' contract by allowing prejudgment interest to exceed the policy limits.

    Milne cites extensive authority for the proposition that an insurer is required to pay interest on the entire judgment of its insured, even when the judgment exceeds policy limits, or even if the total payments exceed policy limits. See, e.g., United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Russom, 241 F.2d 296, 303 (5th Cir. 1957); Powell v. T.A. C. Taxi, Inc., 104 N.H. 428, 432, 188 A.2d 654, 656 (1963); Germer v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 99 N.J. Super. 137, 144, 238 A.2d 713, 717 (1967); Western Casualty Sur. Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579, 586 (Tex.App. 1985); McPhee v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 57 Wis.2d 669, 682, 205 N.W.2d 152, 160 (1973). In each case cited, the court was construing the same standard insurance policy interest clause found in Milne's policy under which the insurer agrees to make supplementary payments exceeding the limits of liability for:

  9. Boyaki v. John M. O'Quinn & Assocs., PLLC

    NO. 01-12-00984-CV (Tex. App. Sep. 30, 2014)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that judgment requiring specific performance of material contract right in Rule 11 agreement is award of value sufficient to support attorney's fees award under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001

    " However, neither the filing of a suit, nor the allegation of a demand in the pleadings can, alone, constitute a presentment of a claim or a demand that the claim be paid, within the meaning of section 38.002." Id. (citing W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579, 589 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). If an agreement complies with Rule 11, then the party seeking to enforce the agreement may amend its pleading and add a breach of contract claim on that agreement.

  10. Helping Hands Home Care, Inc. v. Home Health of Tarrant Cnty., Inc.

    393 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. App. 2013)   Cited 45 times
    Holding that agreed order for temporary injunction and agreed extension of temporary restraining order do not meet presentment requirement because neither document “says anything about the proof of the amount owing” and neither document “contains a specific demand from [the defendant] for payment”

    However, neither the filing of a suit, nor the allegation of a demand in the pleadings can, alone, constitute a presentment of a claim or a demand that the claim be paid, within the meaning of section 38.002. Id. (citing W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Preis, 695 S.W.2d 579, 589 (Tex.App.-Waco 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). B. Discussion