" (Emphasis supplied.) In Western Amusement v. Springfield, 274 Or. 37, 545 P.2d 592 (1976), the court discussed the scope of review in cases of this nature: "We have reviewed special assessments in all sorts of proceedings, — writs of review, suits for injunction, declaratory judgments, and suits to quiet title.

Gilbert v. City of Eugene, 255 Or. 289, 292, 465 P.2d 880 (1970). To the same effect see Wing v. City of Eugene, 249 Or. 367, 437 P.2d 836 (1968); Stanley v. City of Salem, 247 Or. 60, 427 P.2d 406 (1967); Boyle v. City of Bend, 234 Or. 91, 380 P.2d 625 (1963); Western Amusement v. Springfield, 21 Or. App. 7, 533 P.2d 825 (1975), aff'd 274 Or. 37. 546 P.2d 592 (1976). Thus, while it is axiomatic both that special assessments can be levied only upon property which is "specially benefited" by the improvement for which the levy is passed and that in order to specially benefit property the improvement must bring to it a benefit substantially more intense than that which is realized by land not assessed, the scope of judicial review on those questions has traditionally been relatively narrow.

' " The following month, the council adopted ordinances Nos. 1042 and 1043, levying special assessments in accordance with the amended Ordinance No. 842 formula in the respective sewer districts where plaintiffs' properties are located. Plaintiffs' arguments fail to segregate or distinguish two very different issues: first, whether the legislative assessment formula of the ordinances is impermissibly discriminatory or otherwise unlawful; and, second, whether the particular special assessments levied on plaintiffs' properties were made consistently with the procedural and evidentiary requirements to which such quasi-judicial determinations are subject. See, e.g., Western Amusement v. Springfield, 274 Or. 37, 545 P.2d 592 (1976). Our review of the first issue would be subject to a minimal scrutiny test, essentially equivalent to the rational basis test which applies when tax or other socio-economic legislation is challenged on equal protection grounds.

When proceeding on a writ of review, the role of the court is to determine whether the order under scrutiny is supported by substantial evidence. See Western Amusement v. Springfield, 274 Or. 37, 40, 545 P.2d 592 (1976). In Western Amusement we pointed out, however, that the "substantial evidence rule" is, in reality, a variable rule.

See, e.g., Chrysler Corp., 25 Or App at 367. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also has said that the location of an improvement on or near a parcel is at least some evidence that the property has been or will be benefited. Western Amusement v. Springfield, 274 Or. 37, 46, 545 P.2d 592 (1976). 4. Plaintiff insists that it is unreasonable for the city to conclude that his property enjoys a benefit from the construction of the sewer line, because his property is currently undeveloped and used only for horse grazing.

However, a city's final determination that certain property has been benefited and the amount of the benefit is subject to judicial review by way of writ-of-review proceedings. ORS 223.401; ORS 224.065; Western Amusement v. Springfield, 274 Or. 37, 545 P.2d 592 (1976); Stanley v. City of Salem, supra, 247 Or at 64. "* * * [O]wners of any property against which an assessment for local improvements has been imposed may seek a review thereof under the provisions of ORS 34.010 to 34.100 [the writ-of-review statutes]."

None of the opinions purported to reject the Universal Camera/Stork Restaurant formulation of the "substantial evidence" test, and in several opinions, the court noted the weakness of contrary evidence in upholding the decision under review. E.g., Menges v. Bd. of Comm., supra, 290 Or at 264; Western Amusement v. Springfield, 274 Or. 37, 44-46, 545 P.2d 592 (1976).Cf. City of Portland v. Bureau of Labor and Ind., 298 Or. 104, 690 P.2d 475 (1984).

Declaratory judgment proceeding ordered dismissed because the writ of review procedure should have been pursued. Western Amusement v. Springfield, 274 Or. 37, 545 P.2d 592 (1976). Writ of review proceeding involved review of a special street assessment.

Petitioners also contend that there was no "reliable, probative and substantial" evidence to support the finding by the Hearings Council and by the Board of Commissioners that approval of the conditional use permit for construction of the sewage treatment plant "will not be injurious to property and improvements in the area," as required by Article VI, § 1.2 of the Jackson County Zoning Ordinance. The question to be decided, however, is whether there was "substantial" evidence to support that finding, and this court is precluded from setting aside that finding if it is supported by substantial evidence. In Western Amusement v. Springfield, 274 Or. 37, 40, 545 P.2d 592 (1976), this court held that the words "reliable, probative and substantial" as then used in the writ of review statute, ORS 34.040, "mean `substantial' evidence." Indeed, ORS 34.040 (3) has been amended so as to now refer to findings "not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

We will not substitute our judgment for that of the administrative body if such evidence is found to exist. Public Utilities Commission v. Northwest Water Corp. (1969), 168 Colo. 154, 451 P.2d 266; Western Amusement Co., Inc. v. City of Springfield (1976), 274 Or. 37, 545 P.2d 592; Standard Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Employment Security Div. (1980), 185 Mont. 241, 605 P.2d 610. As to the first two grounds upon which the Board decided to revoke appellant's license, appellant makes no argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence.