Colorado Springs Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. State, 780 P.2d 494, 499 (Colo. 1989) (remanding case to trial court with directions to enter a modified injunctive order); Village of Sister Bay v. Hockers, 317 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Wis.Ct.App. 1982) ("Injunctive relief is ordered in the discretion of the trial court, and this court will not change the trial court's decision in the absence of abuse of discretion."); Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage, 342 P.2d 249, 252 (Cal. 1959); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Chalcraft, 148 N.E.2d 592, 595 (Ill.App.Ct. 1958) ("It is true that courts of review sometimes dissolve or order modification of injunctions on appeal, but this is usually in cases where the chancellor has made some error of law."). The consumer is the ultimate arbiter of what advertising practices are deceptive, 1A L. Altman, Callman's The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 5.04, at 5-32 (4th ed. 1981), and the trial court has the best view of consumer perception.

Although Maas attempts to excuse the deficiency in his allegation of facts by stating that he lacked access to Cohen's books and records, we note that he never requested discovery of documents pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 214 (73 Ill.2d R. 214). Cohen's past history of delayed or withheld payments to Maas and misrepresentation of the status of the negotiations concerning the sale of one restaurant may constitute valid complaints in a suit at law, but they do not qualify Maas for injunctive relief. In a final attempt to overcome the jurisdictional deficiencies of his request for an injunction, Maas cites Western Auto Supply Co. v. Chalcraft (1958), 16 Ill. App.2d 461, 148 N.E.2d 592, and Rosinia v. Gusmano (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 882, 414 N.E.2d 21, as support for his argument that an injunction may issue to prevent a defendant from collecting or receiving money equitably belonging to the plaintiff or dissipating property consisting mainly of money arguably belonging to plaintiff. We find his reliance to be misplaced. While it is true that Maas too wishes to enjoin defendants from collecting and disbursing money allegedly belonging to him, he does not have the same proprietary right to the funds as did the plaintiffs in the cited cases.

While the court did not specifically find that any certain part of said materials belonged to the plaintiff, the defendants' failure to answer or dispute the plaintiff's allegations justified the court in assuming the truth of her claimed interest. (See Schlicksup Drug Co. v. Schlicksup (1970), 129 Ill. App.2d 181.) It is doubtless true, as the defendants argue, that in similar situations the builder might be found to be the legal owner or person in possession of the unused building materials ( Koester v. Huron Development Co. (1962), 25 Ill.2d 337), but the plaintiff's affidavit being unanswered, the allegations therein and the natural inferences flowing therefrom are presumed to be true. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Chalcraft (1958), 16 Ill. App.2d 461. • 2, 3 Thus we may assume that the plaintiff had a clearly ascertained right which needed protection.

The circuit court did not err in applying established equity principles to the Authority's request for preliminary injunctive relief. • 3 Alternatively, citing Western Auto Supply Co. v. Chalcraft (1958), 16 Ill. App.2d 461, 148 N.E.2d 592, the Authority argues that the court under equitable principles, should have granted relief to prevent the improper use of funds. In that case, however, the circuit court granted injunctive relief to preserve the status quo until a trial on the merits.

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 69, par. 1.) The instant appeal is similar to Western Auto Supply Co. v. Chalcraft (4th Dist. 1958), 16 Ill. App.2d 461, 148 N.E.2d 592, in that if the temporary injunctive relief sought by the appellants is denied the cause may proceed to a point where no remedy would be available because of the destruction of one of the corporation's most valuable assets. The plaintiff and counterdefendants established the existence of an emergency situation which would result in imminent and irreparable harm if the status quo of the corporation's resources and preservation of its liquor license were not maintained.

In this type of situation we may not consider for the first time in this appeal the matter of alleged defects in the form of the injunctional order. See Western Auto Supply Co. v. Chalcraft, 16 Ill. App.2d 461, 465-466, 148 N.E.2d 592, where this court refused to consider the contention that an order for temporary injunction was too broad in its scope so as to create an unnecessary hardship because this question had never been submitted to the trial court. Therefore, we will not consider the questions raised by defendant concerning alleged errors in the form of the injunctional order.

In our case Tugmen's has chosen to make use of a more potent arsenal. It is not required that a plaintiff seeking a temporary injunction make out a case that is certain to prevail on final hearing, it is enough if there is shown a fair question as to the existence of the rights claimed, so that the court is satisfied their present state should be preserved until final hearing and disposition. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Chalcraft, 16 Ill. App.2d 461, 464, 148 N.E.2d 592; O'Brien v. Matual, 14 Ill. App.2d 173, 186, 188, 144 N.E.2d 446. The order of the Superior Court granting the temporary injunction is affirmed.